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Getting to Grips with EU citizenship: 
understanding the friction between EU free 
movement law and UK immigration law
Executive Summary and Briefing Note 
Introduction
There are still major difficulties 
with the effective implementation 
of EU free movement law in 
all EU Member States. These 
challenges are not just practical 
ones about the application of the 
law by administrators and courts, 
but they also have a legal cultural 
dimension. It is hard to say that 
there is already a fully functioning 
common citizenship area, as 
part of the broader EU internal 
market despite the fact that the 
free movement rules make the 
EU the largest laboratory for 
human mobility in the world. 
Also, EU free movement is 
not hermetically sealed off 
from broader debates about 
immigration, and so is affected 
by policy changes and popular 
perceptions about immigration 
and immigrants. This project 
has explored these challenges 
by looking at EU free movement 
law and UK immigration law, by 
seeing how they overlap and 
interact, and by studying the 
frictions that arise between them. 
It has also reviewed the context 
in which EU policies such as free 
movement rights operate. The 
research studied both materials 
explaining the current state of 
EU and UK law, with a particular 
focus on primary materials 
such as recent case law of the 
EU court and the UK tribunal 
system, and also incorporated 
the findings from interviews 
with members of important 
stakeholder groups to ask them 
to explain how they saw the 
relationship between the two 
systems evolving. EU law and 
the relevant UK implementing 
measures continue to evolve 
rapidly, and we have attempted 
in this research project to 
present a dynamic picture of the 
law and its application.
Although EU citizenship is a 
political priority of the current 
European Commission and free 
movement of persons, especially 
for economic reasons such as 
work and self-employment but 
also for leisure and study, is a 
professed goal of all Member 
States, in practice when EU 
citizens attempt to exercise 
their citizenship rights by living 
and working (or studying) in 
other Member States, they 
often face many legal, practical 
and cultural obstacles. The 
complaints they make to the EU 
institutions help us to see the 
pattern of obstacles. But we can 
also find out more by looking 
at how the UK institutions work. 
For example, a high rate of 
refusals of applications by EEA 
applicants by the UK Borders 
Agency acting on behalf of the 
Home Office can be seen in 
recent years, especially those 
applications made by the family 
members of EU citizens. But 
there has also been a high 
rate of successful appeals 
against those refusals within the 
tribunals and courts systems, 
suggesting that something may 
be amiss in the decision-making 
matrix. Also, in the UK, the 
increasingly negative attitudes 
within public opinion towards 
both immigration and the UK’s 
membership of the European 
Union has raised sensitivities 
about EU free movement, 
especially with the impending 
removal of the transitional 
measures restricting access to 
the labour market for EU citizens 
from Romania and Bulgaria 
at the end of 2013. But there 
is very little informed attention 
directed to the detailed issues 
by bodies that could hold the 
UKBA to account, such as 
Committees of the UK Houses 
of Parliament, when it comes 
to the application of EU law. 
There is plenty of negative press 
coverage, but not very much of it 
cites the extensive research that 
has been done about the fiscal 
and economic consequences 
of migration from the new post-
2004 and 2007 Member States 
of the EU or provides robust 
evidence about the numbers 
of current and future citizens of 
those states taking advantage, 
or likely to take advantage, of the 
free movement rules.
vThe research
To unpick the issues raised in more detail, the 
research addressed three descriptive and 
analytical questions and one normative 
question:
1. In which areas do we see particular frictions 
between the systems of EU free movement law 
and UK immigration law?
2. What are the principal dimensions of these 
frictions, in the sense of how they play out in 
both legal structures and popular discourse?
3. Can we identify the possible causes of those 
frictions? In particular, do they stem from causes 
within the legal systems in question, or are they 
the result of external factors impacting upon how 
free movement law operates in the UK?
4. What types of measures or approaches might 
alleviate the friction between the systems and 
thus give rise to more effective implementation 
of EU free movement law in the UK?
Addressing these questions led to four 
key findings and to conclusions and 
recommendations about the best way forward in 
the future to ensure better fit between the UK and 
EU legal systems, and to promote the EU as a 
‘common citizenship area’.
Key Finding 1
We found that there are four 
main areas where we can see 
evidence of high levels of misfit 
or friction between EU law 
and UK law in the area of free 
movement:
•	 residence rights, especially 
in relation to third country 
national family members of 
EU citizens/EEA nationals;
•	 problems of access to 
welfare relating to the 
application of the ‘right to 
reside’ test;
•	 problems of ‘probity’ and the 
perceived need to distinguish 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
migrants;
•	 issues raised by the 
transitional or special 
regimes for certain groups of 
citizens (new Member State 
citizens and Turkish citizens).
Illustrating our findings with 
stories drawing on legal 
materials and coverage of the 
relevant issues in the press, 
what we saw in each case 
was that there were significant 
differences between the way 
that the law was applied by the 
UK authorities, especially the 
UK Borders Agency and the 
interpretations put forward by the 
European Commission and the 
Court of Justice. In a number of 
occasions, the UK law had been 
found not to be in compliance 
with EU law, but adjustment of 
practices at the national level 
was slow in arriving.
The common factor for each 
of these areas was that 
they pose challenges to the 
boundaries between EU free 
movement law, based on 
facilitative principles and rights 
such as ‘equal treatment’ and 
national immigration control, 
based on limited permissions 
which continue to draw stark 
distinctions between the citizen 
and the alien. EU law, in contrast, 
breaks down those distinctions 
through the protection it provides 
for migrant EU citizens. The 
‘edges’ of EU free movement 
law and UK immigration law 
each need careful study to 
help us understand how they 
operate in relation to each other, 
both in terms of legal doctrinal 
questions, but also in terms 
of differing legal cultures. EU 
free movement law is rights-
based and UK immigration 
law is permissions-based. UK 
judges dealing with (national) 
immigration matters are 
accustomed to finding that the 
national rules provide exhaustive 
answers to most questions, 
and/or leave wide discretion 
to decision-makers. This is not 
the case with EU law on free 
movement. These differences 
matter when the two systems 
come into close contact, and 
close attention should be paid 
to these matters both in terms 
of differences of legal doctrine 
and also of perceptions and 
approaches of stakeholders and 
‘users’ within legal institutions.
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Key Finding 2
We found that particular 
problems arise as regards the 
extent to which the ‘culture’ 
of EU free movement is 
effectively embedded into UK 
law and legal/administrative 
practice. We found that there 
continued to be some degree 
of reluctance on the part of 
decision-makers fully to accept 
the rights-based character of 
EU law. The impact of this is 
most obvious where claimants 
are seeking to rely on the very 
‘edges’ of free movement law, 
e.g. a third country national 
family member of a migrant 
EU citizen, or an EU citizen 
with residence rights seeking 
to resist a post-imprisonment 
removal order that would 
normally be upheld if the person 
in question was a third country 
national with no EU connections. 
Sometimes this means relying 
on the more controversial or 
contested parts of the EU’s 
Citizens’ Rights Directive, such 
as the provisions protecting 
extended family members, or 
the provisions on removal for 
reasons of public security or 
public policy, but sometimes 
applicants also have to rely 
directly upon EU citizenship 
rights or upon the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. Here 
lack of familiarity with elements 
of EU law beyond the confines 
of the Citizens’ Rights Directive 
and the UK Regulations on the 
part of decision-makers with 
responsibilities for applying and 
interpreting EU law (the UKBA 
and, in some circumstances, 
the courts/tribunals) plays a role 
in undermining the capacity of 
these parties to make correct 
decisions, within the timescales 
laid down by EU law.  We found 
that these problems raised both 
training issues for decision-
makers, but also legal cultural 
issues relating to the character 
of EU law as separate from 
immigration law.
Key Finding 3
Our research showed that internal system-level 
frictions represent a very significant challenge to 
the effective implementation of EU free movement 
law within the UK. These relate to the character 
of the two systems, and the way in which rules 
are applied by decision-makers. For example, 
it was widely felt that some of the cultures of 
immigration law, which see the credibility of the 
claimant being placed at the heart of the enquiry, 
had ‘seeped’ or ‘leaked’ into EU free movement 
law, where a factual enquiry alone based on the 
principles of EU law is normally the central task 
of the decision-maker.  Beyond that enquiry, the 
decision-maker has relatively little discretion in 
EU law, and the burden of showing that there is 
a substantive reason to doubt, for example, that 
the applicant is the person she says she is, or 
has the family relationship she claims she has, 
lies with the authorities. However, the evidence 
to be drawn from recent judgments of the Upper 
Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), 
which has shown itself ready both to admonish 
the UKBA for obvious errors and to refer difficult 
and unresolved questions on the interpretation 
of the Citizens’ Rights Directive to the Court of 
Justice for decision, suggests that over time 
some of the legal problems of implementation 
identified by the research may be decreasing in 
scope and significance. This is important given 
that the numbers of persons exercising EU free 
movement rights has grown considerably since 
the enlargements of the EU in 2004 and 2007, 
although it would be wrong to assume that all the 
difficulties that arise with decision-making relate 
solely to citizens of those states.
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Key Finding 4
In addition to internal system-level friction, problems of friction 
can also stem from exogenous causes such as the politicisation 
of immigration and of attitudes towards the EU in the UK, media 
coverage on these matters, and the UK’s powerful ‘border identity’ 
as an island state which has negotiated itself an opt-out from 
membership of the Schengen zone and the development of certain 
policies which flow from the creation of a borderless Europe, 
including most aspects of external immigration policy. This identity, 
combined with the hostility shown in sections of the press both 
to some aspects of EU free movement and also to European 
integration more generally, has led to a broad public opinion 
consensus at the present time which is wary of free movement, so far 
as it concerns flows into the UK. In fact, immigration issues and EU 
issues were both identified as problematic areas in terms of press 
coverage in the 2012 Leveson Inquiry on the Culture, Practices and 
Ethics of the Press. These factors, which may be on the increase, 
could act as a possible counterweight to the evidence noted above 
of a new approach to EU free movement law which is thus far most 
evident in the case law of the Upper Tribunal. The prospective easing 
of the transitional restrictions on the access of citizens of Bulgaria 
and Romania to the UK labour market at the end of 2013 has been 
a particular cause of controversy and debate in the press, with the 
potential to spill over into the application of the law.
Conclusions
Perceptions about EU free movement are changing, in both popular 
and political discourse, and this is reflected in what appear to be 
increasingly adversarial relationships around the construction of 
the boundaries of EU free movement rights and the relationships 
between EU law and UK law, in spite of the best efforts of the Upper 
Tribunal to clarify many aspects of the law. In fact, even the courts 
have commented upon the adversarial positions taken by Home 
Office employees from time to time. Our research was not limited 
to observing the internal system-level aspects of friction, as we 
had expected at the outset, but rather it led on quite organically 
in our interviews to discussions about how the UKBA works, what 
resources it has and how it trains decision-makers, all as part and 
parcel of an administrative justice system. Looked at in these terms, 
many of our interviewees felt that it does not match up to the highest 
standards such as those set by the Administrative Justice Tribunals 
Council Report Right First Time.
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Recommendations
We concluded that these structural difficulties and 
the adversarial relationships emerging around 
the concept of EU free movement needed to be 
addressed urgently because these are having a 
corrosive effect upon the effective implementation 
of EU law. This has costs not only for citizens of 
other Member States who come to the UK but also 
potentially for UK citizens who themselves benefit 
from free movement rights. Challenges in the UK 
to EU citizens’ rights could lead to difficulties for 
UK citizens in other Member States. In addition, 
as is widely recognised, free movement goes to 
the very core of EU law and does not represent 
some sort of optional competence for which the 
UK could easily leverage an opt out. While training 
and awareness raising can help to militate some 
of the most egregious effects of poor decision-
making that is unfortunately evident in the written 
record of the law at present, we felt that there 
was an urgent to need to discuss in more detail 
the institutional arrangements for the application 
of EU law in the UK. It is well established in the 
UK that there are very few specific vehicles for 
the implementation of EU law, and this is true for 
the administration of free movement rights which 
are the responsibility of the UK Borders Agency 
under the broader aegis of the Home Office. There 
is little about the public face of these institutions 
which might lead the casually enquiring EU citizen 
at present to conclude that they evinced an open 
attitude towards the possibilities of free movement. 
In practice, the specific responsibilities of these 
bodies relating to EU law are not fully visible to the 
outside world, with the material made available on 
the UKBA/Home Office website often confusing 
in character. What is more, issues raised by the 
proper implementation of free movement law are 
not often picked up and tested out by bodies such 
as the Committees of the House of Commons 
and Lords that have responsibility for scrutiny and 
accountability matters in relation to both EU affairs 
and immigration more generally. There continues 
to be a significant lack of awareness about what 
EU free movement means, who it benefits and 
how, and what its costs might be, even though 
there is a substantial body of robust research-
based evidence there to be drawn on by those 
who wish to seek it out.
Towards a citizenship champion
To overcome these obstacles, we propose the 
creation of a new office of EU free movement 
or citizenship ‘champion’. The role of this 
‘Ombudsman-like’ office would be to support the 
effective development of a common citizenship 
area in a manner that promotes joined up policy-
making and enhances the flow of information 
between government institutions and those who 
rely upon the law. It would not be to supplant the 
current decision-making processes, but it would 
help to ensure that the ‘EU flag’ was clearly visible 
when so-called EEA decisions are taken by the 
UK authorities, or when the information necessary 
for EU citizens to make effective use of their 
free movement rights is made available through 
websites or other outlets. As with the investment 
in the creation of specific institutions which aim to 
protect human rights, raise awareness of issues 
around discrimination on grounds of sex, race 
or other protected characteristics, or even act as 
a strategic litigant in key court cases, innovative 
institutional solutions bringing together expertise 
with political will can, without great expense, 
give visibility to certain issues which are often 
misreported in the media.
Even with limited powers to provide information, 
act as an advice and reference service offering 
assured levels of expertise, and operate as the 
EU conscience of UK decision-makers, this new 
institution can bring great benefits. It can, in sum, 
act as the single reference point for EU citizens 
both arriving in or departing from the UK to ensure 
that they enjoy the full benefits of the common 
citizenship area and promote a profound and 
much needed culture change in this area.
Jo Shaw | University of Edinburgh
Nina Miller | University of Glasgow
Maria Fletcher | University of Glasgow
1Section 1: Introduction
1. This research report presents the results 
of a Nuffield Foundation funded study1 
aimed at building a better understanding 
of how precisely the European Union’s free 
movement rules take effect in the United 
Kingdom. The primary focus is upon the 
tensions that arise specifically between 
the EU free movement rules and United 
Kingdom immigration law. It should be 
recalled, however, that EU free movement 
law also operates at times in tension with 
other areas of national law such as social 
welfare law, taxation law, criminal law and 
criminal procedure, and even family law. 
Whilst it is apparent that very large numbers 
of EU citizens resident in the UK exercise 
their EU citizenship rights in the UK without 
encountering any particular difficulties, even a 
brief review of the case law of the UK and EU 
courts, the work and outputs of advocacy and 
advisory organisations, the scholarly literature 
and recent media coverage makes it clear 
that there have been some difficulties within 
the system for some groups of EU citizens 
and their family members resident in the UK 
(or wanting to be so resident). More than just 
a pure implementation or compliance report, 
our research has tried to go below the surface 
of the interaction between the systems. 
It has addressed three key questions 
of description and analysis followed by 
one additional question regarding the 
consequences and conclusions which flow 
from the research:
a. In which areas do we see particular frictions 
between the systems of EU free movement law 
and UK immigration law?
b. What are the principal dimensions of these 
frictions, in the sense of how they play out in 
both legal structures and popular discourse?
c. Can we identify the possible causes of those 
frictions? In particular, do they stem from 
causes within the legal systems in question, or 
are they the result of external factors impacting 
upon how free movement law operates in the 
UK?
d. What types of measures or new approaches 
might alleviate the friction between the 
systems and thus give rise to a better and 
more effective implementation of EU free 
movement law in the UK?
2. We will address those questions by reviewing 
the relevant legal and policy background to 
the implementation of the free movement 
rules in the UK (Sections 2-4), exploring the 
different ways in which EU law and national 
law interact with each other (Section 6), 
and by presenting the data from a series of 
semi-structured interviews with stakeholders 
who engage directly with the application 
of EU free movement law in practice 
interwoven with commentary drawn from 
other primary materials such as case law 
and legislation (Section 7-8). We present 
only a limited snapshot of the relevant and 
very extensive legislation and case law on 
EU free movement and its application in the 
UK, because of restrictions of space in this 
report. Our intention is rather to map the key 
features of the legal landscape.2 Reference 
is made, where necessary, to more detailed 
commentary on these matters in the footnotes 
and the bibliography. We have also made use 
of secondary data on perceptions of EU free 
movement in the UK, where this is available, 
including press coverage.
1. Friction and Overlap between European Union Free Movement Rules and Immigration Law in the United Kingdom.
2. The methods used both in the ‘mapping’ exercise and in the empirical section of the research are discussed in more detail in Section 9 below.
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3. The wider context of our research is that of 
EU citizenship. 2013 – the 20th anniversary 
of the Treaty of Maastricht and thus of the 
inception of EU citizenship – is the European 
Year of Citizens3 and the 2009-2014 Barroso 
Commission has made citizenship a political 
priority. As the Commission has made clear 
in a report in 2010,4 citizenship of the Union 
should be a means whereby citizens can 
confront the obstacles to enjoying the full fruits 
of the single market in their daily lives. Based 
on their own extensive research,5 the examples 
offered in the Commission’s practical 
programmes for developing citizenship rights 
(e.g. ‘25 Actions to Improve the Daily Lives of 
Citizens’ in the EU Citizenship Report 2010 
and ’20 Main Concerns’ developed as part of 
seeing the single market through the ‘lens’ of 
the people6) are organised not according to 
the traditional legal categories of EU law (free 
movement rights, especially for economically 
active groups such as migrant workers; 
rights to non-discrimination; harmonisation 
of national laws, etc.), but according to ‘real 
life’ engagement with the single market in its 
widest sense. This important shift in approach 
means engaging with common sense social 
categories of how cross-border activities 
occur: e.g. through the everyday lives of 
international families, of students studying 
abroad, of consumers purchasing goods or 
services, and of holidaymakers and other 
travellers. It also includes such activities as 
paying taxes, voting, or participation in crime 
(as victim or perpetrator) where these have a 
cross border dimension, alongside the other 
more conventional economic categories 
such as working, self-employment and 
provision or receipt of services. Such acts or 
engagements, even though cross-border in 
character, may not always involve physical 
cross-border mobility, since many exchanges 
are virtual or electronic. All of this means, of 
course, that the enjoyment of rights under 
EU law is dependent upon implementation 
through many fields of national law beyond 
the obvious areas (e.g. immigration, welfare, 
employment, taxation, consumer) including 
family law, criminal law and procedure, civil 
procedure, not to mention various areas of 
executive action, such as consular protection 
and naturalisation processes, most of which 
lie beyond the scope of this research. It will 
also necessarily involve many different types 
of public and private sector organisations and 
actors, although in this research we limit our 
focus to public authorities only.
4. According to 2012 Eurostat figures,7  of the 
UK’s total population of just under 63m 
persons, around 7.2% or 4.48m were not UK 
citizens, and of these 3.3% of the population, 
or 2.06m persons were citizens of other 
EU Member States. Although the UK’s 
percentage of non-national EU citizens is 
not especially high (the same as Germany; 
considerably lower than Spain or Ireland), its 
absolute numbers are amongst the highest 
in the EU, as the UK is one of the EU’s most 
populous countries, after Germany and 
France. Detailed statistics about EEA national 
arrivals and departures, plus figures relating 
to the participation of citizens of Bulgaria and 
Romania in the UK labour market, as well as 
grants of residence permits to EEA nationals 
are published quarterly by the Home Office.8
3. Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Year of Citizens (2013), COM(2011) 489. Press Release, “It’s about 
Europe. It’s about you. Join the debate” – 2013 is the ‘European Year of Citizens’, IP/12/1253, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1253_en.htm. Details 
are to be found at http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/european-year-of-citizens-2013/index_en.htm.
4. EU Citizenship Report 2010: Dismantling the obstacles to EU citizens’ rights, COM(2010) 603.
5. E.g. Commission Staff Working Paper, The Single Market through the lens of the people: A snapshot of citizens’ and businesses’ 20 main concerns, 
SEC(2011) 1003, August 16 2011.
6. Single Market through the lens of people: a snapshot of citizens’ and businesses’ views and concerns, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/strategy/index_
en.htm#20concerns, 2011, last accessed 29 January 2012
7. See Nearly two-thirds of the foreigners living in EU Member States are citizens of countries outside the EU-27, Eurostat statistics in focus, 31/2012, http://epp.
eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-12-031/EN/KS-SF-12-031-EN.PDF. These figures had risen from those published in 2011, where they were 
respectively 4.36m non-UK citizen residents, of which 1.92m were EU citizens. See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-11-034/EN/KS-
SF-11-034-EN.PDF. 
8. See http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/immigration-asylum-research/. 
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5. During the forty years of the UK’s membership 
of what we now call the European Union, the 
free movement of persons has generally been 
understood as a bulwark of the European 
integration project. In the EU institutions 
themselves, for sure, but also within the 
Member States, it has widely been regarded 
as a relatively uncontroversial foundation 
stone of the single market, which extends also 
to goods, services and capital. It was rarely 
called into question by national institutions 
or within broader public opinion or media 
coverage. In fact, for many years, it received 
little attention at all beyond administrative and 
legal circles. 
6. Despite the many treaty amendments since 
their inception in 1958, and the supplanting 
of the EU and EC Treaties with the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
on the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon 
in December 2009,9 the key free movement 
principles have been preserved more or less 
intact since the moment when the EEC Treaty 
came into force. They can now be found in 
Articles 45, 49 and 56 TFEU. While the right of 
free movement as laid down in the EEC Treaty 
originally covered the categories of workers, 
self-employed persons and providers of 
services, subsequent developments through 
amending treaty provisions, secondary 
legislation and the case law of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
have seen the scope of coverage extended 
to cover aspects of the movement and 
residence of almost all EU citizens and their 
family members (whether EU citizens or third 
country nationals). This means the inclusion of 
categories such as students, retired persons, 
work seekers and persons of independent 
means, all of whom can reside in other 
Member States, albeit under conditions. The 
range of rights and the extent of protection 
against discrimination on grounds of 
nationality have widened considerably, and 
the list of rights granted has even extended 
into the political sphere since the Treaty of 
Maastricht. None the less, the restrictive 
economic character of the original provisions 
of the Treaty still prevails to some extent, 
as free movement rights – or in particular 
residence rights and certain rights which may 
flow from stable and continued residence 
such as access to full welfare state protection 
– are not extended unconditionally to those 
persons who are not capable of maintaining 
themselves without recourse to state support.
7. However, the concept of EU citizenship, 
enshrined in the EU treaties since the 
Treaty of Maastricht of 1993, gives a certain 
constitutional character to the idea of the EU 
as a space of free movement and also – in 
certain respects – of solidarity amongst the 
Member States. Article 20(2) TFEU indeed 
suggests that the starting point is that all EU 
citizens must benefit from EU free movement:
‘Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights 
and be subject to the duties provided for in 
the Treaties. They shall have, inter alia: 
(a) the right to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the Member States...’
 The existence of a right of free movement has 
been the primary focus of the interpretation 
given by the CJEU to this provision since 
the Baumbast case where the Court held 
that this provision was directly effective 
and could be relied upon in national courts 
against the national authorities.10 Later on in 
the same provision, another clause seems 
to provide some space for Member States to 
restrict citizenship rights in the same ways as 
they have retained the power to restrict free 
movement rights:
9. This text refers throughout to the post-Treaty of Lisbon organisation of the Treaty provisions and article numbering.
10. Case C-413/99 Baumbast, [2002] ECR I-7091; Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECR I-6279; Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] ECR I-9925; Case C-34/09 
Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-1177; Case C-256/11 Dereci, Heiml, Kokollari, Maduike and Stevic, 15 November 2011.
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‘These rights shall be exercised in 
accordance with the conditions and limits 
defined by the Treaties and by the measures 
adopted thereunder.’
 It is the balance between the obligations of 
the Member States to ensure rights of free 
movement and residence to EU citizens and 
their families regardless of national citizenship 
and the residual power of those same states 
to impose limitations or restrictions on those 
rights which lies at the heart of many debates 
about exactly what EU citizenship means 
today. This raises questions about the extent 
of the solidarity which must exist between 
the Member States as regards any possible 
costs which accrue from the exercise of free 
movement rights if any sort of notion of EU 
citizenship is to function effectively. And more 
broadly it challenges us to consider whether 
the EU is now a political and social union 
based, inter alia, on citizenship rather than 
simply an economic union based essentially 
on trading relationships. Such restrictions do 
still allow the Member States legitimately to 
deny the right of free movement to persons 
who become an unreasonable burden on the 
state or who represent an unreasonable threat 
to public policy or public security. Removals 
can occur under the latter headings even – in 
very limited circumstances – if the EU citizens 
in question have the permanent right of 
residence under the Citizens’ Rights Directive 
(CRD).11 Any such restrictions must, however, 
be proportionate.12
8. This constitutional structure is also supported 
by the general features which characterise the 
relationship between EU law and national law. 
This phenomenon is generally known as the 
idea of the ‘constitutionalised treaty’ because 
of the way in which the CJEU has interpreted 
the effects of the EU treaties as being different 
to those of other international treaties. So 
where there is a conflict between EU law and 
national law, the former must take precedence, 
and national courts and administrative 
authorities are under a duty to apply EU law 
and to ensure that individuals are able to rely 
upon their rights derived directly under EU 
law. These are the well known principles of 
supremacy and direct effect and they have 
been of considerable significance in the field of 
free movement law because they have made it 
possible for EU citizens to enforce their rights 
against the Member States in national courts 
which can then be referred to the CJEU for an 
interpretation of EU law, rather than relying on 
the Commission to bring enforcement actions 
in the CJEU against states which do not 
comply with their obligations. These features 
are more or less effectively picked up and 
taken into UK law through a combination of 
the European Communities Act 1972 and the 
generally receptive approach to key concepts 
such as supremacy, direct effect and the duty 
to give a concordant interpretation of national 
law in the light of EU law given by most UK 
courts, including the House of Lords (and 
more recently the Supreme Court).
9. While the application of EU law in practice – 
whether in the UK or in other Member States 
– was never wholly satisfactory, the general 
principles of EU free movement law and the 
widespread acceptance of those principles 
(if not their honouring in every case) had not 
really seemed to be under serious threat since 
the beginning of the 1970s. In recent years, 
the situation has changed. It is arguable that 
some of the difficulties with regard to the 
application of EU free movement law can 
be dated to 2004 and the accession of eight 
Member States from central and eastern 
Europe, followed by a further two states 
from that region in 2007.13 The differences in 
labour market costs and GDP between the 
11. Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the Member States, OJ 2004 L158/77. The abbreviation ‘CRD’ is one used primarily by academic scholars and other commentators and it is not 
used by the European Commission, which refers generally to the ‘Free Movement Directive’, or ‘FMD’ in its documentation, perhaps responding to Member 
State sensibilities in this area. On the other hand, the connection between this directive and the filling out of the concept of citizenship of the Union through 
legislative action and judicial interpretation is clear.
12. N. Nic Shuibhne ‘The Outer Limits of EU Citizenship: Displacing Economic Free Movement Rights’, in C. Barnard and P. Odudu, The Outer Limits of European 
Union Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 167-195.
13. So-called A8 or EU8 = Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia; A2 or EU2 = Bulgaria, Romania.
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seemed likely to place some new demands 
upon the system of free movement as it 
had operated since the end of the original 
transitional period. Certainly the eagerness 
of many Member States (but not the UK with 
the 2004 accession) to restrict the access of 
the citizens of those states to their domestic 
labour markets during a lengthy transitional 
period imposed by the accession treaties, 
when viewed in combination with some media 
coverage of and popular conceptions about 
the mobility of that group of EU citizens, 
would seem to suggest as much. In addition, 
it would seem that the implementation of the 
2004 CRD, with its novelties such as the right 
of permanent residence, has raised particular 
problems as the Commission’s 2008 report on 
the implementation of the CRD makes clear.14 
The acceptance of EU free movement has also 
been significantly challenged by the economic 
problems and high levels of unemployment 
in many states – and thus the pressures on 
wages for existing ‘sedentary’ workers – since 
the banking crisis first erupted in 2008 and 
during the period of significant austerity, 
especially in those states in the Eurozone 
which have had to have recourse to bailouts.15 
The prolonged jobs crisis has brought to the 
fore one of the key controversies of labour 
migration, namely what impact it has on 
jobs and wages overall both in the host and 
the sending country. In that context, the EU 
continues to be one of the most significant 
laboratories for understanding the effects of 
economic migration which the world has ever 
seen.16
10. Yet at the same time, despite these new 
controversies, EU free movement is such a 
‘regular’ issue for many people and in many 
contexts, as a result of student mobility, leisure 
and work travel, the free movement of goods 
and services, etc. This is true to the extent 
that any form of obstacle to such regular 
exchanges, however seemingly trivial,17 can 
engender a great deal of comment if it reaches 
the attention of the media. The character of 
such attention would seem to add weight to 
the view sometimes expressed that EU free 
movement rights, and EU citizenship more 
generally, largely benefit the mobile middle 
class citizens of the Member States, at the 
expense of those who are poor, socially and 
economically marginalised or members of 
ethnic minorities, for whom solidarity may 
be as important as equal treatment. The UK 
has not been the only state reaching for the 
toolkit of protectionism, or acting in denial of 
certain free movement rights in recent years. 
In addition to a pilot in the UK aimed at the 
removal of some homeless and destitute new 
Member State citizens, discussed in Story 
Three below, recent incidents have included 
threats on the part of the UK to deny the right 
to exercise free movement rights to Greek 
citizens seeking to exercise their mobility rights 
in the event of the departure of that state from 
the Eurozone,18 and more worryingly, in the 
sense that they have resulted in substantial 
numbers of EU citizens actually being removed 
from the host Member State, steps taken by 
France and Italy to remove larger groups of 
Roma migrants on the grounds that they were 
occupying illegal camps or because they were 
somehow associated in the public perception 
with crime and illegality. The expulsion of 
14. European Commission Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and 
their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States Brussels, 10 December 2008 COM(2008) 840.
15. See A. Lazarowicz, ‘A dangerous UK consensus on free movement of workers in the EU’, EPC Commentary, 21 March 2013, http://www.epc.eu/documents/
uploads/pub_3421_a_dangerous_uk_consensus_on_free_movement_of_workers_in_the_eu.pdf.  
16. See M. Benton and M. Petrovic, ‘How Free is Free Movement? Drivers and Dynamics of Mobility within the European Union’, Migration Policy Institute Europe, 
March 2013, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MPIEurope-FreeMovement-Drivers.pdf. 
17. ‘Diplomatic spat over Edinburgh pub’s refusal to accept EU identity card’, http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/home-news/diplomatic-spat-over-edinburgh-
pubs-refusal-to-accept-eu-identity-card.17243655. 
18. See the report on the views of the Home Secretary: ‘Theresa May: we’ll stop migrants if euro collapses’, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/
immigration/9291493/Theresa-May-well-stop-migrants-if-euro-collapses.html, Daily Telegraph, 25 May 2012, subsequently refuted by the Deputy Prime Minister 
as ‘apocalyptic’ in character: ‘No British ‘drawbridge’ to stop Greek immigration, says Nick Clegg’, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/9293763/No-British-
drawbridge-to-stop-Greek-immigration-says-Nick-Clegg.html, Daily Telegraph, 27 May 2012. The point was repeated several weeks later by Prime Minister 
David Cameron, although without making any of the legal modalities clear: ‘UK prepared to seal border against Greeks’, http://euobserver.com/22/116864, EU 
Observer, 4 July 2012.
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around 1000 Romanian and Bulgarian citizens 
of Roma origin by France, as perhaps the 
most salient example, attracted a great deal 
of attention from the EU institutions, especially 
in the form of negative comment by the 
Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights 
and Citizenship, Viviane Reding, who used 
quite strong language to condemn the French 
actions.19 Yet despite the existence of a French 
government circular20 (since withdrawn) that 
seemed to make it clear that the actions of the 
French state were specifically targeting Roma 
origin EU citizens, there has been no effective 
legal redress to establish the precise legal 
position under EU or European human rights 
law in relation to such apparently collective 
expulsions or to compensate in any way 
those who were expelled without individual 
consideration of their cases. This points to 
weaknesses in these formal legal processes.
11. Of course, legal action in the national courts, 
or by the European Commission in the CJEU, 
is not the only means by which redress 
for alleged failures in respect of the free 
movement rules can be sought.21 Through the 
SOLVIT system,22 the European Commission 
has created an online framework for receiving 
complaints intended to allow Member States 
to work together pragmatically to deal 
with problems that arise as a result of the 
misapplication of EU law. It has also created 
the Your Europe Advice service for EU citizens, 
through which they can receive information 
from experts on their rights under EU law.23 
Both services are free of charge and receive 
growing numbers of inputs from aggrieved 
citizens that in turn inform Commission 
policy-making and priority-setting. Although 
many of the complaints do not relate to the 
types of free movement rights (that is, those 
which come close to traditional issues of 
immigration) under scrutiny in our report, 
and – moreover – neither of these frameworks 
really provides a remedy where it is private not 
public action that obstructs free movement 
in practice (e.g. employers who discriminate 
against workers from certain Member 
States), in practice one core free movement 
issue, namely residence rights, has been a 
consistently important part of the workload, 
amounting to 12% of SOLVIT cases across the 
period 2002-2011.24
12. Fears about the growing gap between theory 
and practice in relation to EU free movement 
law in the UK and elsewhere have led the 
European Commission to raise concerns 
about the implementation of EU law at the 
national level. In quite a number of cases, 
this has gone as far as bringing infringement 
proceedings, although none have so far 
reached the CJEU for adjudication (see 
paragraph 32). There is room for criticism 
of many Member States in respect of 
their compliance as recent steps taken by 
the Commission towards the bringing of 
infringement proceedings have shown, but 
some of the criticisms directed at the UK 
have been quite harsh. A recent example 
from a European Parliament report adopted in 
March 2012 (drawing on petitions made to the 
European Parliament Committee on Petitions 
where complaints about the UK have been 
particularly prominent) will suffice to give the 
flavour:25
19. For full coverage, see S. Carrera and A. Atger, L’affaire des Roms : A Challenge to the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, CEPS Paper in Liberty and 
Security, September 2010 (available from http://www.ceps.eu/books).
20. This text was leaked to the press and made available publicly: http://www.lecanardsocial.com/upload/IllustrationsLibres/Circulaire_du_5ao%C3%BBt_2010.pdf.
21. M. Dawson and E. Muir, ‘Individual, Institutional and Collective Vigilance in protecting fundamental rights in the EU: lessons from the Roma’, (2011) 48 Common 
Market Law Review 751-775.
22. SOLVIT: http://ec/europa.eu/solvit/. 
23. Your Europe Advice: http://ec.europa.eu/citizensrights/front_end/index_en.htm. 
24. Commission Staff Working Document, ‘Reinforcing Effective Problem-Solving in the Single Market – Unlocking SOLVIT’s full potential at the occasion of its 10th 
anniversary’, SWD(2012) 33 final, 24 February 2012.
25. European Parliament Report on the EU Citizenship Report 2010, A7-0047/2012, p18.
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Kingdom did not allow non-EU family 
members to enter without a visa, even 
though they had residence cards issued 
by another Member State. The UK 
authorities asked for an excessive number 
of documents, processed applications with 
excessive delays and retained the original 
documents. Following the intervention of 
the European Commission, based on many 
complaints and petitions received, some 
improvements in the administrative practices 
have been initiated.’
 These impressions can be backed up from 
the case law. A particularly unfortunate 
example which reached the courts by way of 
a damages claim brought against the Home 
Office is AB and MVC v. Home Office,26 where 
the applicants (an EEA citizen27 resident and 
initially working in the UK and a third country 
national spouse, along with their EEA citizen 
child) waited altogether for 953 days for the 
third country national partner to be issued 
with a residence card as an extended family 
member.28 Likewise, the case of Papajorgji29 
is instructive. It shows the (over-)readiness 
of consular officials to assert that a perfectly 
ordinary marriage of 14 years standing 
between a Greek man and an Albanian woman 
resident in Greece, with two children living 
in a common household, was a marriage 
of convenience. The ECO refused the 
family permit initially because the applicant, 
having answered 115 questions in the entry 
clearance application form and having 
submitted numerous documents evidencing 
that her husband was a Greek citizen and 
was intending to accompany her on the visit 
to the UK, had apparently failed to provide 
evidence that she was not asked for, such as 
photographs evidencing family life. The Upper 
Tribunal determination made it clear that there 
must be some evidence of abuse before the 
United Kingdom Borders Agency (UKBA30) 
could require the applicant to show that his or 
her marriage was not one of convenience.
13. Further evidence of difficulties relating to the 
application of the EU free movement rules is 
offered by information on applications and 
appeals provided by the UKBA and the Courts 
Service. Information provided by the UKBA 
indicated that of the 73,373 EEA applications 
(e.g. for permanent residence, EEA family 
permits or specific decisions related to new 
Member State citizens) made in 2010 and 
90,879 made in 2011, 82% were granted in 
2010 and only 62% were granted in 2011.31 
38% is a high refusal rate in circumstances 
where national authorities have little discretion 
in deciding whether to admit an application, 
and where the rules of eligibility are supposed 
to be reasonably clear. Inevitably a certain 
percentage of those refusals were appealed 
to the First Tier Tribunal and it was interesting 
to see that 39% of appeals succeeded in 2010 
and 60% succeeded in 2011. The dates do 
not align entirely, but information provided 
by HM Courts Service offered back up data 
confirming these trends by indicating that 
there were 7100 appeals in respect of EEA 
decisions received by the First Tier Tribunal 
between 1 April 2011 and 31 March 2012.32 
The Courts Service data indicated that during 
the same period 40% of appeals were allowed, 
26. [2012] EWHC 226 (QB).
27. UK implementation of EU free movement rules explicitly extends all the same rights and legal frameworks to citizens of the EEA as well as the EU (i.e. Norway, 
Iceland and Liechtenstein), as well as Swiss citizens. The ‘shorthand’ to cover all these categories is the reference “EEA”.
28. For detailed comment, see I. Solanke, ‘Another type of ‘Other’ in EU Law? AB (2) MVC v Home Office and Rahman v Secretary of State for the Home 
Office’, (2013) 76 MLR 370-400.
29. [2012] UKUT 00038 (IAC).
30. At the time when this research was conducted, the decision-making function in relation to EEA rights fell within various parts of the UKBA and throughout this 
report we therefore refer to the UKBA. The Secretary of State for the Home Department announced in March 2013 a further splitting and reorganization of the 
UKBA’s current functions, amounting in effect to an abolition of the UKBA and a reassertion of certain functions by the ‘owner’, the Home Office. Press reports 
referred to the separation of the visa function from the enforcement function. However, no specific attention was paid in the brief documentation announcing 
this to the implications for the EU free movement rules and those who seek to rely upon them. See ‘UK Border Agency to be abolished, Teresa May announces’, 
Guardian, 26 March 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/mar/26/uk-border-agency-broken-up.  Some have argued that the split will be expensive and 
unnecessary, since it has already been announced that most officials will still carry on working in the same way, for the same immediate bosses: http://www.
instituteforgovernment.org.uk/news/latest/institute-statements-decision-scrap-ukba. 
31. Information (dated 4 September 2012) provided to the authors pursuant to an FOI request, and held on file.
32. Information (dated 21 August 2012) provided to the authors pursuant to an FOI request, and held on file.
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41% were refused, and the balance withdrawn 
or abandoned. In the same period (and thus 
inevitably not referring to the same batch of 
cases), 670 appeals to the Upper Tribunal 
from the First Tier Tribunal were received, of 
which 40% were allowed.33 This represents a 
substantial case load for the Tribunals, and 
reflects also why practitioners, as this research 
shows, now indicate that EEA cases represent 
a substantial proportion of and challenging 
element within their ongoing immigration work. 
The success rate seems to be higher than that 
for UKBA decisions generally (27% for appeals 
against UKBA decisions given in 2010).34 
14. Clearly the UK authorities do not necessarily 
accept all the criticisms that are levelled at 
them,35 and some of the legal propositions 
which underpin these criticisms continue to 
be tested in various courts. But, looked at 
objectively, it is still clear from the considerable 
body of evidence that EU law, as interpreted 
by the EU institutions and the UK institutions 
(certainly the UKBA/Home Office and – in 
some respects – also the UK courts), has not 
always been applied as would be required by 
the interpretations given by the EU institutions, 
and especially the CJEU. However, presenting 
the full legal evidence to back up this assertion 
would require a much more extended and 
detailed analysis of the law than is possible 
in this report, as well as a different approach 
to presenting legal material, and so this task 
must be left to other writers. But overall, we 
can conclude that in both a popular and a 
legal sense, we appear to be in a phase of 
increased friction between the systems. The 
impetus behind this research comes from the 
urgent task of improving our understanding of 
this ‘friction’ or ‘misfit’ between the systems.
33. This figure does not distinguish between appeals brought by the UKBA and appeals brought by the applicant.
34. Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council (AJTC) 2011 report Right First Time, June 2011, available from http://www.justice.gov.uk/ajtc/docs/AJTC_Right_first_
time_web(7).pdf at 15.
35. For a public statement in defence of the status quo, which supplements the implicit statements that the UK government makes every time it defends its position 
in court, see the government responses appended to the end of the Report on the Free Movement of Workers in the United Kingdom in 2008-2009, October 
2009, prepared by the Network of Experts on the Free Movement of Workers, http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=5040&langId=en. 
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immigration and asylum law 
15. The UK’s current approach to issues of free 
movement needs to be placed, amongst 
other matters, in the context of its relationship 
with the Schengen zone (comprising 22 other 
Member States plus Switzerland, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway) and the broad 
powers that it has retained to opt out from the 
emerging body of EU immigration and asylum 
law and policy adopted under the TFEU. In 
this respect, in comparison to other Member 
States – with the exception of Ireland which 
has joined the UK in most aspects of its opt-
outs – the UK has a uniquely insular approach 
towards the areas of EU immigration and 
asylum law which have seen an increasingly 
close connection being developed between 
the control and management of external and 
internal frontiers.
16. The UK’s insularity – which takes the legal 
form of a body of opt-outs and possibilities 
for opt-ins - has a considerable impact 
upon both the policy context and also the 
detailed operational and legal work of public 
institutions such as UKBA case workers and 
the tribunal and courts systems, which have 
to navigate across a legally complex terrain in 
order to work out precisely which set of rules 
is applicable. The possibility of ‘seepage’ of 
ideas about or legal tests specific to issues of 
‘ordinary’ immigration control (i.e. the areas 
which continue to fall within a reserved sphere 
of UK competence) or even areas where the 
UK and the EU now share competences (e.g. 
asylum) is discussed in more detail in the later 
sections of this report. It is therefore important 
to review in brief the significant and (in the 
UK) often misunderstood framework put in 
place to govern cross-frontier intra-EU mobility, 
external frontier control and some aspects 
of immigration from outside the EU into the 
Member States, because this is essential 
to understanding precisely how broader 
questions of immigration control operate as 
exogenous factors which affect the detailed 
application and implementation of the free 
movement rules in the UK.
17. Free movement, as established in the original 
Treaty of Rome and subsequent legislation 
such as Regulation 1612/68 and Directive 
64/221, represented an important incursion 
into the immigration sovereignty of postwar 
European states. Member States could no 
longer apply ordinary immigration control 
vis-à-vis the citizens of other Member States, 
and so could not demand visas of them and 
were required to accept that citizens could 
cross borders on the production of an identity 
card, rather than a passport. As discussed 
in greater detail in the next section, they 
could also not restrict their right to work and 
to seek work within the host state, and to 
bring their families in the event of settlement. 
Nationals of the Member States were no 
longer ‘aliens’ but ‘second country nationals’ 
entitled to non-discrimination on grounds of 
nationality. However, this regime did not apply 
to third country nationals and Member States 
retained their own external frontier controls, 
visa regimes and restrictions on the activities 
and work of third country nationals (unless 
they were family members of Member State 
nationals). So long as there were separate 
external frontier controls, the Member States 
were unable to secure passport-free (or more 
accurately identity-check-free) travel at the 
internal frontiers for their own citizens. In other 
words, the free movement of persons could 
not live up to the ideals of the progressive 
establishment of the single market, as 
mandated by the Single European Act and its 
amendments to the original Treaty of Rome. 
According to what was introduced as Article 7a 
of the EEC Treaty (now Article 26 TFEU), ‘the 
internal market shall comprise an area without 
internal frontiers in which the free movement 
of goods, persons, services and capital is 
ensured in accordance with the provisions of 
this Treaty’ (emphasis added).
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18. It was achieving this parallelism between 
persons and other dimensions of the single 
market such as goods, where the removal 
of internal barriers to trade as a result of the 
completion of a common external trade regime 
was achieved after the Single European Act of 
1986, that was the original motivation behind 
the Schengen Agreement. This agreement was 
first signed in 1985 by just five Member States 
(Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, France 
and Germany) and supplemented in 1990 with 
a longer implementing Convention. Given the 
opposition of some Member States, including 
the UK, to achieving the aim of the removal 
of internal frontiers within the framework of 
the existing treaties, the idea was to create 
an external ‘laboratory’ of deeper integration 
amongst the limited number of Member 
States choosing to participate, comprising 
the commitment to remove internal frontiers, 
along with compensatory measures deemed 
necessary for the purposes of ensuring 
security within this zone (e.g. Schengen 
Information System). Gradually the zone has 
enlarged to cover 26 states, with 400 million 
citizens.36
19. The legitimacy issues which attached to the 
original external Schengen arrangements 
need not concern us here, but suffice it to say 
that as from date of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
which came into force in 1999, that part of the 
emerging field of Justice and Home Affairs law 
comprising EU competences in the areas of 
external borders, illegal and legal immigration 
and asylum was fully brought within the 
framework of the treaties and substantially 
‘communitarised’. This means that it was 
brought within what was then termed the ‘first 
pillar’ of the EU, i.e. the bodies of laws and 
regulations under the EC Treaty. By the end 
of the first decade of the twenty first century, 
after a further reform process in the shape of 
the Treaty of Lisbon, all these fields of policy-
making, notwithstanding their sensitivity, 
were largely subject to ‘ordinary’ legislative 
and policy-making powers on the part of the 
EU institutions (although some of the most 
sensitive areas of competence still require 
a unanimous agreement in the Council of 
Ministers and involve only the possibility of 
EU action complementing national action), 
along with full jurisdiction of the CJEU to 
review EU measures and to judge national 
compliance subject only to a rider related to 
law enforcement and internal security.37 But this 
substantial achievement in fields which touch 
upon the core of national sovereignty remains 
subject to the caveat that the participation of 
the UK and Ireland in Schengen (and thus in 
the removal of internal frontier controls and the 
creation of a common set of external frontier 
controls including a largely common visa 
regime) has been excluded since the Treaty of 
Amsterdam by an opt out set out in a protocol 
to the treaties, and a further protocol on 
participation in measures adopted in the policy 
areas of immigration and asylum law allows 
the UK and Ireland to choose not to participate 
on a case by case basis (i.e an opt-in).38 It is 
important to point out that since the principle 
of the single market without internal frontiers is 
enshrined in the EU treaties, where passport 
controls are maintained this has to be seen 
as an obstacle to free movement, albeit one 
which is approved by a Protocol of equal legal 
weight to the treaty. Consequently, some have 
argued that UK measures in this area are 
subject to a test of proportionality,39 although it 
seems unlikely that the Commission would try 
to test this point directly in the near future.
36. Of the EU Member States, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania also remain outside the Schengen zone, but this is not through their own choice. Denmark treats 
‘Schengen law’ as international law, as a result of a complex opt-out protocol that it has negotiated, but it is operationally part of the Schengen zone so far as 
internal and external frontiers are concerned.
37. Article 276 TFEU provides: ‘In exercising its powers regarding the provisions of Chapters 4 and 5 of Title V of Part Three relating to the area of freedom, security 
and justice, the Court of Justice of the European Union shall have no jurisdiction to review the validity or proportionality of operations carried out by the police or 
other law-enforcement services of a Member State or the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law 
and order and the safeguarding of internal security.’
38. See generally S. Peers, ‘EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (Non-Civil)’, in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd Edition, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011, 269-297.
39. See the Report on the Free Movement of Workers in the United Kingdom in 2008-2009, above n.35 at p6.
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20. The reasons why the UK and Ireland maintain 
an opt-out from Schengen, and have also 
chosen not to participate in substantial parts 
of the developing EU acquis in the area of 
immigration and asylum law relate, of course, 
to issues of sovereignty and autonomy. 
Notably, we see a strong desire on the part 
of the UK to maintain its own frontier controls 
as an island state, and the desire on the 
part of Ireland not to lose the common travel 
area with the UK.40 The UK’s strong ‘border 
identity’ is evident in many places including 
press coverage and political statements. The 
centrality for the UK of ‘securing the borders’ 
is one of the core messages in the political 
Foreword to the UKBA Business Plan 2011-
2015, signed off by the Home Secretary, the 
Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and the same topic forms the 
40. See B. Ryan, ‘The Common Travel Area between Britain and Ireland’, (2001) 64 Modern Law Review 831-854.
41. UKBA Business Plan, April 2011-March 2015, available to download from http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/aboutus/uk-border-
agency-business-plan/. 
first and longest chapter in the Plan itself.41 
The absence of any differentiation in that 
chapter of the Business Plan between EEA 
and non-EEA travel highlights that from the 
UKBA perspective ‘securing the border’ (i.e. 
effecting the right sorts of controls on entry 
and building an e-borders project which will 
result in enhanced information about exit) is 
seen as a generic task, without any immediate 
regard to the implications of or for EU law. So 
long as the UK continues to allow EU citizens 
to travel on their identity cards, then it is 
fulfilling its free movement related obligations 
in this area. In practice, as EU free movement 
law and the interface with the evolving body 
of EU immigration and asylum law grow more 
complex, the UK – opted out or not from the 
latter – will experience certain legal effects, 
even if only indirectly.
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Section 4: EU free movement rules and their 
implementation in the UK
21. The legal framework governing the free 
movement of EU citizens in the Member States 
is surprisingly complex even though the basic 
principles are relatively simple, and this is 
matched by considerable complexity in the 
implementation arrangements at the national 
level. When two complex systems come into 
contact with each other, there are bound to 
be problems of implementation in practice. In 
this respect, this field of EU law does not differ 
from any other field that is dependent upon 
national implementation, such as consumer 
protection law or environmental law. 
22. At the EU level the key elements of the 
framework comprise the treaty provisions on 
free movement and EU citizenship outlined 
in Section 2, plus the guarantee of non-
discrimination on grounds of (EU) nationality 
contained in Article 18 TFEU. Most of the 
relevant treaty provisions are thus to be found 
in the TFEU, although these are buttressed by 
fundamental rights guarantees in the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights (CFR), given equal 
legal value to other treaty provisions by Article 
6 TEU since the amendments introduced by 
the Treaty of Lisbon. At the level of legislation, 
the main provisions are now contained in the 
Citizens’ Rights Directive (CRD), although 
this does not provide a complete code of 
protection for the rights of EU free movers. 
It did repeal most of the previous legislation, 
and sought to ‘simplify and strengthen’ 
the rights of EU citizens.42 Other significant 
pieces of legislation include the provisions 
of Council Regulation 492/11 in particular 
those on equality in relation to ‘social and 
tax advantages’,43 various measures relating 
to the free movement of services and of 
various professions and trades, measures 
on the mutual recognition of qualifications 
and diplomas, and finally measures on the 
‘posting’ of workers. As these latter measures 
do not, for the most part, collide or intersect 
with UK immigration law, they were not 
discussed in detail in this research. They are, 
however, of immense importance in relation 
to the construction of what one might call a 
‘common citizenship area’.
23. In addition, of course, there has been a 
considerable body of case law in the CJEU, 
which has both elaborated upon and in some 
cases extended the extant treaty provisions 
and secondary legislative measures. Some of 
this case law has been reflected in subsequent 
treaty amendments and legislation. In other 
words, there has often been a circular 
relationship between the treaty provisions and 
legislative measures, on the one hand, and the 
case law of the CJEU, on the other. Although 
Citizenship of the Union now represents the 
foundational constitutional building block 
of the common citizenship area, in practice 
the CJEU only relies upon the citizenship 
provisions in its reasoning in cases which 
come before it where the facts do not allow it 
to give an interpretation of EU law based on 
the more specific free movement provisions 
of the treaty, or the secondary legislation. This 
has been in particular in respect of certain 
cases where there does not appear to be a 
direct link to the issue of free movement as 
such.44 These cases, where reliance is placed 
42. Paragraph 3 of the Preamble to Directive 2004/38.
43. Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on Freedom of Movement for Workers within the Union, OJ 2011 
L141, replacing Regulation 1612/68. 
44. See, for example, Case C- 34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-1177. The UK regulations reflect the scheme of the CRD itself by focusing on free movement 
issues by, for example, excluding from the scope of the Regulations a UK citizen who has not exercised a free movement right. In like manner, the CJEU, in 
cases such as Ruiz Zambrano has found that the provisions of the CRD do not cover all situations in which it considers the concept of EU citizenship to be 
under threat – in that case in respect of certain minor EU citizens resident in the state in which they were citizens, who risked being forced to leave the territory of 
the EU if their non-citizen parents were not permitted to stay by Belgium.
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on the treaty itself or – indeed – on the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights (CFR), raise particular 
problems in the UK context as they fall outside 
the statutory scheme put in place to deal with 
the implementation of the free movement 
rules and so it is not always apparent what 
procedure of appeal should apply in such 
cases where admission to the UK is refused.45 
That is not to say that the Court never invokes 
citizenship when it decides cases on the 
basis of the CRD. Such was the case in 
Metock,46 almost the first and perhaps the 
most important case thus far decided on the 
interpretation of the CRD, where the Court 
held that the correct interpretation of the 
CRD precluded national measures (such as 
those in force in the UK and Ireland at the 
time) which required prior lawful residence 
in another Member State by a third country 
national family member if they were to benefit 
from the protection of EU law, rather than 
remain subject to national immigration law. As 
Peers correctly noted, this is a fundamental 
question regarding the relationship between 
free movement and immigration control.47
24. At the UK level, implementation measures 
are centred on the Immigration (European 
Economic Area) Regulations 2006,48 as 
amended in 200949 201150 and 2012 (twice).51 
These Regulations should be read in the light 
of the Explanatory Memorandums prepared 
by the Home Office and also laid before 
Parliament. These accompanied both the 
original regulations52 and the subsequent 
amendments. Despite the clarifications 
provided in the Explanatory Memorandums, 
the scheme of the Regulations does not 
follow closely the scheme of the CRD, and it 
is sometimes difficult to check one against 
the other to see exactly how the UK law 
implements the rights set out in the CRD. The 
approach of the Regulations seems to owe 
more to the heritage of UK immigration law 
with its ‘leave’-based system, rather than to the 
approach of the CRD, which is a rights-based 
system reflecting the framework and approach 
of the treaties. Reading them together, there 
often seems to be something of a dissonance 
between the two legal frameworks. From the 
perspective of the EU lawyer, the wording of 
the Regulations seems exceedingly opaque in 
places, while for the UK lawyer the text of the 
CRD also seems opaque, with the Regulations 
merely mirroring difficulties to be found at the 
EU level. The Regulations have been amended 
on a number of occasions, but they have not 
always been amended as rapidly as might 
seem desirable even where this appears to 
be necessary in order to implement clear 
case law of the CJEU or indeed in such a 
way as to be likely to escape further negative 
scrutiny via CJEU case law.53 The Regulations 
are supplemented by European Casework 
Instructions, which are applied by UKBA Entry 
Clearance Officers and other caseworkers. 
These instructions do not have a formal 
status in law, although they are more regularly 
updated than the Regulations. Although these 
are made available on the UKBA website,54 
45. See M (Ivory Coast) [2010] UKUT 227 (IAC) where it was made clear to the Home Office in the Upper Tribunal determination that although the claim to enter the 
UK was upheld on the basis of a Treaty right under the Chen case (Case C-200/02 Chen v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] ECR I-9925) 
rather than the EEA Regulations, the form of document to be granted to enable to applicant to enter the UK (the EEA family permit) should be the same as the 
one granted under the Regulations.
46. Case C-127/08 Metock [2008] ECR I-6241.
47. Peers, S. ‘Free Movement, Immigration Control and Constitutional Conflict’, (2009) 5 European Constitutional Law Review 173–196.
48. SI 2006 No. 1003.
49. The Immigration (European Economic Area) (Amendment) Regulations 2009, SI 2009 No. 1113.
50. The Immigration (European Economic Area) (Amendment) Regulations 2011, SI 2011 No. 1247.
51. The Immigration (European Economic Area) (Amendment) Regulations 2012, SI 2012 No. 1547; The Immigration (European Economic Area) (Amendment) (No. 
2) Regulations 2012, SI 2012 No. 2560.
52. Explanatory Memorandum to the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006, No. 1003 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2006/1003/pdfs/
uksiem_20061003_en.pdf. 
53. A good example is the introduction in the 2012 amendment regulations of a new type of ‘derivative residence card’, based on a ‘derivative right of residence’ for 
persons relying on the principles contained in the Chen case (n.45.), which have also been recognized and implemented by the courts in the UK (see M (Ivory 
Coast) above n.45.). This derivative right of residence cannot lead to a right of permanent residence under the Regulations. This restriction will undoubtedly be 
challenged in the UK courts. On the other hand, there are examples of swift implementation of CJEU decisions: the second set of 2012 amendment regulations 
implemented in November 2012 the finding of the CJEU in September in Case C-83/11 SSHD v. Rahman, 5 September 2012 that in assessing whether or not 
an extended family member should be allowed to reside in the UK pursuant to Article 3(2) CRD the national authorities could not require that the family member 
had previously resided with the EEA national in another Member State.
54. http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/ecis/. 
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and can thus be reviewed and interpreted by 
applicants and their legal advisors, they are 
by no means easy to navigate. For example, 
the materials related to the issue of EEA family 
permits (i.e. visas) to third country national 
family members of EU citizens for entry to the 
UK are displaced to a separate section on 
‘modernised guidance’.55
25. The Home Office EEA Free Movement team56 
explains the more detailed approach taken in 
the Regulations thus:
‘Directive 2004/38/EC sets out the rights of 
EU citizens to move and reside freely within 
the Union, but often in broad terms. The 
Immigration (European Economic Area) 
Regulations 2006 need to be more specific 
to be in-keeping with UK legislation and to 
provide guidance to UKBA caseworkers 
responsible for implementing and applying 
the provisions of the Directive.’
Practitioners, likewise, recognise the 
difference in approach at the two levels:
‘...although in a number of places they’re 
gold plated, it is generally a reasonably 
good transposition with a few flaws with 
my view. The main difference between the 
directive and the regulations is the extent of 
prescriptiveness within the regulations rather 
than a broader approach.’ [Q1]
26. The use of the term ‘immigration’ in the title of 
the Regulations is instructive. It reminds us that 
although EU free movement law is based on 
a set of facilitative principles and rights, rather 
than a structure of permissions, it has been 
enfolded, in certain respects, in the UK into the 
existing structures of immigration law. In some 
ways the overlap is inevitable, as in places the 
CRD, for example, does invite Member States 
to apply national law, for example in relation to 
the assessment of the entry of so-called ‘other’ 
family members (i.e. TCN members of the 
extended family of the EU citizen). But a more 
general enfolding of free movement law within 
immigration law in the UK is also immediately 
evident in the role that has been given to the 
UKBA, rather than a specialist administrative 
service, in this area. These observations have 
motivated our decision to construct the key 
tension within the framework of implementation 
of EU free movement as being that between 
EU free movement law and UK immigration 
law, leaving aside for the time being tensions 
with other areas of national law such as 
welfare law or family law. 
27. At the strategic and policy level, we were 
supplied with details of how the UKBA works 
in respect of EU law and policy by the Home 
Office EEA Free Movement Team:
‘EU migration and free movement policy 
is handled centrally by the Home Office’s 
Strategy, Immigration and International 
Group (SIIG), providing a cross-cutting 
capability through a mixture of strategy and 
policy work and the management of external 
programmes. SIIG coordinates and liaises 
with colleagues across the department and 
externally (for example with the European 
Commission and other Member States).’
 There is further coordination across 
Whitehall between departments with 
particular responsibilities relating to the 
operationalisation of EU free movement rights, 
such as the Department of Work and Pensions 
and the Department for Communities and 
Local Government.
28. Operationally speaking, responsibilities are 
spread across the five areas of operation 
into which the UKBA (prior to its ongoing 
division into two57) has been divided, with the 
international area handling requests for EEA 
family permits, the borders area handling 
border control and overseeing admissions, 
the immigration team handling requests for 
registration certificates and residence cards 
and the implementation of the labour market 
restrictions applied to nationals of EU Member 
55. http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/modernised/07-eea-swiss-ec/. 
56. Information supplied in writing, 16 November 2011, held on file by authors. Further information on the single written response provided by the UKBA to 
questions posed by the authors is provided in Section 6 below.
57. These arrangements may have changed since the further reorganization of the UKBA announced in March 2013.
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States subject to transitional regimes, and the 
criminality and detention team, responsible 
not only for borders related crime, but also for 
deportations of EEA nationals and their family 
members. The immigration area within the 
UKBA also houses the European Operational 
Policy Team, which ‘has primary responsibility 
for providing advice and guidance to 
caseworkers and stakeholders on the 
implementation of the Immigration (European 
Economic Area) Regulations 2006.’58
29. Decisions taken by the UKBA – effectively 
acting on behalf of the Secretary of State for 
Home Affairs – in respect of what the UK terms 
EEA nationals (i.e. EU citizens, plus citizens of 
the EEA states, plus Switzerland) are termed 
EEA Decisions and appeals against them can 
be brought within the unified tribunal system.59 
This would normally be before the Immigration 
and Asylum Chamber of First Tier Tribunal, 
and thence to the same chamber of the Upper 
Tribunal (UKUT (IAC)).60 It is worth commenting 
that the Tribunal has made it clear that in 
some cases failing to take an explicit decision, 
such as where the UKBA has responded 
in rather vague terms to the application but 
has not made it explicit whether or not it has 
taken a decision, can amount to a decision 
for these purposes and can be challenged 
in the Tribunal.61 Other types of EEA related 
appeals form a significant portion of the work 
of an ever busier Tribunal Service, with appeals 
against decisions which rely on immigration 
concepts (such as the right of residence) 
taken by social security authorities brought 
before the Social Entitlement Chamber of 
the First Tier Tribunal and thence to the 
Administrative Appeals Chamber of the Upper 
Tribunal. Limited appeals lie to the Court of 
Appeal and the Court of Session in Scotland. 
In limited circumstances, cases on EU free 
movement law questions can also come 
before the ordinary courts by way of judicial 
review, or writ of habeas corpus. The Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission is also 
relevant as it takes cases involving national 
security issues.62 All of these courts or tribunals 
can make references for a preliminary ruling 
to the CJEU in order to seek an interpretation 
of a provision of EU law under Article 267 
TFEU where this is necessary for the purposes 
of deciding the case. In practice, until 
quite recently the immigration and asylum 
judiciary had in place a self-limiting ordinance 
effectively centralising the power to make 
references with the President of the Tribunal/
Chamber.63 However, the removal of this 
restriction has yet to have had a significant 
impact on the actual practice of referrals from 
the UK courts to the CJEU, with many of the 
batch of recent references having been made 
by the Upper Tribunal in cases in which the 
current President (since 2010), Mr Justice 
Blake, has been sitting.64 
30. Oversight of implementation and enforcement 
of EU measures in the Member States is 
the primary responsibility of the European 
Commission, especially as it has the power 
to commence infringement proceedings 
against the Member States under Article 
258 TFEU in order to ensure compliance. 
However, as is well established under EU 
law, individual vigilance and the capacity of 
aggrieved individuals to bring actions in the 
national courts, relying upon the direct effect 
and supremacy of EU law and the rights 
58. See above n.56.
59. Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
60. The language of immigration continues elsewhere in the statutory scheme: other types of decisions in relation to EEA nationals’ entitlement to enter or remain 
in the UK in areas not covered by the 2006 Regulations are termed ‘immigration decisions’ by S109 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 which 
provides for regulations to be made to establish rights of appeal in other cases not covered by the 2006 Regulations.
61. Bee and another (permanent/derived rights of residence) [2013] UKUT 00083 (IAC).
62. E.g. ZZ v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 440. It was noted by those who attended the hearing at the Court of Justice in 
Luxembourg that ZZ, who had been obliged to move his family out of the UK in order to continue to enjoy family life with them, was able to attend the hearing in 
his case (Case C-300/11 ZZ v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, pending), which was held in open court, notwithstanding the approach taken in the 
UK in order to avoid disclosing to ZZ the grounds on which he has been excluded from the UK.
63. Some indication of the approach taken by Tribunal judges can be found in paragraphs 17-20 of HM and others (Iraq) CG [2008] UKUT 00331(IAC), which helps 
to explain the current position, although the substance of that decision was overturned on appeal.
64. Exceptions include two recent cases on the intersection between time spent in prison and the accumulation of periods of residence for the purposes of 
residence rights: Case C-378/12 Onuekwere, pending, referred by the Upper Tribunal in Onuekwere (imprisonment – residence) [2012] UKUT 00269 (IAC) and 
Case C-400/12 MG, pending, referred by the Upper Tribunal in MG (EU deportation – Article 28(3) – imprisonment) Portugal [2012] UKUT 00268 (IAC).
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arising thereunder, is an important dimension 
of a system of dual vigilance. National courts 
may also make references to the CJEU under 
Article 267 TFEU to obtain clarification of 
questions of EU law. In some circumstances, 
national courts are under an obligation to 
refer. Not only must Member States implement 
relevant EU laws, such as the CRD into 
national law, but also national administrations 
are under a duty, under Article 4(3) TEU, 
faithfully to apply EU law in the context of their 
day-to-day work.65
31. Responsibility within the Commission for the 
free movement of persons, especially those 
aspects related to immigration, mobility 
and equality, is divided between various 
Directorates General: Employment and 
Social Affairs; Home Affairs and Justice. 
The Commission’s work in relation to the 
implementation of any directive begins by 
scrutinising the implementation legislation 
that the Member States must introduce and 
also notify to the Commission. In pursuing 
its concerns, the Commission can rely on 
information that it gleans from complaints 
it receives or hears about via the SOLVIT 
system or via Your Europe Advice, or via the 
European Parliament Committee on Petitions. 
It also seeks to generate as much information 
as it can via national experts about national 
implementation issues. It has commissioned 
but not always published ‘conformity checking’ 
reports (national and horizontal) on the CRD.  
It also sponsors, supervises and funds a 
Network of Experts on free movement of 
workers within the European Union,66 who 
produce national, European and thematic 
reports, publish an online journal, collate 
a collection of case law of the CJEU and 
hold events in the Member States on topical 
questions. Furthermore, in its work in this 
area it has been backed up by organisations 
such as ECAS – the European Citizens’ Action 
Service. ECAS has conducted and published 
its own research highlighting the gap 
between theory and practice in relation to free 
movement rights.67
32. The Commission’s work on the CRD has 
been quite frustrating. As it has admitted, 
there remain profound problems with national 
implementation of this measure. In its 2008 
report68 it stated baldly that 
‘The overall transposition of Directive 
2004/38/EC is rather disappointing. Not one 
Member State has transposed the Directive 
effectively and correctly in its entirety. 
Not one Article of the Directive has been 
transposed effectively and correctly by all 
Member States.’
 It subsequently produced Guidelines on better 
transposition and application of the CRD in 
July 2009,69 and it has continued to maintain 
vigilance and begun to initiate infringement 
proceedings in order to push the Member 
States into compliance by issuing reasoned 
opinions. None of these actions has yet come 
before the CJEU, 70 and doubtless the majority 
of them will be resolved between the parties 
before reaching the formal adjudicatory 
process in keeping with the normal pattern in 
such cases. Key problems of incomplete or 
incorrect transposition and implementation 
as illustrated by the infringement proceedings 
that have thus far been announced by press 
release concern three main issues: the entry 
and residence of family members, including 
partners; the issuing of visas and residence 
cards for third-country national family 
members; and safeguards against expulsions. 
However, much of the Commission’s 
enforcement work continues behind closed 
doors in negotiations directly with Member 
States, an approach which reduces the level of 
transparency which citizens enjoy.
65. J. Temple Lang, ‘The Development by the Court of Justice of the Duties of Cooperation of National Authorities and Community Institutions Under Article 10 EC’, 
(2008) 31 Fordham International Law Journal 1483-1532.
66. This Network is housed with DG EMP, although in practice it deals with issues which cut across the portfolio of DG JUSTICE. For details, see http://ec.europa.
eu/social/main.jsp?catId=475&langId=en. 
67. ECAS, Mind the Gap: Towards a Better Enforcement of European Citizens’ Rights of Free Movement, December 2009.
68. COM(2008) 840, above n.14. at p3.
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69. European Commission Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on guidance for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on 
the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, 2 July 2009, COM(2009) 313. 
70. According to the Commission’s Press Release ‘Free movement: Determined Commission action has helped resolve 90% of open free movement cases’, 
IP/11/981, 25 August 2011, infringement proceedings were launched (through the issuing of a reasoned opinion) against Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Germany, Malta, Lithuania, Spain, Sweden, Poland and the United Kingdom over the period from March to June 2011. The free movement situation 
in Belgium has remained under analysis by the Commission. Three more sets of infringement proceedings were opened in the first half of 2012: against 
the Czech Republic and Lithuania: ‘Free movement: Commission upholds EU citizens’ rights’, IP/12/75, 26 January 2012; against the UK: ‘Free movement: 
Commission asks the UK to uphold EU citizens’ rights’, IP/12/417, 26 April 2012; and against Austria, Germany and Sweden: ‘Free movement: Commission 
asks Austria, Germany and Sweden to uphold EU citizens’ rights’, IP/12/646, 21 June 2012. The specifics of the infringement proceedings launched against 
the UK in respect of the so-called right to reside test (especially media and political reactions) are discussed in more detail in Story Two below, and in the text 
accompanying n below.
71. For the standard treatments see S. Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, 3rd Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, P. Boeles et al, European 
Migration Law, Oxford/Antwerp: Intersentia, 2009 and K. Hailbronner (ed.), European Immigration and Asylum Law: A Commentary, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2010.
72. UK-focused textbook coverage can be found in all the leading works, e.g. P. Craig and G. de Búrca, Text, Cases and Materials on EU Law, 5th Edition, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011, D. Chalmers, G. Davies and G. Monti, European Union Law, 2nd Edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010 and 
Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union Law, 5th Edition, London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2006. The periodical literature on the free movement of persons and EU 
citizenship is too extensive to cite in full but for reviews of how the key issues have evolved see J. Shaw, ‘Citizenship: Contrasting Dynamics at the interface of 
integration and constitutionalism’, in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 475-609 and O’Leary, 
S. ‘Developing an Ever Closer Union between the Peoples of Europe? A Reappraisal of the Case Law of the Court of Justice on the Free Movement of Persons 
and EU Citizenship‘, (2008) 27 Yearbook of European Law 167-193 (albeit before the recent cases such as Zambrano).
73. The leading textbook account is G. Clayton, Textbook on Immigration and Asylum Law, 5th Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, Section 2. Other 
extended discussions of the application of EU free movement law in the UK include: H. Toner, ‘New Regulations implementing Directive 2004/38’, [2006] Journal 
of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 158-178; A. Hunter, ‘Family members: an analysis of the implementation of the Citizens’ Directive in UK law’, [2007] 
Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 191; R. McKee, ‘Regulating the directive? The AIT’s interpretation of the family members provisions of the 
EEA Regulations’, [2007] Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 334; N. Rollason, ‘The entry and residence of EEA nationals in United Kingdom’, 
[2007] Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 186; R. Scannell, ‘The right of permanent residence’, [2007] Journal of Immigration, Asylum and 
Nationality Law 201; H. Toner, ‘Legislative Comment: New Regulations implementing Directive 2004/38’, [2007] Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality 
Law 158; A. O’Neill, ‘Free Movement of EU Citizens within the EU’, Paper given to a Matrix Chambers Seminar on EU law and immigration, http://eutopialaw.
files.wordpress.com/2011/12/free-movement-of-eu-citizens-within-the-eu.docx.
74. D. Feldman, ‘The Nature of Legal Scholarship’, (1989) 52 Modern Law Review 498-517.
75. Valcke’s two part review of the affect of the Directive in the UK contains recommendations for the amendment of both EU and UK law: A. Valcke, ‘ Five years of 
the Citizens Directive in the UK - Part 1’, [2011] Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 217-244; A. Valcke, ‘Five years of the Citizens Directive in 
the UK - Part 2’, [2011] Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 331-357.
76. An exception is provided by S. Carrera and A. Atger, Implementation of Directive 2004/38 in the context of EU Enlargement: A proliferation of different forms 
of citizenship?, CEPS Special Report, April 2009 (available from http://www.ceps.eu/books), but its focus is on the EU as a whole, not just the UK.
77. E.g. B. Ryan, ‘The Accession (Immigration and Worker Authorisation) Regulations 2006’ (2008) 37 Industrial Law Journal 75; H. Toner, Partnership Rights, Free 
Movement and EU law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004.
78. See n.66. above.
79. For a fuller discussion of the grounding of the research in the existing scholarly literatures, see J. Shaw and N. Miller, ‘When legal worlds collide: an exploration 
of what happens when EU free movement law meets UK immigration law’, (2013) 38 European Law Review 137-166, especially pp144-147.
Section 5: The research problem and the framework 
for the empirical research   
33. The legal topics covered in this report have 
been examined extensively in various scholarly 
literatures: on EU justice and home affairs 
law,71 on EU free movement law72 and on the 
implementation of EU free movement law in 
the UK.73 However, the primary focus of most 
of these works has been on ‘internal legal 
analysis’,74 concerned with the explication 
and interpretation of the law as it stands and, 
in some cases, proposing improvements 
in line with what are seen as the normative 
objectives of the EU integration process (i.e. 
promoting free movement and protecting the 
rights of those who move and their families).75 
Moreover, much of the work has focused on 
one legal system (EU or UK), to the exclusion 
of the other,76 and little work has grappled – 
beyond the question of UK compliance from a 
legal perspective – with the precise character 
of the fit between the systems. In some cases, 
a more contextual approach to doctrine is 
taken. The works of Ryan and Toner, both of 
whom place EU free movement law in its wider 
political and social context, including that 
of national immigration law, represent good 
examples.77 A stronger emphasis on the bridge 
between the systems can be gleaned from 
the work of the Network of National Experts 
on the Free Movement of Workers,78 where 
the combination of national reports, thematic 
reports, European reports, and reports on 
the follow up to CJEU case law provide 
detailed information about these issues of 
implementation and interface between the 
systems. However, these works are primarily 
descriptive in character.
34. In our research, we have sought to offer 
something different.79 We have worked from 
the assumption that the practical problems in 
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relation to the implementation and application 
of EU free movement rights need to be 
illuminated by going beyond the surface of 
the treaties, the legislation and the case law. 
We also wanted to avoid carrying out research 
that placed the question whether the UK is, or 
is not, in compliance with its EU obligations 
at the heart of its enquiry. The point of the 
research is not to play the blame game about 
the UK government’s conduct in relation to its 
EU obligations, although issues of effective 
implementation and the performance of 
national administrators and courts eventually 
came to play a prominent role in our research. 
While the analytical techniques of legal 
research have done much to illuminate why 
EU citizenship rights do not seem to be 
effectively applied in practice in all cases, it 
was clear that further empirical research would 
be needed to map the precise contours of 
the ongoing conflicts between the systems, 
which have hitherto been poorly understood, 
and thus to begin to see how these problems 
might be overcome. In so doing, we have built 
upon a tradition of socio-legal work on EU free 
movement rights which has probably been 
stronger in the UK than in any other Member 
State.80 We wanted to find an approach which 
engaged directly with the societal and political 
contestedness of issues around immigration 
and citizenship which are thrown up by the 
demands of EU free movement law upon 
the UK legal and constitutional system, but 
within that broader context we wanted to 
identify a specific focus for our research which 
examined how certain key actors understood 
the field in which they were working, and which 
also allowed us to highlight internal legal 
systemic and cultural questions which relate to 
the effectiveness of implementation.
35. In building this approach we have drawn upon 
a well-established tradition of socio-legal work 
in both (UK) immigration law and policy81 and – 
to a lesser extent – EU free movement law. The 
core insights of such work are, of course, that 
the experience of law in action always differs 
from how it appears ‘in the books’. Much of 
the work by Ackers and her collaborators on 
women, children and retirement migrants82 and 
that by Currie on new Member State migrants83 
focuses on the experience of migration 
within the context of the exercise of EU free 
movement rights. The study by Kubal of Polish 
migrants to the UK after the 2004 enlargement 
and how they experienced, and negotiated 
their way around, the relevant rules and 
regulations has a similar focus.84 This project, 
in contrast, turns the spotlight directly onto the 
role of law and legal institutions and those who 
work within them.
36. Elsewhere in the social sciences, the concept 
of ‘Europeanisation’ provides a toolkit that 
can be used to classify the different ways 
in which Member States respond to their 
obligations under the EU Treaties. Distinctions 
between ‘pace-setters’, ‘foot-draggers’ 
and ‘fence-sitters’85 are commonly drawn. 
Alternatively, Radaelli has identified strategies 
of ‘inertia, absorption, transformation, 
retrenchment’ that mark Member States’ 
reactions to the demands of implementation 
and compliance.86 Belonging primarily within 
the disciplines of political science and 
international relations, the Europeanisation 
literature focuses on trying to tease out 
the causalities that occur in relation to 
80. Political scientists and sociologists across the EU Member States have, however, been involved in a number of EU-funded research projects on mobility in 
recent years (e.g. PIONEUR: http://www.obets.ua.es/pioneur/; MOVEACT: http://www.moveact.eu/) which have sought to offer a better understanding of some 
of the everyday practices of free movement.
81. E.g. A. Hunter, Diversity in the Labour Market: The Legal Framework and Support Services for Migrants entitled to work in the United Kingdom, ESRC/HWWI, 
etc. 2007; A. Woodfield et al, Exploring the decision making of Immigration Officers: a research study examining non-EEA passenger stops and refusals at UK 
ports, Home Office Online Report 01/07; R. Thomas, ‘Risk, Legitimacy and Asylum Adjudication’, (2007) 58 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 49.
82. E.g. L. Ackers and H. Stalford, A Community for Children?: Children, Citizenship and Migration in the European Union, Ashgate: Aldershot, 2004; HL Ackers 
and P. Dwyer, Senior Citizenship? Retirement, Migration and Welfare in the European Union. Bristol: Policy Press, 2002.
83. S. Currie, ‘De-Skilled and Devalued: The Labour Market Experience of Polish Migrants in the UK Following EU Enlargement’, (2007) 23 International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 83; S. Currie, Migration, Work and Citizenship in the Enlarged European Union, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008.
84. A. Kubal, ‘Why semi-legal? Polish post-2004 EU enlargement migrants in the UK’, [2009] Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 148-164.
85. T. Börzel, ‘Pace setting, foot dragging, and fence sitting: Member State responses to Europeanisation’ (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 19. 
86. C. Radaelli, ‘The Europeanization of Public Policy’ in K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (eds.), Politics of Europeanization, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 
27-56 at 37-38.
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processes of EU policy-making and issues 
of national implementation. Is the key issue 
the ‘downloading’ of EU laws and policies 
into systems within which they do not always 
fit well, or one of the ‘uploading’ of national 
particularities and sensitivities? Although 
issues of culture are often mentioned, 
this is rarely specifically in relation to legal 
culture or issues which are particular to legal 
systems and courts as opposed to other 
sets of institutions. Thus the existing body 
of Europeanisation research provides few 
insights into the questions which we want to 
raise about the fit between the EU and national 
legal systems. On the other hand, it could be 
argued that its general toolkit, offering close 
attention to the task of breaking up the wider 
problem of compliance into a set of smaller 
engagements which can each better be 
understood in its own terms, can help us in 
our endeavour to understand more about how 
issues of misfit can arise because of differing 
legal-technical interpretations of provisions 
of EU law made by different stakeholders, or 
because of the different legal structures of EU 
law and national law.
37. It was against the backdrop of these 
different methodological frameworks within 
socio-legal studies and political science/
international relations that we drew up our 
research framework, comprising a series of 
research tasks. The first was to identify and to 
characterise the areas of friction between EU 
free movement law and UK immigration law, 
and both the legal and societal issues which 
these engage. The second was to conduct 
interviews with key informants in order to 
understand better how this (lack of) fit between 
the systems operated. Our interviews allowed 
us both to test out certain intuitions that the 
research team had developed as to how and 
why the misfit operated as it did, and also to 
give space to interviewees to suggest their 
own ideas. The final task was to draw some 
conclusions from the research.
38. In our research we chose to interview 
only stakeholders (judges, practitioners, 
representatives of advocacy and advisory 
groups) rather than the EU citizens themselves 
who take advantage of their free movement 
rights.87 By definition, therefore, these 
professional groups will orient their perspective 
primarily towards the problems encountered 
by the minority who choose to consult a legal 
advisor or advocacy group or to bring a case 
before the courts because of the problems 
they encounter. However, we chose to look 
at this group because we wanted the initial 
focus of our work to be on the systemic issues 
relating to the interface between two legal 
systems and institutional structures. However, 
as the report outlines below, in some respects 
we were forced, through our research, to 
confront a wider range of factors which may 
help to the account for the problems of friction 
that seem to be arising between UK law and 
EU law in this area. This in turn suggests the 
space for a much larger enquiry than we have 
thus far been able to undertake.
87. Of course, this is not to say that this group themselves, or their family members, could not experience problems as mobile or static EU citizens, but we 
interviewed them primarily by reference to their professional activities, not their private circumstances. See the research reports from the PIONEUR, MOVEACT 
(n.80. above) and EUCROSS (http://www.eucross.eu/cms/) projects.
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Section 6: Phase One Research Findings: the areas of 
friction between EU law and national law
39. To ensure that our socio-legal research was 
based on sound premises in relation to a 
swiftly changing field of law, we first needed 
to build a clear picture of the existing law. We 
found that the legal position was unfolding 
quite rapidly even as we evaluated it, through 
case law in both the national courts and the 
CJEU, and through shifts in policy positions 
and legislative amendments adopted by the 
UK authorities and clarifications emerging 
from the Commission. We have tried to 
work with a more dynamic picture of the 
relationship between UK immigration law and 
EU free movement law than has been used 
hitherto in studies of these issues which tend 
to try to provide a snapshot, and perhaps a 
critique, of the law at a given moment in time. 
This approach, which is sensitive to change 
through time, has helped us to define the 
concept of friction or misfit in a way that 
was analytical rather than anecdotal, and 
which is contextual rather than merely legal.
40. In a first phase of research, therefore, the 
project sought to tease out the key issues in 
relation to EU free movement law that have 
brought about conflicts or disagreements 
between the EU institutions and the UK 
authorities. Reviewing this evidence and 
placing it in the context of media coverage and 
various forms of stakeholder engagement and 
commentary, we concluded that the presence 
of most or all of the following features in a 
particular area marks it out as one where there 
is particular friction or misfit between the two 
legal systems:
•	 There	are	clusters of case law in the UK 
courts and the CJEU with interpretations 
of EU law which diverge from those given 
by the UK government enforcement and 
implementation agencies; in some cases, the 
UK courts and the CJEU have also diverged 
in their interpretations, although this tends to 
be a temporary phenomenon as new CJEU 
interpretations ‘bed in’ within UK judicial 
practice;
•	 There	are	(threats	of)	Commission 
infringement proceedings potentially 
resulting in litigation before the CJEU under 
Article 258 TFEU;
•	 A	particular	area	of	free	movement	law	or	its	
interface with UK law has become the focus 
for coverage in the academic literature;
•	 Anecdotal	evidence	suggests	high	levels	
of (individual) strategic or opportunistic 
behaviour, often based on legal advice about 
how to use EU law to work around national 
restrictions within immigration law;
•	 There	are	extensive	campaigns	and	
awareness raising by NGOs and other civil 
society organisations representing migrants;
•	 There	is	evidence	of	higher	than	usual	levels	
of press coverage (bearing in mind that EU 
free movement law has historically been less 
politicised and therefore less present in the 
public eye than ‘traditional’ immigration law).
 Together, these bullet points define the 
character of friction or misfit between the 
two legal systems which is the primary focus 
of this research, but they also opened out the 
possibility of illustrating how these frictions 
operated not only by reference to legal texts 
and interpretations, but also by reference 
to ‘stories’, that is evidence derived from a 
wider range of textual sources (and some 
interview data) about the precise character 
of these issues. The intention here is to place 
this material in its wider societal context, and 
to illuminate the issues in an accessible way. 
One story is developed in more detail for 
each of the four areas of friction, after a brief 
explanation of the main legal issues.
KEY FINDING 1: We found that there are 
four main areas of friction between EU law 
and UK law in relation to questions of free 
movement
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41. Friction or misfit, as defined in paragraph 
40, arises most acutely in four interlinked 
issue areas. We outline these areas of friction 
with a very brief note of the legal issues that 
have arisen and a set of stories that have 
emerged in relation to these matters, in the 
media discourse that we have reviewed, and in 
interviews with key stakeholders.
Principal areas of friction between EU law 
and national law
1.  Problems in the area of residence rights 
for family members
2.  Access to welfare benefits and the ‘right 
to reside’
3.  The area of ‘probity’: selecting the ‘good’ 
from the ‘bad’ migrants
4.  The area of ‘boundary zones’ between 
different regulatory systems – transitional 
measures for new Member State citizens, 
Turkish migrants, etc.
Problems in the area of residence 
rights for family members
42. The application of EU free movement rules 
in relation to the residence rights of third 
country national (TCN) family members 
of EU citizens has led to the most acute 
problems. EU law brings TCN family members 
under the same protective umbrella as EU 
citizen family members, with the rationale 
that if family members, regardles of their 
citizenship, cannot travel and reside with 
a free moving EU citizen under the same 
conditions, then this will be an obstacle to 
the exercise of free movement rights by the 
EU citizen. In other words, the rights for third 
country national family members are derived 
from the rights of EU citizens. TCN family 
members do not have their ‘own’ rights under 
EU law, except in certain limited circumstances 
related to the death or departure of the Union 
citizen or after they have acquired the right 
of permanent residence. As regards these 
derived rights, problems arise both in respect 
of the initial access of such family members 
to the UK, and in relation to their continued 
residence and permanent settlement as family 
members.
43. The position is complicated as the CRD 
divides family members into two categories. 
Article 2(2) of the CRD covers the spouse, 
registered partner, and ascending and 
descending dependent family members. Other 
family members, covered by Article 3(2) are 
other dependent family members and the 
partner who has a durable relationship with the 
EU citizen. There are two respects in which the 
treatment of the groups differs. As regards the 
Article 2(2) family members, the only issues 
that can arise are around the issue of family 
relationship (e.g. is this a sham marriage? are 
the parties who they say they are?) and the 
question of dependency. Beyond that point, 
it is clear that the Member State must grant 
admission or residency, as the case may be, to 
the TCN family member. The argument made 
by some Member States including the UK that 
there needed to be ‘prior lawful residence’ of 
the TCN family member with the EU citizen in 
another Member State was laid to rest by the 
CJEU in the Metock case.88 As regards those 
‘other’ family members mentioned in Article 
3(2), there are likewise questions of family 
relationship and dependency (and here there 
is a more complex formulation of dependency 
and need for personal care, plus a reference 
to ‘in the country from which they come’ 
which has caused considerable confusion). In 
addition the obligation on the Member States 
is limited: it is to ‘facilitate’ entry and residence 
‘in accordance with its own legislation’, after 
undertaking ‘an extensive examination of the 
personal circumstances’ of any applicant. 
It must justify any refusal. This is clearly an 
area where even the CRD foresees an overlap 
between EU free movement law and national 
immigration law, and it is one that has become 
ever more controversial as Member States 
have sought to restrict other avenues of 
family migration in recent years. In keeping 
with this approach, the EEA Regulations also 
distinguish between ‘family members’, who 
88. See n.46. above.
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are defined in Regulation 7, and ‘other family 
members’, although Regulation 8 uses the 
term ‘extended family members’. The meaning 
of ‘facilitate’ has been controversial and is not 
yet fully settled despite some initial indications 
by the CJEU in the 2012 Rahman case 
emphasizing that national authorities must 
make their decision on the basis of the fullest 
assessment of the personal circumstances of 
the applicant.89 
44. There have been many challenges for the 
UKBA in aligning its decision-making under 
the UK Regulations with the requirements of 
the CRD, in circumstances where both the 
CRD and the Regulations are drafted in terms 
which can give rise to some uncertainty. The 
UK courts too have struggled with some of 
these issues,90 although more recently it is 
evident that the UKUT (IAC) in particular, in 
combination with a willingness to refer moot 
points to the CJEU, has started to clarify 
many of the most difficult questions.91 The 
Commission did pick out two particular issues 
to follow up through a reasoned opinion, which 
is one of the procedural steps leading towards 
the bringing of infringement proceedings 
before the CJEU.92  These concerned the 
refusal by the UK to allow extended family 
members of EU citizens to apply to have their 
residence in the UK considered under EU law 
when they were lawfully residing in the UK 
before the arrival to the UK of the EU citizen 
on whom they are dependent and the refusal 
by the UK to allow family members who hold a 
residence card from another Member State to 
travel to the UK without an EEA family permit. 
Article 5(2) of the CRD authorises the Member 
States to apply a visa requirement to such 
family members (in the UK parlance this is an 
EEA family permit), although the granting of 
these visas should follow automatically and 
without charge upon the proof of the family 
relationship and dependency issues, but an 
important exception exists where the family 
member holds a residence card from another 
Member State. The latter issue is rather 
complicated, as the UK insists that if the TCN 
family member were to arrive at the UK border 
they would be admitted if they can show that 
they fall within the ‘family member’ category. 
However, in practice, every person coming 
to the UK has to use a carrier, and the carrier 
liability rules applied by the UK mean that in 
reality persons without EEA family permits 
holding the residence card of another Member 
State will be denied boarding even though the 
carriers’ liability would be waived if boarding 
were allowed and the person were admitted 
at the border under Regulation 11(4).93 On 
the other hand, evidence of a constructive 
dialogue between the UK authorities and 
the Commission/CJEU can be gleaned from 
the fact that the UK Government rewrote the 
Regulations (for the second time in 2012) 
within two months of the Rahman case 
to remove the requirement of prior lawful 
residence in another Member State as a 
condition for taking advantage of Article 3(2) 
CRD.94 That part of the infringement action will 
therefore fall.
45. Meanwhile, the question of family members’ 
rights has often arisen for discussion and 
decision under the EU citizenship treaty 
provisions themselves, rather than the CRD, 
and the interpretation and application of 
these cases in the UK have also caused 
difficulties.95 For example, it was only in the 
2012 amendments to the EEA Regulations 
that the UK finally made full provision for the 
so-called Chen parents. Chen parents are 
89. Case C-83/11 SSHD v. Rahman, 5 September 2012. See C. Brown and A. Davies, ‘Rahman – further fleshing out of the position of third country nationals under 
the Citizenship Directive’, EUtopia Law, 29 November 2012, http://eutopialaw.com/2012/11/29/rahman-further-fleshing-out-of-the-position-of-third-country-
nationals-under-the-citizenship-directive/.
90. E.g. KG (Sri Lanka) and AK (Sri Lanka) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 13; Bigia & Ors [2009] EWCA Civ 79.
91. MR & Ors (EEA extended family members) Bangladesh [2010] UKUT 449 (IAC) (referred to the CJEU as Case C-83/11 Rahman see n.89. above); Ihemedu 
(OFMs – meaning) Nigeria[2011] UKUT 340 (IAC); Moneke (EEA – OFMs) Nigeria [2011] UKUT 00341(IAC).
92. See IP/12/417, n.70. above.
93. The 2012 amendments to the Regulations (above n.51.), adding a further paragraph to Regulation 12 on the granting of EEA family permits appear in part to be 
an attempt to react to this challenge to UK law.
94. See the amendments introduced by the Immigration (European Economic Area) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2012, SI 2012 No. 2560 (above n.51.) as 
discussed in n.53. above.
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95. E.g. Case C-60/00 Carpenter [2002] ECR I-6279, Case C-413/99 Baumbast [2002] ECR I-7091; Case C-2002/02 Chen [2004] ECR I-9925; Case C-109/01 
Akrich [2003] ECR I-9607; Case C-1/05 Jia [2007] ECR I-1 Case C-127/08 Metock [2008] ECR I-6241; Case C- 34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-1177; Case 
C-256/11 Dereci, Heiml, Kokollari, Maduike and Stevic, 15 November 2011.
96. Case C-2002/02 Chen [2004] ECR I-9925.
97. A. Weiss, ‘EEA Nationals and their rights - The new Changes to the Immigration Regulations 2006’, Migration Pulse, 1 August 2012, http://www.migrantsrights.
org.uk/migration-pulse/2012/eea-nationals-and-their-rights-new-changes-immigration-regulations-2006. However, in Bee and another (permanent/derived rights 
of residence) [2013] UKUT 00083 (IAC) the issue of permanent rights of residence under the CRD and other provisions of EU law for carers with derived rights 
was considered by the IAC, and the case was rejected.
98. Case C-40/11 Iida v. Stadt Ulm, Opinion of AG Trstenjak, 15 May 2012, judgment of the CJEU, 8 November 2012.
99. Cases C-310/08 and C-480/08 London Borough of Harrow v. Nimco Hassan Ibrahim, Maria Teixeira v. London Borough of Lambeth [2010] ECR I-1065.
100. The issue of permanent residence for the carer in these cases is before the CJEU in a case referred by the IAC, Case C-529/11 Alarape and Tijani v. SSH, 
pending (Opinion of AG Bot of 15 January 2013). This case concerns the claim for permanent residence made by a carer who derives his or her rights of 
residence from the fact that he or she is caring for an EU citizen child in education, focusing in particular on what happens after the child has reached the age of 
majority.
101. See above text accompanying n.25.
102. Papajorgji [2012] UKUT 00038 (IAC), discussed in paragraph 12.
103. AB v. Home Office, 16 February 2012, discussed in paragraph 12.
the TCN parents of EU citizen children whose 
right to reside is derived from the 2004 case of 
Chen.96 In fact, the amendments themselves 
may be problematic as they appear to deny 
the possibility that such persons could 
eventually acquire the permanent right of 
residence, and this raises questions as 
regards its compatibility with EU law which 
may be tested in the future.97 These difficulties 
seem set to continue as the CJEU continues to 
explore rights of residence based not only on 
the treaty provisions themselves, but also the 
treaty provisions read in the light of provisions 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights on family 
life, although the much anticipated case of 
Iida has not pushed at the boundaries of EU 
citizenship as some had expected after the 
Advocate General’s opinion.98 The UK has, 
in addition, faced challenges concerning the 
implementation of the Ibrahim and Texeira 
judgments, which originated in the UK courts,99 
according to which a parent caring for the 
child of a migrant worker who is in education in 
the host Member State has a right of residence 
in that State and that right is not conditional 
on the parent having sufficient resources not 
to become a burden on the social assistance 
system. These judgments were also finally 
implemented into UK law in the first set of 2012 
amendments to the EEA Regulations.100
46. Such are the principal legal challenges in 
what remains a complex and dynamic area of 
the law. However, there have been additional 
problems with the practical implementation of 
the rules. As noted before, the UK authorities 
routinely take longer than they are permitted 
to decide upon applications by TCN family 
members,101 have erred in the manner in which 
they have applied the rules relating to the 
evidencing of family relationships,102 and have 
been less than careful in their management of 
documentation and correspondence.103 All of 
this has contributed to the high rate of success 
in appeals against UKBA decisions brought 
before the tribunals, which was discussed in 
paragraph 13.
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Story One: Third Country National Family Members – 
The Experience of the UK and Ireland 
Third Country National Family Members: Their Rights 
Third country national (TCN) family members derive certain rights from their EU citizen family member, 
including, most significantly, the right to accompany or join the EU citizen family member in the Member 
State to which they move. The CRD expresses the need and motivation for certain rights to be extended to 
TCN family members of EU citizens; asserting in the preamble that,
“The right of all Union citizens to move and reside freely within the territory of 
the Member States should, if it is to be exercised under objective conditions of 
freedom and dignity, be also granted to their family members, irrespective of 
nationality”. 
 In order to benefit from these rights family members must simply prove that they have a relationship with 
the EU citizen for example by producing a marriage certificate to prove a spousal relationship.
The nature and extent of these rights are set out in the CRD, although, in parts, in fairly broad terms and as 
a result some Member States, in the process of transposing the CRD into domestic legislation, included 
more specific rules. It has therefore been necessary for the CJEU to clarify, through case law, whether 
these further rules are lawful, and to elaborate on where the limit to the derived rights of TCN family 
members lies. 
It is the distinction between the UK and Irish response to the CJEU case law that illustrates the friction 
surrounding TCN family members in the UK. 
The implementation of Metock in the UK and Ireland 
In 2008 the CJEU handed down the Metock judgment which is considered to be a milestone in clarifying 
the rights of TCN family members. It addressed the issue of whether or not it was permissible to require 
that TCN partners of EEA citizens be already lawfully resident in another Member State before exercising 
their derived right of entry and residence in a given Member State – in this case Ireland. The CJEU 
held that this requirement in Ireland, which was also a requirement of the UK’s Immigration (European 
Economic Area) Regulations, was impermissible. We will turn in a moment to the implementation of this 
case in Ireland, where it originated, but we will consider first its implementation in the UK.
Although the Court’s judgment was handed down on 28 July 2008, the internal guidance used by UKBA 
was not amended to reflect the change until January 2009 and the EEA Regulations were not changed until 
June 2011, almost three years after the date of the judgment. The amending legislation, the Immigration 
(European Economic Area) (Amendment) Regulations 2011, asserts in its Explanatory Notes that:
‘The UK Border Agency has been operationally compliant with this judgment 
[Metock] since November 2008.’
104. R (on the application of Yaw Owusu) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWHC 593 (Admin).
105. Network of Experts on the Free Movement of Workers, Follow Up of Case Law from the Court of Justice, Thematic Report, September 2010, http://ec.europa.
eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=6670&langId=en, at 12.
106. The Follow Up report of September 2010 (above n.105.) and a subsequent report by the Network of Experts, Follow Up of Case Law from the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, Thematic Report 2010-2011, October 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=7738&langId=en provide detailed 
information about the implementation of the Metock judgment at the national level, including in Member States, such as Denmark, where the issue was highly 
politicised and saw extensive negative political comment and press coverage: see M. Wind, ‘When Parliament comes first – the Danish concept of democracy 
meets the European Union’, (2009) 27 Nordisk Tidsskrift for Menneskerettigheter 272–288. The point to note is that legislative implementation occurred in 
Denmark within months, despite the intense political struggles over immigration which were directly affected by Metock.
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This sits ill with a Court of Appeal judgment104 which held the previous UK rules to be ‘flagrantly 
unlawful’ due to the ‘the failure of the Secretary of State and its agencies in its obligation to give effect 
to Community Law’. Mr Justice Blake urged the Secretary of State to amend the Regulations, declaring, 
‘there remains the problem that until the offending rule is revisited and clarified to respect Community Law, 
as to the position of other people in a similar situation. I urge the defendant [the Secretary of State] to give 
it urgent consideration’.
This can be contrasted with the experience in Ireland where the equivalent regulations were amended 
immediately. The “Thematic Report on the Follow Up of Case Law from the Court of Justice” remarked 
that,
‘The Irish Government reacted swiftly to the Metock judgment, adopting 
regulations amending the offending part of the European Union (Free Movement 
of Persons) Regulations (S.I. 226 0f 2006) only four working days after the Court 
delivered its judgment… in respect of family members who are not Union  
citizens, the requirement of prior lawful residence was removed’.105
Furthermore, the applications of all those who had applied since 28 April 2006 (the coming into force of 
the CRD) for a residence card and had been refused because they did not have prior lawful residence 
were reviewed.106
Ruiz Zambrano in the UK and Ireland 
In March 2011 the CJEU issued another landmark decision, elaborating on the rights of TCN family 
members. This time the rights concerned were those that flow directly from the EU citizenship provisions 
of the Treaty rather than from the CRD. In Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v. Office national de l’emploi (ONEM) 
the CJEU sought to refine the rights of TCN family members where the EU citizen (in this case a child) is 
dependent on the TCN family member but where the EU citizen is in his own Member State and has not 
exercised any free movement rights. Due to the length of time between the decision of Metock and the 
amendment of the UK Regulations, practitioners have anticipated a similar delay between the judgment of 
Ruiz Zambrano and the inclusion of the resulting new rule in UK legislation. To date, a year from when the 
decision was issued, there has been no legislative change in the UK. Instead an announcement on the 
UKBA website on the 21 September 2011 stated that the UKBA, 
‘will be looking at putting regulations to reflect the Zambrano judgment in place 
before the close of 2011 at the earliest’.
In the meantime, since the 19 September 2011, to benefit from the rights established in Ruiz Zambrano, 
an applicant can apply to the ‘European Casework business’ section within UKBA. Where the UKBA finds 
sufficient evidence has been supplied by the applicant, it will issue a ‘Certificate of Application’ which 
permits the applicant to work pending its substantive consideration of the application which will take place 
once the Immigration (EEA) Regulations have been changed.
Again, by contrast, in Ireland, on 21 March 2011, nine working days after the judgment, a public 
statement was made by the Minister for Justice, Equality and Defence. The statement set out how the 
Irish government intended to respond to the Ruiz Zambrano judgment. As a result, government officials 
examined all cases that had already been lodged at court (approximately 120) involving Irish citizen 
dependent children to which the Ruiz Zambrano judgment may be relevant. The relevance of Ruiz 
Zambrano to others seeking to remain in Ireland also underwent examination. Decisions made by the end 
of 2011 had resolved 108 cases that were before the courts at the date of the Ruiz Zambrano judgment. 
2011, http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=7738&langId=en provide detailed information about the implementation of the Metock judgment at the national 
level, including in Member States, such as Denmark, where the issue was highly politicised and saw extensive negative political comment and press coverage: 
see M. Wind, ‘When Parliament comes first – the Danish concept of democracy meets the European Union’, (2009) 27 Nordisk Tidsskrift for Menneskerettigheter 
272–288. The point to note is that legislative implementation occurred in Denmark within months, despite the intense political struggles over immigration which were 
directly affected by Metock.
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47. Issues around rights of residence also arise 
from time to time for EU citizens, especially 
for EU citizens from post-2004 new Member 
States. However, as the UKBA rarely seeks 
the removal of EU citizens (except where 
there are issues of probity or lack of self-
sufficiency which are discussed below at 
paragraphs 50-54), we will treat these issues 
of residence as relating primarily to the use 
by the UK authorities of residence tests as the 
basis for welfare rights (paragraphs 48-49). 
They also arise rather often in relation to EU 
citizens subject to transitional regimes (see 
paragraphs 55-56).
Access to welfare benefits and 
the right to reside
48. In the UK, access to social benefits 
and welfare provision in many areas is 
conditional upon having, in particular, the 
‘right to reside’. The question whether the UK 
has been within the scope of the limitations 
which it may legitimately impose under the 
CRD and other legislative measures on social 
security has been a contested one within 
the UK and the EU for many years and it has 
been the subject of considerable litigation 
and – now – infringement proceedings 
initiated by the Commission by the issuing of 
a reasoned opinion.107 One issue that arises 
is that, when compared with previous EU 
legislative instruments on free movement, 
what is important about the CRD is that it 
focuses on different levels of ‘residence 
right’ on the part of EU citizens. This can sit 
quite uneasily with the evolving UK law in this 
area. Where the person in question is also a 
third country national family member of an 
EU citizen resident in the UK, there are often 
additional problems which arise cumulatively. 
In a link to the discussion of probity issues 
in paragraphs 54-55 and Story Three below, 
there also appears to be an increasing trend of 
using the absence of a ‘right to reside’ as the 
basis for removal, on the grounds that such 
a person is not a qualified person. However, 
in practice the route of removal – which is 
administratively complex, potentially costly and 
not the basis on which an EU citizen can be 
durably expelled from the UK – is rarely taken 
in such cases. On the contrary, the main focus 
lies on access to benefits, and the obvious 
impact upon ability to remain in the UK if 
benefits are withdrawn. Patmalniece,108 the 
leading Supreme Court judgment, decided, 
by a majority, that while the UK measures 
were indirectly discriminatory on grounds of 
nationality, none the less that discrimination 
was justified by the need to protect the 
public pursue (Lord Walker dissenting). It is 
interesting to note that Baroness Hale referred 
in her opinion to a view put forward by the 
AIRE Centre109 that it was wrong to ‘starve 
them out’. The AIRE Centre view, presented 
on its website110 and in its intervention before 
the Supreme Court, is that EU law does not 
foresee EU citizens being left destitute when 
UK citizens would not be in comparable 
circumstances, and that in fact the appropriate 
line of action for the UK authorities is to grant 
the benefits, but then to start proceedings 
for removal on grounds that the EU citizen 
is no longer a qualifying person under the 
Regulations and falls outwith the scope of EU 
law protections as regards free movement.111
49. An additional element to the issue of the ‘right 
to reside’, as Story Two shows, concerns 
the way in which the presentation of these 
questions reflects on the construction of EU 
migrants in the UK in the eyes of the media. 
Story Two presents the media coverage and 
we return to this issue below when we look 
at the external pressures upon the interface 
between EU free movement law and UK 
immigration law as part of our discussion of 
Key Finding Four.
107. IP/12/417, n.70. above.
108. Patmalniece v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2011] UKSC 11.
109. Advice on Individual Rights in Europe, a specialist law centre focusing in particular on EU law free movement and citizenship rights (http://www.airecentre.org/). 
110. http://www.airecentre.org/news.php/18/uk-supreme-court-judgment-in-patmalniece. 
111. But see also Valcke, Part 2, above n.75. at 350 on possible restrictions on removal derived from international law.
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Story Two: ‘Benefit Tourism’ in the media
On 29 September 2011 the European Commission launched the first phase of an infringement action 
against the UK by issuing a ‘reasoned opinion’. The ‘reasoned opinion’ requested that the UK end the 
application of the ‘right to reside’ test.112 The test appears in UK benefits legislation and is a means of 
confirming the eligibility of applicants for certain social welfare benefits.113 The European Commission has 
requested an end to this test as it indirectly discriminates against citizens of other Member States. The 
potential outcome of infringement proceedings is that the Commission may decide to refer the UK to the 
CJEU. The British media reported on the European Commission’s press release, the reaction of the Work 
and Pensions Secretary Iain Duncan Smith and other UK MPs and campaign organisations. Aside from 
the reaction of British politicians the media commentary itself reveals a dominant negative portrayal of EU 
migrants and of the EU institutions. 
The term ‘benefit tourist’ is frequently used to describe people who seek social assistance but who are not 
British citizens. The term suggests the need to be suspicious of the motives of non-UK citizens seeking 
social assistance and perpetuates a hierarchy suggesting that there may be a justification for denying 
subsistence to those deemed undeserving. The coverage is also similar to that given to asylum seekers. 
It is designed to focus on ‘othering’ the group where possible. In much of the press coverage, EU citizens 
are frequently designated as ‘foreigners’ or ‘people from overseas’ rather than being designated ‘EU 
citizens’ or ‘EU migrants’. 
‘Benefit tourism’ 
There seems to be a preoccupation across a wide spectrum of newspapers and news broadcasters with 
the idea that migrants are economically motivated and seek access to the welfare state in the United 
Kingdom. The phrase ‘benefit tourist’ started to gain more traction in the British media in 2004 after 
the accession to the EU of the new Member States. The term is used liberally when reporting on the 
infringement action, playing into the fear that ‘our’ economic security as a country is being threatened 
by migrants. The Telegraph and The Daily Mail both headlined with the term ‘benefit tourist’: ‘Brussels 
threatens to sue Britain to let in ‘benefits tourists’ (The Daily Telegraph, 29 September 2011);114 ‘We’re 
throwing open doors to ‘benefit tourists’: EU plan to let migrants claim as soon as they enter the UK is 
blasted’ (The Daily Mail, 30 September 2011).115 The Daily Mail went on to declare that ‘Europe has given 
Britain two months to scrap its policies which prevent benefit tourists claiming billions of pounds in 
hand-outs’ (The Daily Mail, 30 September 2011). 
Other media sources, who are not known for anti-immigrant and anti-Europe reporting in the same way as 
The Telegraph and Daily Mail, also used the phrase in the content of their articles: ‘Ministers fear taxpayers 
could be forced into handing out more than £2bn to EU nationals, including so-called “benefit tourists”’ 
(BBC, 30 September 2011).116 The Independent did not use the term but instead used a similar phrase 
‘benefits for migrants’: ‘The threat of legal action by the European Commission over Britain’s restrictions 
on benefits for migrants risks “blowing the Government’s immigration policy out of the water”’ (The 
Independent, 30 September 2011).117
112. Press Release, ‘Social security coordination: Commission requests United Kingdom to end discrimination of EU nationals residing in the UK regarding their 
rights to specific social benefits’, IP/11/1118, 29 September 2011.
113. Child Benefit, Child Tax Credit, State Pension Credit, Income-based Allowance for Jobseekers, Income-based Employment and Support Allowance.
114.  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/8798095/Brussels-threatens-to-sue-Britain-to-let-in-benefit-tourists.html. 
115. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2043519/Now-EU-orders-Britain-Let-migrants-claim-benefits-soon-arrive-UK.html. 
116. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-15120522. 
117. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/immigration-policy-under-threat-2363687.html. 
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‘EU migrants’ or ‘foreigners’ 
EU migrants are presented as part of larger homogenous group of ‘migrants’ or ‘foreigners’. This 
construction by the media fails to distinguish between the set of rights that third country nationals can 
acquire in the UK and the enhanced rights of movement, residence and access to benefits that EU 
citizens and their family members automatically possess. This is also very similar to the way asylum 
seekers have been constructed by the media for the past decade: they are seen as a large group (seen 
as much larger in the popular imagination than they actually are) who are defined by their movement and 
by what they seek to take away from the state and as a consequence as a group that threatens state 
interests.118
Thus the BBC wrote, ‘The European Commission has threatened legal action against the UK, saying 
a test of eligibility for benefits discriminates against foreigners’ (BBC, 30 September 2011). The Sky 
News article began with an alarmist perspective, ‘Tax payers could be left with a £2bn bill if the European 
Commission brings legal action over Britain limiting benefits for foreigners, according to ministers. The 
UK has been given two months to explain how it will fall into line with EU rules after being warned its “right 
to reside” test could discriminate against people from overseas’ (Sky News, 30 September 2011).119 
The Guardian confused the issue entirely by saying those affected are “overseas”: “Possible legal action 
by the European Commission over Britain’s plans to limit benefits claims for those overseas could leave 
tax payers with a £2bn bill, the work and pensions secretary, Iain Duncan Smith, has said” (The Guardian, 
30 September 2011).120
118. A.J Innes, ‘When the threatened become the threat: the construction of Asylum Seekers in British Media Narratives’, (2010) 24 International Relations 456-777.
119. http://news.sky.com/story/886358/benefits-for-foreigners-uk-faces-2bn-bill. 
120. http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/sep/30/eu-threat-uk-benefits-changes. 
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The area of ‘probity’: selecting the 
‘bad’ from the ‘good’ migrants
50. EU free movement rights are not unconditional. 
Member States are able to restrict free 
movement rights by reference to reasons of 
public security and policy, but any measures 
taken must be related to the personal conduct 
of the EU citizens in question (and will also 
– as with such determinations in ‘general’ 
immigration law – be subject to human rights 
scrutiny in the courts). The test which much 
be applied by the Member States will also vary 
depending upon how long a person has been 
resident in the UK, and thus what rights they 
have. The interface of periods of imprisonment 
and the accumulation of the necessary years 
of residence in the host Member State has 
been an issue that has come quite frequently 
before both the UK courts121 and the CJEU122 
in recent years. In any event, it is important 
to emphasise that Ministers do not have the  
power, as they have in relation to aliens, to 
exclude a person from the UK on the grounds 
that their presence is not conducive to the 
public interest.123 In addition, Member States 
are permitted to enquire into certain family 
relationships, e.g. to prevent so-called sham 
marriages or indeed forged papers ‘proving’ 
family relationships being used in order to 
circumvent restrictions imposed within national 
immigration law.
51. It should also be noted that the coming into 
force of the CRD coincided with a period of 
intense public scrutiny of UK practices on 
deportation/removal, especially in relation to 
two categories – foreign national prisoners 
and persons who had had a claim for asylum 
rejected. In relation to the former group, there 
is scope for considerable overlap with the 
proper treatment of EEA nationals who have 
committed crimes and who are considered 
for deportation under the CRD. In relation to 
foreign national prisoners in general, the UK 
Borders Act 2007 introduced a higher degree 
of automaticity into the process of deporting 
foreign prisoners at the end of a custodial 
sentence of twelve months or more, albeit 
with saving provisions for those enjoying 
‘Community rights’.124 However, in more 
general public statements from Government 
officials, including some made in Parliament, 
it was not always made clear that there are 
separate regimes in relation to those covered 
by EU law and those who are not. The Ministry 
of Justice service instructions on Immigration, 
Repatriation And Removal Services note that 
while EEA nationals normally have a right to 
live and work in the UK, they can be removed 
under certain circumstances. Thus ‘all EEA 
nationals with a sentence of 12 months or 
more should be referred to UKBA who will 
determine whether they should be deported 
or removed.’125 Cases such as that involving 
Learco Chindamo, who was sentenced to 
lengthy term of imprisonment for the murder 
of head teacher Philip Lawrence in London 
in 1996 and who was recommended for 
deportation after his release in 2006, show 
that the UK courts are able to apply the 
appropriate EU law standards, notwithstanding 
popular and press hysteria about the notion 
that prisoners may be enjoying human rights 
protection that they do not deserve.126 
121. E.g. SSHD v FV (Italy) [2012] EWCA Civ 1199.
122. Case C-348/09 PI v Oberbürgermeisterin der Stadt Remscheid, 22 May 2012.
123. Compare the High Court judgment in Naik v. SSHD [2010] EWHC 2825 on the exclusion of a Muslim writer and speaker, a citizen of India, who had made 
statements in support of Osama bin Laden (Secretary of State’s decision lawful as regards her personal power to exclude such persons) and the Tribunal 
determination in GW (EEA reg 21: ‘fundamental interests’) Netherlands [2009] UKAIT 50 on the attempt to exclude the radical Dutch politician Geert Wilders 
from the UK (decision not to admit Wilders successfully appealed). However, particular problems – now before the CJEU following a reference from the Court 
of Appeal (ZZ v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 440) – concern the operation of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission 
system and the difficulties for an EU citizen of appealing an exclusion decision where the authorities do not wish to reveal certain security sensitive information 
on the basis of which the decision was made: Case C-300/11 ZZ v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, pending. This case raises significant 
questions about the applicability of the CFR in this area and of course its applicability in the UK.
124. UK Borders Act 2007, s33(4).
125. Prison Service instructions on Immigration, Repatriation And Removal Services, PSI 52/2011, November 2011, available from http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/
hmi-prisons. But see also Section Three of Chapter Eight of the European Casework Instructions, ‘Enforcement actions taken against EEA nationals and family 
members’, available from http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/ecis/.
126. LC v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (Learco Chindamo), IA/13107/2006, 17 August 2007.
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52. Even so, despite the fact that relevant cases 
have not necessarily come to court, there 
is some evidence of EEA national prisoners 
having been caught in an initial ‘crackdown’ 
which occurred when the question of 
deporting foreign national prisoners first 
came to public prominence in the middle of 
the first decade of the 21st century. First of 
all, as the Thirty-Second report by the Joint 
Committee of the House of Commons and 
the House of Lords on Human Rights pointed 
out,127 a recent attempted crackdown by the 
government on foreign prisoners was rejected 
by the courts in relation to EEA nationals. 
Effectively, the UK Government was forced to 
abandon the attempt to impose a presumption 
that EEA nationals who had served sentences 
of 24 months or more should be deported. 
And then, in a number of reports issued by 
HM Inspector of Prisons,128 evidence came 
out of EEA national prisoners being swept 
up in rather indiscriminate trawls conducted 
by immigration officials of prisoners coming 
towards the end of their sentences, and being 
placed in immigration detention, or moved to 
higher security prisons as a result.
53. Finally it should be noted that there is some 
overlap between the issues of UK law relating 
to the deportation of foreign national prisoners 
(i.e. non-EEA nationals) and EU law, following 
the CJEU judgment in Ruiz Zambrano which 
made it clear that it would amount to a 
substantial deprivation of the rights of EU 
citizenship if a citizen of a Member State, even 
one who was resident in the state of which s/
he was a citizen and had never exercised a 
free movement right, would be required to 
leave the EU altogether because of a decision 
made relating to the residency status of her/his 
parents on which s/he was dependent. These 
principles, along with the particular weight to 
be given to the presence of UK citizen children 
in all cases relating to the deportation of 
foreign national prisoners which were raised 
by the Supreme Court in ZH Tanzania,129 were 
discussed at some length by the UKUT (IAC) 
in the determination in Sanade,130 not least 
in order to give further guidance to First Tier 
tribunals.
54. Although it is clear there are many different 
issues arising under this heading, we can 
summarise this area of friction as engaging 
with issues of ‘probity’ in its broadest sense. 
This would include not only attempts to deport 
those convicted of serious criminal offences, 
but also terrorism- and public security-related 
issues, as well as sham and forced marriages. 
Moreover, there is also an overlap with the 
previous issue, as Member States from time to 
time seek to effect the removal of EU citizens 
who are unable to maintain themselves, are 
homeless and often destitute and are perhaps 
housed in temporary accommodation or 
‘camps’, on the grounds they do not qualify 
under the treaty rules. But when media 
commentators comment upon such cases, 
they often forget to add that EU citizens who 
have been removed because they are not 
deemed to be exercising their ‘treaty rights’ 
can simply return to the UK by exercising 
their ‘ordinary’ free movement rights which 
give them – unconditionally – a minimum of 
three months to remain in the UK every time 
they visit. They cannot normally be refused 
entry to the UK except by reference to specific 
individual characteristics and serious risks. 
These various categories of EU citizens who 
might be thought to be ‘bad’ migrants are thus 
conflated in careless media reporting, creating 
a link, in our analysis, between the two areas 
of friction concerning access to welfare rights 
and the issue of ‘probity’.
127. See http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200506/jtselect/jtrights/278/27805.htm#a4. 
128. HM Inspectorate of Prisons, Foreign national prisoners: a thematic review, July 2006 ; Foreign national prisoners: A follow-up report, January 2007.
129. ZH (Tanzania) v. SSHD [2011] UKSC 4.
130. Sanade and others (British children – Zambrano – Dereci) [2012] UKUT 00048.
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Story Three: The UKBA Homelessness Pilot and the 
‘Bad Migrant’
Removal
EU law provides for the removal by Member States of an EU citizen and his or her family members where 
there are grounds to do so on the basis of ‘public policy, public security or public health’. However, 
such a removal must only take place on account of ‘the personal conduct of the individual concerned,’ 
and that conduct must represent ‘a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the 
fundamental interests of society’.
The Homelessness Pilot
In 2010, the UKBA piloted a scheme that aimed to remove EU citizens for a different reason: expulsion for 
those who were not exercising treaty rights (by working, studying or being otherwise self-sufficient) and 
who were homeless and sleeping rough in the UK.
The scheme was launched in April 2010 and was supported by local councils and housing and 
homelessness organisations who were facing difficulties as a result of an increasing number of ‘A10’ 
nationals (nationals of the new member states: the ‘A8’ states who joined the EU in 2004 and the ‘A2’131 
states who joined the EU in 2004) who were homeless and sleeping rough. UKBA explains that the pilot 
‘sought to test the feasibility and resource implications of administratively removing individuals who were 
‘not exercising a treaty right’. The pilot was geographically limited to the city of Peterborough and parts of 
London.
During the pilot UKBA issued written notices to individuals informing them that they had been deemed 
‘not to be exercising a treaty right’ and must therefore appear at a local police station for an interview to 
determine whether they had the right to remain in the country. It has not been disclosed how many notices 
were served and how many removals were carried out, although The Guardian reported that within the 
first month of the pilot 200 people were considered, roughly 100 people were served with a notice, and 13 
people had been deported (The Guardian, 20 July 2010). The pilot has now ended and UKBA are carrying 
out an evaluation that will conclude whether to extend the policy to other areas of the UK. 
Who felt the impact? 
Although the Homelessness Pilot was not specifically aimed at citizens of the recently acceded Member 
States of the EU, the impact of the pilot was felt most by these Central and Eastern European nationals. 
This was due, on the one hand, to the rules set out in the transitional arrangements which limited access, 
for A8 and A2 nationals, to social assistance for a certain period. Without access to benefits or job 
seekers allowance, this group faced an increased risk of homelessness in times of financial hardship or 
unemployment. On the other hand, this group was more exposed, than other EU citizens, to being found 
‘not to be exercising treaty rights’. The transitional arrangements limit the circumstances where an A8 
or A2 national will be deemed to be ‘exercising a treaty right’. The key time an A8 or A2 national will be 
considered ‘not to be exercising a treaty right’ is where they are unemployed and cannot, for example 
because they have never been employed or are not seeking work, retain worker status or exercise 
131. A note on terminology: the continued use of the terms A8 and A2 national, long after the respective states had acceded and even – in the case of the citizens 
of the eight central and eastern European states – after the expiry of the transitional period (May 2011) represents one way in which they have continued to be 
constructed as quasi-second class (EU) citizens. The terms A8 and A2 are only used in the text that follows because this was the terminology widely used to 
present and report upon the homelessness pilot.
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rights as a job seeker. An A8 or A2 national will be considered to be ‘exercising a treaty right’ where the 
individual is working and the work is either ‘registered’ on the A8 Workers Registration Scheme or is 
‘authorised’ as part of the Worker Authorisation Scheme and also when they are studying or are otherwise 
‘self-sufficient’.
Before the homelessness pilot, these categories were only relevant in the UK for determining eligibility for 
benefits. During the homelessness pilot these categories became relevant to the decision to remove an 
EEA citizen. Where UKBA found an EEA citizen ‘not exercising a treaty right’ and homeless and sleeping 
rough they sought to remove them to their home country on the basis that they were ‘not exercising a 
treaty right’.
Even for the most at-risk group, non-economically active and homeless A8 and A2 nationals, campaign 
groups have argued that expulsion is unlawful. These individuals may be said to be exercising residence 
rights as self-sufficient individuals. To be self-sufficient, one must have: sufficient resources to avoid 
becoming a burden on the social assistance system; and comprehensive sickness insurance cover. In 
the only known legal challenge (an unreported first tier tribunal decision) the tribunal held that, amongst 
other things, such expulsions appear to be disproportionate in general because the only legitimate aim 
they might pursue, as a matter of EU law, would be to protect the social assistance system and the 
circumstances of A8 and A2 cases are that individuals are not eligible for social assistance.
The Irony
The pilot has a certain irony; it ignores the fact that EU citizens as a function of EU law have the right to 
return. As described by an interviewee, 
‘They don’t in reality remove EU Citizens because they have the right to re-
admission, so it’s pointless because if you deport someone on the Eurostar they 
can turn round at the Gare de Nord and exercise their return ticket and come 
back in…
There have been pilot schemes where the UKBA have been doing that with local 
authorities, Peterborough and Westminster, where one solution they’ve decided 
to go for with rough sleepers is to remove someone to a country like Poland or 
another accession state. But there is some evidence to suggest that when people 
have been removed, family members have paid for budget airlines to return 
the person to the UK because the very fact the person came to the UK, this is 
anecdotal, the very reason that they came to the UK is that their family don’t want 
them in Poland; their family members who were supposed to support them send 
them back on a return coach trip or a return Easyjet flight or whatever it is.’ 
So, you know, there’s not really a solution to homelessness as such. It’s just an 
out of sight out of mind policy.’ [Q2]
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The serious problem 
However despite the efficacy of the pilot perhaps being undermined by the ability of EU citizens to simply 
return to the UK, what is not in question is that a serious problem underlies this pilot: homeless and 
destitute EU citizens who are often vulnerable to exploitation. A study by the Combined Homeless and 
Information Network found that in London in 2011 28% of rough sleepers in London were from Central and 
Eastern European countries and one in ten of all new rough sleepers are Polish.
An interviewee described examples of people living in very desperate conditions,
‘They are often people with an alcohol or a drugs problem. They’re the hard to reach of the homelessness 
sector who annoy the local residents but who are also lying in tents with trench foot and such things.’ [Q3]
A category of expulsion for the ‘unwanted’
Where do these removals fit within the framework of EU law? The framework of EU law that provides for the 
removal of EU citizens on the grounds of ‘public policy, public security or public health’ and on account 
of the personal conduct of the individual concerned presenting a ‘genuine, present and sufficiently 
serious threat affecting the fundamental interests of society’? The categories in which EU citizens and 
their family members can be excluded are unique and carefully litigated. However it appears that during 
the homelessness pilot the UKBA attempted to pry open a fourth category, another kind of ‘bad’ migrant 
or simply an ‘unwanted’ migrant. This is where issues of destitution elide with issues of delinquency, and 
where a category of unwelcome migrants emerges. Where a person is unable to maintain him or herself, 
one interviewee expressed that this, combined with a low skill level, is the ‘defining point of being a “bad 
migrant”’ in the eyes of the UKBA:
‘As a Polish migrant or a Lithuanian migrant, I think it’s probably got more to do with the skill level 
that they’re operating with. Forty-five year old men who are working in agriculture and have got very 
intermittent records of employment, one week here and two weeks there and they have very insecure 
living circumstances, that’s the defining point of being the bad migrant as far as the UK authorities are 
concerned and they’re looking for some point of purchase for dealing with that group. The avenues 
that that’s leading them to are actually closer collaboration with social welfare organisations, things like 
housing and homelessness organisations.’ [Q4]
The final aspect of these cases that makes them problematic is that the categories of persons targeted 
are unlikely to have ready access to formal justice, in the sense of being willing or able to bring an action 
within the Tribunal system in order to test out the scope of EU law. A rare example of a case brought 
by a homeless Czech citizen who had in fact resided in the UK for some considerable time, with the 
assistance of the AIRE Centre, did in fact result in a successful appeal against the removal directions 
given by the Home Office.132
132. ‘Expulsion of homeless EEA national struck down on appeal’, 30 July 2011, http://www.migrantsrights.org.uk/migration-pulse/2011/expulsion-homeless-eea-
national-struck-down-appeal. 
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The area of ‘boundary zones’
55. The fourth area of friction directly engages the 
‘boundary zones’ to be found at the limits 
of EU law and of the EU’s territory. It arises 
from the issues which emerge at the physical 
boundaries of the territory of the EU in respect 
of new Member States and in respect of a 
state which still aspires to membership but 
which has long had a legal relationship with 
the EU (an association agreement) which 
affects the status of those of its citizens who 
are resident in the EU (Turkey).
56. Particular problems have arisen in relation to 
the special regimes governing the cases of 
citizens of new Member States that joined the 
EU in 2004 and 2007. One of the issues raised 
by the Commission in the reasoned opinion 
sent to the UK government in April 2012 
concerned the failure by the UK authorities 
to issue to Bulgarian and Romanian workers 
covered by the transitional regime in force 
until the end of 2013 the same residence 
permits as are issued to nationals of other 
Member States.133 As the EU continues to 
enlarge, transitional regimes such as these 
are likely to be a permanent feature as is well 
illustrated by the case of Croatia which will 
accede to the EU on 1 July 2013,134 and so will 
the question of what steps such transitional 
regimes allow Member States to take and 
where they must treat nationals of those states 
as ‘ordinary’ EU citizens with the usual range 
of citizenship rights. Moreover, this material is 
contextualised in its application by the EU’s 
own emerging interventions in the field of 
immigration law as a legislature and – as such 
measures are implemented by the Member 
States – as judicial actor. This brings into play 
the interstitial case of Turkish migrants, whose 
situation is governed by the provisions of 
an Association Agreement, in particular the 
effects of its standstill clause as interpreted 
by the CJEU in the Soysal judgment.135 The 
Association Agreement with Turkey (or ‘Ankara 
Agreement’) – unlike many measures under 
the EU’s emerging immigration and asylum 
law – applies also to the UK.
133. IP/12/417, see above n.70.
134. The European Union (Croatian Accession and Irish Protocol) Bill 2012 (HL Bill 59 2012-2013 see http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2012-13/
europeanunioncroatianaccessionandirishprotocol.html for details of its progress) was given a first reading in the House of Lords on 28 November 2012. It 
makes legislative provision for restrictions on access to the UK labour market (by means of regulations to be adopted by the Secretary of State), which are 
modelled on the approach taken in relation to Bulgarian and Romanian accession in 2007: see House of Commons Library Standard Note, The Croatia 
Accession Bill: an introduction, SN6327, 14 May 2012. In October 2012, the Home Office also issued a Statement of Intent in relation to the transitional 
provisions to be introduced for Croatian citizens in relation to the UK labour market: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/immigration/croatia-eu-
accession/. Essentially, the UK will maintain restrictions on persons seeking to take up low skill work, while making it easier for Croatian citizens to take up high 
skill work, especially those who are already resident and working in the UK under the Immigration Rules.
135.  Case C-228/06 Soysal [2009] ECR I-1031.
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Story Four: The Ankara Agreement and the ‘Special 
Status’ of Turkish Workers
Special Regimes within EU law
EU law requires Member States to operate and manage a number of different systems of rights and 
obligations beyond those which govern the free movement rights of EU citizens and their family 
members. There are different arrangements between groups of Member States, such as the transitional 
arrangements operating as a result of the accession of the new Member States in 2004 and 2007, 
and there are agreements between Member States and non-EU states. An example of the latter is the 
system in place between the EU and Turkey under the Ankara Agreement 1963 (‘The Agreement’). The 
Agreement was ratified in anticipation of Turkey’s accession to the EU and the desire to consolidate a 
trade relationship between the EU and Turkey. As a result the Agreement has a protective effect which 
ensures that the momentum leads towards the integration of Turkish migrants, not against it. Many of the 
provisions have direct effect and Articles 12-14 provide that the contracting parties are to be guided by 
the relevant articles of the EC Treaty in progressively securing freedom of movement for workers, freedom 
of establishment, and provision of services. The rights do not include a right of entry as it was anticipated 
that the right of entry would be governed by the national laws of the Member States. Once lawful 
residence is established in a Member State the principle of non-discrimination applies as between Turkish 
nationals and EU citizens. 
The life cycle of the Ankara Agreement
Other than a series of cases in the late 1980s and early 1990s that established the jurisdiction of the CJEU 
to interpret the Agreement and the accompanying Decision 1/80, the Agreement lay largely dormant 
until a reawakening moment in 2000, brought about by a preliminary reference from the UK to the CJEU. 
The Court confirmed in Savas136 that the ‘standstill clause’ in Article 41 of the Additional Protocol to the 
Agreement (relating to the right of establishment for self-employed persons and the right to provide 
services) was directly effective and prevented the UK from applying rules on the establishment of Turkish 
workers that were more restrictive than those which were in force at the commencement of the Ankara 
Agreement in 1963. For the UK this was 1973; from the point at which the UK joined the EU. In other 
words, if rules in 1973 were more favourable to that currently in force, then the older rules must be applied. 
This invigoration of the standstill clause meant that the potential scope in which Turkish workers could 
benefit from more favourable rules was suddenly increased. 
In the UK this occurred at the same time as, as one practitioner describes: 
‘an explosion of awareness, if you like, amongst Turkish nationals of the right to 
establish themselves, in business, on no less restrictive terms than 1973 which 
previously, by many, had been fairly unnoticed. This coincides with a lot of failed 
asylum seekers having exhausted their appeal rights and casting round for a 
different basis upon which to remain in the UK … I don’t know what the numbers 
are but I would guess that there was a sharp increase in numbers, that might 
be wrong, you can see. But certainly there was a big increase in the number of 
judicial review applications about refusal of leave to remain on that basis.’ [Q5]
136. Case C-37/98 R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Abdulnasir Savas [2000] ECR I-2927.
36
Getting to grips with EU citizenship:  
Understanding the friction between UK immigration law and EU free movement law
The Ankara Agreement and the CJEU 
The CJEU continued to enforce the Ankara Agreement, elaborating on the terms and function of 
the Agreement, most often in favour of promoting the integration of Turkish workers. For example, in 
Commission v. Netherlands,137 the Court held that the standstill clause extended not only to legislative 
measures but also to procedural measures imposed by the state. Therefore the standstill clause was 
applicable to charges imposed on Turkish nationals for the issue of residence permits concerning a first 
admission to the territory of a Member State or for the extension of such a permit. Further, the Court stated 
that any disproportionate difference in fees required of Turkish nationals compared with EU citizens would 
also be prohibited on the grounds of the equal treatment principle present in the Agreement.
The Ankara Agreement and the UK
In the UK, responding to the revitalisation of the Ankara Agreement, the scope of the Agreement is now far 
more frequently litigated. Many were taken by surprise by the existence of the Ankara Agreement and the 
rights contained within it, as one practitioner explained:
‘The Turkish applications are getting in through, what I think is being seen as the 
back-door, in that probably, when the UK joined the EC, nobody even knew about 
this Ankara Agreement, really. You can tell just from the history of the cases that 
have come up, Savas [2000] and then Tum [2008] and then Oguz [2011], it’s 
relatively recent, even in our recent history of being in the EC. What is it, probably 
the last 10, 12 years that people have started arguing this because nobody really 
cottoned onto it.’ [Q6]
Turkish Workers: What Kind of ‘Special Status’? 
As the legal terrain is being tested in the CJEU and in the UK courts and as both the reach of the standstill 
clause and the terms under which the rights may be limited are being explored, the scope of the ‘special 
status’ of Turkish nationals seems uncertain: where do Turkish nationals fit within the scheme of EU law 
and free movement rights? They appear to enjoy a status halfway between the status of a national of a 
Member State and a third country national. What, if anything, is the impact of the Long Term Residence 
Directive 2003/109 (which does not apply in the UK) which would protect long term resident Turkish 
nationals in other Member States?138 
When interpreting the rights within the Agreement the CJEU has been guided ‘as far as possible’ 
by EU free movement rules. This is an approach that is all the more justified as often the provisions 
are formulated in identical terms to the Treaty. However recent case law of the CJEU has somewhat 
undermined this approach.139 The Court decided that, rather than interpret the protection from expulsion of 
a Turkish national from a Member State in line with the protection from expulsion of EU citizens prescribed 
by the CRD, the threshold should instead be sought from the Long Term Residence Directive 2003/109 
which provides a rule of ‘minimum protection for all third country nationals who hold the status of long term 
resident’. The selection of the Long Term Residents Directive over the CRD as a ‘framework for reference’ 
was based on the distinction between the origins of the two directives; the former being the promotion of 
trade and the latter being the fundamental status of EU citizenship. This is a rational distinction although 
137. Case C-92/07 Commission v. Netherlands [2010] ECR I-3683.
138. Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, OJ 2004 L16/44 harmonises 
national laws in respect of the residence of third country nationals and creates a single status of ‘long term resident’ for which third country nationals can qualify 
after five years of residence. It also provides equal treatment vis-à-vis EU citizens and nationals for long term resident third country nationals.
139. Case C-371/08 Ziebell v. Land Baden-Württemberg, 8 December 2011.
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some commentators140 have pointed out that it has a misleading element, since nationals of EEA states, 
and their family members, another special group of non-EU nationals, also benefit from the CRD along 
with EU citizens. This change in alignment leaves some uncertainty as to how the Turkish regime fits 
within the free movement framework for policy makers and decision makers and it poses a challenge to 
domestic institutions and to practitioners who have to work out how Turkish workers fit into the immigration 
system in the UK, given that the Long Term Residence Directive does not apply in the UK. 
Concluding comments on the 
main areas of friction
57. The presentation of the four areas of friction 
and the legal and societal issues which these 
raise was intended to provide some dynamic 
context for the presentation of the key findings 
from the empirical research on the character 
and possible causes of these frictions. In 
fact, as many of our respondents observed, 
mapping out the relationship between EU law 
and UK immigration law in terms of these four 
areas of friction in practice covered much of 
the relevant legal terrain in one way or another. 
But in fact, the presentation of the legal issues 
is not exhaustive and is not intended to be 
and there are many fundamental questions as 
well as issues of detail dealt with in the CRD, 
the Regulations and the case law which are 
not addressed in the previous paragraphs 
or elsewhere in this Report. But this method 
of presenting the issues is helpful, because 
it emphasises the societal issues about 
immigration and perceptions of immigration 
which underpin the application of the EU free 
movement rules in the UK. For what these 
areas all have in common is that they lie at the 
margins of EU free movement law where 
EU free movement law’s reach gradually 
gives way to other regimes of national or 
EU immigration law. Third country nationals 
generally have rights derived through their 
EU citizen family members, not autonomous 
treaty-based rights or rights rooted in EU 
legislation. Their position in the UK is an 
exception to the normal rule that third country 
nationals are aliens, who are subject to the full 
rigours of immigration control and thus must 
apply for leave to enter and remain. But in 
some cases the CRD actually invites Member 
States to apply their own national law (e.g. 
to ‘other family members’). As entry points 
under national law (family migration, economic 
migration) are closed down, claimants have 
unsurprisingly turned towards EU law to 
see whether or not their situation might be 
differently treated under that regime. The UK 
will therefore need to draw a balance which 
allows it to detect fraudulent behaviour and 
to distinguish it from merely opportunistic 
behaviour. As Baroness Hale famously stated 
in her judgment in the House of Lords case 
of Baiai,141 ‘there are many perfectly genuine 
marriages which may bring some immigration 
advantage to one or both of the parties 
depending on where for the time being they 
wish to make their home. That does not make 
them “sham” marriages.’ The same point can 
be made about the existence of a connection 
to EU law in any given immigration case.
58. In similar terms, the rights of those who 
are unable to support themselves without 
assistance from the state have always been 
restricted under EU free movement law, 
although in practice Member States have 
rarely sought to exercise their immigration 
sovereignty in order to remove this group, 
even though a formal procedure has 
existed in the UK since the mid-1990s.142 
Increasingly, as we have seen, the UK has 
used definitions imported from immigration 
law in order to restrict access to benefits. 
The freedom for Member States to designate 
(and even remove) those they regard as no 
longer qualifying for the protection of the 
140. S. Peers, ‘Expulsion of Turkish citizens: a backwards step by the Court of Justice?’, [2012] Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 56–63.
141. R (on the application of Baiai and others) v. SSHD [2008] UKHL 53.
142. See originally Immigration (European Economic Area) Order 1994, SI 1895, para.15(2).
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free movement rules because they are an 
unreasonable burden on the host state or to 
remove those who represent an unreasonable 
threat to public policy or public security also 
highlights the very edges of EU’s citizens’ free 
movement rights, as the field shifts towards 
the traditional control functions of immigration 
law. Here too, Member States have a difficult 
balancing act to undertake. Finally, transitional 
or special regimes are areas which lie between 
mainstream free movement law and traditional 
immigration laws, and thus pose some 
additional challenges to decision-makers and 
courts.
59. In that respect, of course, these areas of 
friction are not representative of the free 
movement experience for the majority of non-
national EU citizens, but they do represent a 
useful way of capturing the pressure points 
(or ‘pinch points’ as one informant put it 
[Q11]) within the implementation framework. 
These pressure points will tend to consume 
a substantial proportion of the resources 
(administrative, judicial, support) devoted to 
the effective implementation of this field of EU 
law in the UK.
Section 7: Second Phase Findings: an enquiry into 
the character and causes of the areas of friction
60. The second phase of our research 
comprised an enquiry into the character 
and causes of the areas of friction identified 
and discussed in Section 6. To focus the 
attention of our stakeholder interviewees’ 
on these issues, we used as a starting point 
certain intuitions as to why there continue 
to be difficulties in the implementation of EU 
free movement law, even forty years after the 
accession of the UK to the EU. As the research 
evolved, however, we found that the scope of 
the enquiry was broadened to encompass not 
only the (legal) cultural and systemic questions 
which had first attracted our interest but also 
certain factors which are external to the legal 
systems in question, which seem to have a 
substantial impact on the ongoing relationship 
between EU free movement law and UK law.
61. We found widespread agreement amongst 
most stakeholders who engage with the 
implementation of the system of EU free 
movement law in the UK as ‘users’ that there 
does indeed exist friction between the systems 
in respect of the areas outlined above as we 
had postulated on the basis of our original 
desk-based analysis. However, they did not 
necessarily agree about all of the features or 
causes of those frictions. We elaborate upon 
that point in the course of presenting three 
more key findings.
KEY FINDING 2: The evidence showed 
that particular problems arise as regards 
the extent to which the ‘culture’ of EU free 
movement law is effectively embedded 
into UK law. This has a more substantial 
impact where claimants are seeking to 
rely on the very ‘edges’ of free movement 
law or directly on EU citizenship rights or 
the Charter of Fundamental rights. Here 
lack of familiarity with elements of EU law 
beyond the confines of the EU’s CRD and 
the UK Regulations plays a role and can 
limit the effective capacity of decision-
makers and make it less likely that 
correct decisions are reached, within the 
timescales set down by EU law.
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62. A common concern amongst practitioners 
was that they felt that UKBA decision-makers 
and tribunal judges rarely drew a clear enough 
distinction between EU free movement law and 
UK immigration law:
‘I think the thing which creates the biggest 
areas, because it’s not confined to just one 
general heading, is the failure of UKBA, the 
tribunal service and the higher courts to 
recognise that free movement rights are not 
a system of immigration control. And that 
the starting place for the assessment of an 
individual case is entirely different.’ [Q7]
In similar terms, another practitioner 
respondent noted that
‘seeing EU Law as a border control issue 
is probably the problem, it’s not just an 
alternative source of migration control, 
it’s a source of civil entitlement based 
on a common pan European concept of 
Citizenship and I think that’s more than 
rhetoric.’ [Q8]
The same respondent went on to highlight
‘the extent to which the immigration 
authorities at almost all levels, almost 
including advisors concentrate on the 
immigration problem rather than the free 
movement solution to the problem.’ [Q9]
63. Many respondents expressed a general 
concern that at the margins of free movement 
law, the areas where there is always going 
to be some contention about the precise 
meaning of the law and how it should be 
interpreted, there is a rather restrictive 
approach and spirit in the UK, shared not only 
by the UKBA in respect of its decisional role, 
but also by some parts of the judiciary. So one 
practitioner respondent commented:
‘There’s a tension between a genuinely more 
restrictive view of what freedom of movement 
rights entail at the margins which is common 
not just to the Home Office or UKBA but 
to much of the domestic judiciary as well.’ 
[Q10]
This was echoed by a member of the judiciary 
offering a much broader perspective on the 
continuing ‘struggle’ with EU law:
‘The pinch points are those interactions, they 
are those junctures... [M]ost cases ... get 
dealt with very straight forwardly, I don’t know 
what the percentages are but it will be a high 
percentage of people who applied for an EU8 
residence card, family member otherwise, 
they get granted, they apply from overseas 
for the family permit, they get granted. It’s the 
minority ones where there’s these questions 
about what is dependency, what is abuse ... 
whether there are conflicting rights, what’s 
been met. Where the Home Office struggles 
in its decision-making and judges struggle 
in their decision-making and representatives 
struggle in presenting arguments, because 
at those points you’re suddenly having to 
look at more general issues throughout the 
corpus of European Law. [Q11]
64. Particular challenges arise in relation to 
cases which require the courts to depart from 
the EEA Regulations because they do not 
accurately reflect the current interpretation 
of the CRD by the Court of Justice, which 
are based on measures such as Article 24 
CRD (right to equal treatment) which are not 
explicitly transposed into UK law as regards 
immigration questions, or which are based on 
claims arising directly from the treaties, the 
CFR or some other legislative instruments. As 
one practitioner put it:
‘There’s a slight fetish made out of the 
immigration and European Economic Area 
Regulations, that if its not in them, it’s not 
the law. In practical terms, of course it’s true 
that you start with your transposing domestic 
instrument and see if you can accommodate 
the EU Right of Movement interpretation 
within their provisions there. But if you 
can’t, and self-evidently all of these things 
which are not transposing the freedom of 
movement directive these are obviously 
not going to be in the regulations, then it 
becomes very difficult, not just in terms of 
law but of how you give effect to the appeal 
that’s allowed in an immigration jurisdiction 
where there is no obvious way.’ [Q12]
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 As another respondent put it, 
‘it’s the treaty they [referring to the UKBA] 
don’t recognise’. [Q13]
65. Others commented critically upon gaps in 
the CRD, feeling that these contributed to the 
absence of a clear body of law for claimants 
to rely upon. It is not a ‘full code’, as one 
informant commented [Q14]. For example, 
one informant explained his/her understanding 
of the CRD in the following terms:
‘Well I started off with 2004/38 thinking that 
it was a comprehensive statement but the 
more I looked at it the more it’s sort of bits, 
it’s some bits from existing Directives. Some 
codification. So it’s part consolidation, part 
codification, but only at the precise facts 
of cases rather than the principles.… I’m 
trying to look at it as a single comprehensive 
code and it just doesn’t work. And the court 
certainly doesn’t treat it like that. They’re 
saying “This is merely an embodiment of 
an existing principle that carries on anyway 
behind it”.’ [Q15]
 Yet some informants felt that compared to 
the UK transposition of certain measures 
in asylum law, especially the Qualifications 
Directive,143 the implementation of the CRD 
was a model of clarity and simplicity. Ironically, 
however, these implementation failings have 
led judges to revert to the directive itself, 
rather than use the national legislation, which 
is the opposite to the usual way of dealing 
with the area of free movement and citizens’ 
rights. Lack of familiarity with the EU treaties 
and the broader corpus of EU law and, the 
shifting nature of CJEU case law (e.g. from 
Ruiz Zambrano to McCarthy144) were also 
suggested by informants as reasons for 
uncertainty in decision-making.
66. The UKBA response expressed the view that 
there is concordance between EU law and 
national law, as Government believes that 
the CRD is correctly transposed by the EEA 
Regulations. This is a view not accepted by 
the majority of practitioners and NGOs we 
spoke to. However, the UKBA response did 
accept that EU law in this area is complex. The 
response also noted that ‘the complexity and 
multiplicity of ... judgments [of the UK courts 
and the CJEU] can mean that it is difficult to 
maintain a steady state in European policy.’ 
On the compatibility with EU law, the UKBA is 
clear:
‘The UK takes its obligations under EU 
law seriously. We are confident that the 
Regulations correctly implement the 
Directive. Directive 2004/38/EC sets out 
the rights of EU citizens to move and 
reside freely within the Union, but often in 
broad terms. The Immigration (European 
Economic Area) Regulations 2006 need to 
be more specific to be in-keeping with UK 
legislation and to provide guidance to UKBA 
caseworkers responsible for implementing 
and applying the provisions of the Directive.’
 This is clearly a responsible approach to 
take, and it was reflected also in the UKBA’s 
commitment that it is aware of the need for 
resources to be directed towards decision-
making.
67. It is worth amplifying that point, however, 
by reference to other published views of 
the UK Government: After the Metock case 
was decided,145 the UK made a largely 
unsuccessful attempt to persuade its fellow 
Member States to adopt a more restrictive 
approach to free movement generally 
including a wider interpretation of what 
constitutes an abuse of free movement rights. 
This took the form of a proposal for a set of 
Council conclusions presented in November 
143. Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees 
or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted OJ 2004 L304/12.
144. Case C- 34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-1177; Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] ECR I-3375.
145. Case C-127/08 Metock [2008] ECR I-6241.
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2008.146 In the event, the UK’s suggested 
conclusions were watered down into a very 
anodyne text adopted by the Council,147 a text 
which omitted some key words from the UK’s 
original proposal, in particular the view that 
‘only those exercising their rights in the spirit 
of the Treaty should benefit from freedom of 
movement’ (emphasis added).148
KEY FINDING 3: Internal system-level 
frictions represent a very significant 
challenge to an effective implementation 
of EU free movement law within the UK. 
These relate to the character of the two 
systems and the way in which rules are 
applied by decision-makers. Discussion 
of these aspects of friction led on to 
questions being raised about how the 
UKBA works, what resources it has and 
how it trains decision-makers, all as part 
and parcel of an administrative justice 
system, also involving the tribunal system.
68. Our legal analysis of the implementation of 
EU free movement law in the UK, combined 
with findings from stakeholder interviews, 
demonstrates that there are substantial 
internal system-level frictions between EU 
free movement law and UK immigration 
law although we accept that this is a position 
that the UKBA and the Home Office would 
be unlikely to agree with. By this we mean 
that there are problems that relate directly 
to the juxtaposition and – in some cases – 
intermingling of the two systems of EU free 
movement law and UK immigration law. From 
the perspective of UK practitioners and judges, 
the problems can arise not only in respect of 
issues within the UK system itself, in particular 
interpretations given by or on behalf of the 
UKBA, but also from EU law itself. We explored 
these issues in depth with our interviewees 
and their responses produced a wide range 
of aspects of system misfit which they felt 
impacted upon effective implementation, 
including resourcing issues, training, decision-
making and the operation of the administrative 
justice system more generally.
69. The differences between the two systems 
are very stark and have long been recognised 
at the highest judicial level. It has been 
clear since R v. Pieck149 in 1981 (a case 
referred from the UK courts to the CJEU) 
that ‘Community nationals’ must be treated 
differently to ‘ordinary’ aliens and allowed 
to enter without leave. The system of ‘leave’ 
at the point of entry has historically gone to 
the very heart of UK immigration law and the 
control of aliens. Lord Hoffmann, delivering 
the majority judgment in Remilien and Wolke 
in 1998 in the House of Lords (a much earlier 
skirmish in what we now understand to be the 
struggle over the right to reside test),150 put it 
thus:
‘[The Immigration Act 1971] contemplates 
that persons who are not British citizens will 
be entitled to be present here only if they 
have been given leave to enter and that 
their right to reside in the United Kingdom 
will be a consequence of the terms of that 
leave. The whole scheme relies upon the 
exercise of control at the frontier and is 
part of the explanation for the insistence 
of the United Kingdom in retaining such 
controls… The immigration controls of 
most European countries with land frontiers 
operate in a different way. Under their 
systems, the primary question is whether the 
non-citizen has a legal right to be present 
in the country, reside there, be employed or 
follow an occupation. His right to enter is a 
consequence of his having the right to be 
there rather than the other way round.’
146. See Council of the European Union, Note from the UK Delegation, Free movement of persons: abuses and substantive problems - Draft Council Conclusions, 
Doc. 15903/08, 18 November 2008.
147. Council Press Release, 16325/1/08 REV 1 (Presse 344), Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting, 27 and 28 November 2008 at 27.
148. See Draft Council Conclusions, above n.146. at 3.
149. Case 157/79 [1980] ECR 2179. See generally C. Vincenzi, ‘European Citizenship and Free Movement Rights in the United Kingdom’, [1995] Public Law 259.
150. Remilien v. Secretary of State for Social Security; Chief Adjudication Officer v. Wolke [1998] 1 All ER 129; [1997] 1 WLR 1640.
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 The point was recognized more recently by 
Judge Rowland in the Administrative Appeals 
Chamber of the Upper Tribunal as he wrestled 
with problems thrown up by the right to reside 
test:
‘Domestic immigration legislation does not 
expressly recognise the concept of a right of 
residence except in the 2006 Regulations, 
which implement Directive 2004/38/EC. 
However, leave to enter or remain, granted 
under the Immigration Act 1971, amounts 
to recognition of a right of residence. 
Unfortunately, the immigration authorities 
regard decisions under the 1971 Act as 
being matters of immigration “control”, not 
applicable to most European Union citizens 
who are free to enter the United Kingdom 
under regulation 11 of the 2006 Regulations. 
They do not seem to appreciate that, since 
2004 [when the right to reside test became 
applicable], it has been important for 
European Union citizens to have decisions 
that establish not merely a right to be present 
in the United Kingdom but also a right of 
residence and that decisions under the 
1971 Act are not concerned only with lawful 
presence but also with lawful residence.’151
70. The differences between UK immigration law 
and EU free movement law are even starker. 
As one practitioner respondent put it:
‘it’s difficult for a lot of lawyers and judges 
to get their head round how EU law works 
because it is just so different to the domestic 
rules and so it’s a completely different way 
of doing things. The starting points are 
different, so different.’ [Q16]
 In the first place, EU free movement law 
is rights-based, making it in some ways 
more similar to the immigration laws of 
other Member States as sketched by Lord 
Hoffmann, although the legal right to be 
present in the territory of a Member State 
stems from the Treaty not from a decision 
of a national authority. In addition, EU free 
movement law has generated a uniquely far-
reaching set of obligations on the Member 
States which they have had to incorporate 
into their domestic systems to treat nationals 
of other Member States in the same way as 
they treat their own citizens. This has given 
rise to both systemic challenges (especially 
for the UK) and constitutional challenges 
(for all Member States) because it muddies 
the traditional distinction between alien and 
citizen and interferes with traditional notions 
of control and security. Moreover, one of the 
most important features of the EU system 
is that the documents that Member States 
issue are in no way constitutive of the rights 
themselves. They are merely evidentiary. 
Rather the rights flow from the treaties, not 
from the outcome of any process which non-
national EU citizens must engage with vis-à-vis 
the host state in order to establish the right in 
question, and national authorities have very 
little discretion in the system, although they 
are entitled to check that the facts are as they 
are asserted by an EU citizen who wants, for 
example, a residence card for his or her third 
country national family member. This has 
consequences with regards to issues such 
as the burden of proof, and in our research 
was discussed by respondents in particular 
in the context of issues of sham marriage and 
alleged abuses of EU free movement rights. 
71. It was also widely accepted amongst 
practitioner respondents that the general 
tightening up of immigration law has had an 
impact. As one respondent put it:
‘The other thing that has happened is the 
immigration rules have become increasingly 
inflexible and increasingly constrictive as to 
what the criteria for qualification are.’ [Q17]
151. RM [2010] UKUT 00238 (AAC) at para. 15.
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 Another respondent inclined to a very 
negative perspective on how the complexity of 
immigration law intertwined with what s/he saw 
as a negative mindset in decision-makers:
‘I think it is fast-changing, it is complex. If 
there was [sic] a willingness to be a fair 
decision-maker, then it would have less of 
an effect that it is complex and fast moving 
because the legal representatives could 
explain the nub of the issue and could say 
“as you’ll see in such and such a case the 
position is now this.” Because you have 
complexity plus the ingrained suspicion plus 
the inclination to refuse applications which 
must be impacted on by the broader hostility 
to immigration then that’s what you get the 
situation, you’ve got a perfect storm.’ [Q18]
 We return in the next section to the question 
of how changing public perceptions of 
immigration issues are impacting upon the 
implementation of EU free movement rules in 
the UK.
72. The context of ‘normal’ immigration decision-
making for first tier judges undoubtedly also 
have an impact in the area of free movement. 
One respondent put it thus:
‘when you insert EU Law through … national 
implementing measures and you give those 
to immigration judges … who are used to 
saying “The rules are god”. They are used 
to looking it up in the rules and applying 
the rules because that’s what they do, you 
know, that’s what they’ve been doing since 
time immemorial and that’s what they do 
and literally there is a jurisdiction which says 
they’ve got to be in accordance with the 
law, they hardly ever remind themselves or 
are reminded of Section 2 of the European 
Communities Act which says if the rules 
aren’t up to it, chuck them out the window 
mate… It’s a mindset and thing and it puts a 
premium on the regulations.’ [Q19]
73. It was significant that some practitioner 
respondents felt that there was a degree 
of ‘seepage’ or ‘leakage’ between the 
two systems through the importation of 
immigration case reasoning into EU free 
movement cases by decision-makers 
and sometimes judges, with the result that 
tests or standards which were incorrect 
or inappropriate were applied where they 
should not be. One general concern which 
was expressed in a number of cases was a 
willingness to take into account a claimant’s 
poor immigration history, which in free 
movement cases cannot be used as the 
basis for exercising a discretion to refuse an 
application, but rather can only be relevant 
to an enquiry into the facts (e.g. does the 
claimant in fact enjoy the family life with the EU 
citizen which s/he claims?). Even so, a poor 
immigration history, a lack of ‘credibility’ (which 
is highly relevant in asylum decision-making) 
or indeed a generalised suspicion about the 
likelihood that the particular Member State’s 
documents are more often the subject of 
forgeries, are issues which have to be carefully 
applied when it comes to the free movement 
and rights of residence of EU citizens.152
74. Anecdotal evidence supplied by practitioner 
respondents indicates that this can be a 
problem for EU citizens with third country 
national partners or spouses:
‘The other situation is, both for the individual 
who doesn’t know that they’ve got EU rights, 
the [TCN] who’s in a durable relationship 
with a [non-national EU citizen] woman, 
they will just turn up on the door and arrest 
them even although the [EU citizen] is in 
bed with him when they arrived. There is 
no issue about “does this person have a 
right?” rather than “has this person proved 
that they have a right?” Because of the 
immigration system, the whole onus is on 
the individual to make out their claim rather 
152. See for example the negative publicity that Aer Lingus received when it insensitively applied a language test to a Greek passenger travelling with her family from 
Spain to Cork, where she was resident: see ‘A test just for Greek passengers’, Athens News, 16 March 2012, http://www.athensnews.gr/issue/13487/54165. 
Some press reports indicated that Aer Lingus had stated that ‘it had been enacting a directive from the United Kingdom Border Agency issued in early 2011 
that warned airlines about the increasing use of forged Greek passports by illegal immigrants in Spain and Portugal. The airline said the British agency supplied 
the tests, which asked a wide range of questions, including requests to sketch a ladder and a triangle’, see ‘Greek ‘language test’ protester wins free flights’, 
Ekathimerini, 18 March 2012, http://www.ekathimerini.com/4Dcgi/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1_1_18/03/2012_433460. 
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than it being for the immigration authorities 
to enquire to how long the couple have been 
living together and what the nature of their 
relationship is before detaining the Indian 
guy because obviously he might be in a 
durable relationship but their first reaction 
is “let’s detain him and if he’s in a durable 
relationship then presumably he can make 
an application”.’ [Q20]
75. There are also similar practitioner concerns 
about some aspects of judicial decision-
making. According to one practitioner:
‘If the judge is inclined ... to hold someone’s 
bad immigration history against them then 
they will be wanting to use those categories, 
that type of reasoning, even in a free 
movement case when it’s not appropriate. 
It’s not all judges by any means but there is 
[sic] a significant number of judges who will 
be inclined to refuse appeals. You find that 
in EU law just as strongly as you find it in 
immigration law.’ [Q21]
 The same respondent went on to suggest 
what s/he called a ‘seepage’ from the UKBA to 
the judiciary:
‘What’s disheartening is when you suspect 
some judges are not approaching things 
with an open mind. I talked about a seepage 
before, in the same ways there’s a bit of 
seepage of disbelief from asylum into 
immigration. I think there’s also a seepage 
of the culture of disbelief from the Border 
Agency into sections of the decision making 
in the tribunal. I don’t think it’s anything like 
as strong but it is there. You find it also in EU 
cases. That’s why I talked about questions 
of resistance; if a judge is inclined to decide 
in a certain way, they will be resistant to 
drawing conclusions which seem obvious 
from the evidence, or they will be resistant 
to accepting a legal decision is binding if 
they don’t want to implement it. That may be 
wrong in law, it may be possible to appeal 
them if you ever get to a higher court, but it is 
a factor in the first tier tribunal.’ [Q22]
 Another practitioner respondent reported 
similar problems in tribunal cases concerned 
with relationships between migrant EU citizens 
resident in the UK and non-EU citizens, and 
the rights of residence of the latter group in the 
UK:
‘So you’ll make your submissions and 
then you come out and [the judges have] 
rejected them for some credibility issue or 
something and the incredibility really is a 
mindset that they’ve got into from looking at 
the asylum appeals or from looking at some 
immigration cases where there’s dodgy 
documents coming in from a country where 
they do need to test the credibility of the 
relationship.’ [Q23]
76. This suggests that the approach to the abuse 
and fraud issues covered by the CRD and 
implemented into UK law owes more to 
experience in other areas of immigration law 
where sham marriages are under scrutiny, or 
to the relevance of the question of ‘credibility’ 
in the asylum field, than it does to the specific 
criteria applicable in EU law and the particular 
approach to basing decisions on facts 
demanded by EU law. For one practitioner, 
some members of the judiciary seem to have a 
‘mindset’ which makes it hard to separate out 
EU cases from immigration cases:
‘And so again you were finding these 
decisions being made where I think there’s 
just a sense that they can’t separate out the 
European cases from other cases. Maybe 
it’s just the mindset in which they’re always 
used to working. I don’t know if it’s that or if 
maybe there’s a feeling that they’re not harsh 
enough because they’re used to harsher 
rules. I don’t know if that’s behind some of 
the decisions.’ [Q24]
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 Judges have also recognised this 
phenomenon:
 ‘[it would be] some of the restrictive 
approaches within domestic immigration 
law, whether their sort of cold hand applies 
when it comes to looking at EU law and I 
think I wouldn’t rule out that has happened. 
You know I’ve seen immigration judge 
decisions dealing with for example things 
like the durable relationship category which I 
almost think is a sort of hangover from some 
approach to the primary purpose rule under 
immigration law twenty years ago.’ [Q25]
 Some practitioners seem to have a rather 
sanguine view of what is now the First Tier 
Tribunal:
‘Well first tier cases of immigration can 
resemble a sort of Western sometimes, 
somebody comes in the saloon and shoots 
from the hip, yes, you don’t really know 
who’s going to come into town. There is 
a bit more consistency over the years. 
The standard has risen in the immigration 
tribunals from when they were adjudicators. I 
think, there’s more consistency in the upper 
tribunal immigration and asylum chamber .... 
I know certainly they’ve come on enormously 
but they were always quite good at certain 
things but certainly they’ve developed 
consistency and a standard which I think 
is better than it was, you know certainly a 
demanding environment as an advocate.’ 
[Q26]
77. Indeed recent case law of the IAC (UT) will 
reassure observers that the Upper Tribunal 
is fully aware of the need to decide these 
types of borderline cases strictly on the EU 
issues. This is evident from Idezuna (EEA 
– permanent residence) Nigeria,153 where 
the Upper Tribunal’s determination made it 
clear that what the judge needs to focus on 
is the question whether first, the applicant 
had achieved the necessary five years of 
residence in the UK as the family member of 
an EEA citizen (including time before the CRD 
was passed or came into force154), without 
absences exceeding those permitted by the 
CRD, and whether second, the period which 
elapsed since that five year point had been 
achieved had itself not contained absences 
which would mean that the previously acquired 
right of permanent residence would lapse. In 
this case, the answers were respectively ‘yes’ 
and ‘no’, meaning that the UKBA should have 
issued the requested residence card and the 
judge in the First Tier Tribunal had erred in law. 
The problem arose in this case because the 
UKBA and the First Tier Tribunal both insisted 
on focusing on issues around the marriage 
and the marriage breakdown, plus the later 
conduct of the EEA citizen, which were 
irrelevant to the question whether the applicant 
had acquired a right of permanent residence. 
This comes from the way in which the UK 
system tends to construct the applicant’s 
case as an application for a particular status 
judged by reference to the conduct of the 
applicant (and his former spouse) on the 
date of application, rather than a process of 
recognising whether or not a right has been 
acquired and not subsequently lost, and thus 
whether the relevant confirmatory paperwork 
should be issued.
78. In like manner the Upper Tribunal (IAC) dealt 
briskly with the failings of an Entry Clearance 
Officer who was too keen to apply what 
amounted to the ‘ordinary’ rules on marriages 
of convenience to the case of a TCN spouse of 
an EEA citizen in Papajorgji.155 While accepting 
that Article 35 CRD allows Member States to 
adopt the necessary measures to deal with 
issues of fraud and abuse, including treating 
marriages of convenience as such, the tribunal 
insisted that there must be some evidence 
of abuse for the UKBA to raise before the 
applicant would be expected to show that his/
her marriage was not one of convenience. The 
particular issue in Papajorgji was the failure on 
153. [2011] UKUT 00474 (IAC).
154. Case C-162/09 Lassal [2010] ECR I-9217.
155. [2012] UKUT 00038 (IAC).
46
Getting to grips with EU citizenship:  
Understanding the friction between UK immigration law and EU free movement law
the part of the applicant to provide evidence of 
family life (e.g. family photographs) when she 
had not in fact been asked for this material. 
In any event, the tribunal was at pains to 
show that routinely requiring such material in 
an EEA case was not the right way forward, 
commenting negatively that:
‘The impression we have obtained from 
various parts of the ECO’s original reasons 
for the decision is that the ECO has applied 
a general policy of requiring applicants 
to prove that their marriage is not one of 
convenience, and in this context treats EEA 
applications in the same way as ordinary 
immigration applications under the Rule… 
We would emphasise that EEA rights of entry 
are not exercises of discretion generally 
afforded to Member States to formulate rules 
for the admission of aliens, but the exercise 
of Treaty rights to be recognised by states 
subject to the substantive and procedural 
provisions for preventing abuse and fraud.’156
 The extent of the burden on the applicant is 
to prove that he or she is a family member 
– i.e. by producing basic documents. This 
she had done and this represented the 
end of the obligations to be placed on the 
applicant, unless the ECO could find some 
substantive reason to suggest that there 
might be a marriage of convenience (e.g. it 
was contracted shortly before the application 
was made; the applicant was not living at the 
same address as the spouse, etc.). To help the 
UKBA for the future with its decision-making, 
the Tribunal reproduced in an Appendix to 
the determination the relevant parts of the 
Commission’s guidance on abuse and fraud, 
making it clear that the burden of proof is on 
the state.157
79. Common to many respondents were concerns 
about whether there are sufficient resources 
being put into the system to make it work 
properly because of the complexity of the rules 
to be applied. This is one of the issues, along 
with the question of training and whether 
decision-makers are applying the correct 
principles, which affect the quality of decision-
making at all levels. An advisor respondent 
accepted that advisors themselves also need 
to be more aware of EU issues, now that these 
represent, in some areas of welfare work, 
up to 25% of the total case load [Q27]. The 
same respondent also commented that where 
decision-making in some areas – e.g. applying 
the right to reside test in order to determine 
entitlement to benefits – is decentralised, there 
are often problems:
‘Because local authorities each have their 
own decision making teams, and tend to be 
a law unto themselves, we do see certain 
patterns of rogue decision making. You’ll 
get very odd decisions of the same nature 
springing up at local authorities at certain 
times, which seems to be they’ve got it into 
their heads that certain groups should be 
refused on this basis. Usually it’s very wrong 
headed thinking, but it’s a long process 
to get that changed. If possible, we want 
to avoid going down appeal routes; it’s 
time consuming for everybody and costly. 
Sometimes it can be effective that we just 
provide the advisor with the necessary 
references to the legislation or guidance…’ 
[Q28]
 Scottish respondents commented that there 
often seemed to be less familiarity with some 
of the key elements of EU free movement law, 
especially in the higher courts, in Scotland 
than in England, perhaps because there are 
fewer cases coming through the system. This 
can make the task of dealing with the relatively 
few cases that do come to trial even more 
challenging given the complex issues often 
raised.
156. Papajorgji, paras. 21 and 22.
157. Part 4 of COM(2009) 313, above n.69. To the list of recent Upper Tribunal (IAC) cases clarifying the law one can also add Sanade above n.130. on the impact of 
Ruiz Zambrano on foreign national prisoner cases and Barnett 2012] UKUT 00142 [IAC] on issues of documentation and Ewulo v. SSHD (effect of family permit 
– OFM) [2012] UKUT 00238(IAC) on the proper approach to assessing a residence permit application by an ‘other family member’.
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 Discussions of resources also led to some 
interesting speculations about the role 
of government officials in relation to free 
movement issues, an issue to which we will 
return in the conclusions:
‘Yes, there needs to be better resources. 
The irony is I quite regularly talk to people 
who work within the DWP whose job it is to 
encourage people to come to the UK from 
other EU countries. His job is actually to tell 
them that they have a right to come here, 
they have a right to claim benefits should 
their income be low or they’re out of work. 
Yet, the DWP doesn’t provide support for 
the decision makers who are making the 
decisions on those benefits.’ [Q29]
80. Aside from our interview data, it is also 
interesting that some practitioners have not 
hesitated to make their frustrations with the 
UKBA plain, through postings on the internet. 
In a comment on the recent case of Bee, 
where the Tribunal was happy to accept 
that a vaguely worded letter from the UKBA 
broadly rejecting the applicant’s contentions 
constituted an EEA decision for the purposes 
of appeal rights, one solicitor blog commented 
as follows:
The significance here is that the UKBA are 
very keen on rejecting perfectly correct EEA 
applications with a letter which says ‘this is 
not a decision’, but which often gives very 
detailed reasons why a person cannot get 
what they asked for. We have in various 
cases actually just decided to appeal these 
letters. This approach has been accepted by 
some Immigration Judges on the basis that 
the definition of ‘EEA decision’ has a pretty 
wide remit. Certainly writing on a bit of paper 
‘this is not a decision’ isn’t enough to deny 
the true character of the correspondence.
Appealing can have a lot of benefits. 
Often applying to the EEA team with any 
application that involves any complexity is 
like banging your head against a brick wall, 
with repeated rejections. An appeal is a 
chance to have an authoritative assessment 
of the issues and an Immigration Judge’s 
determination on whether the appellant has 
a right under the directive and corresponding 
regulations.158
81. Interestingly, the challenges posed by the 
interplay between domestic law and EU 
law were not felt by commentators to be 
exacerbated by the various sources of 
human rights protection that can be invoked 
in the same forum. CJEU reasoning in 
various citizenship cases has become more 
concerned with human rights arguments 
over time, especially those related to the 
right of family reunion, and the relationship 
between EU law and human rights protection 
is increasingly complex; a multiplicity of 
systems exist, including the EU Charter on 
Fundamental Rights, the prospect of future 
accession of the EU to the ECHR under Article 
6(2) TEU and Article 59(2) ECHR, and the 
ongoing binding force of the ECHR for the 
Member States themselves. Yet, unexpectedly, 
given the frequency at which the EU is wrongly 
held responsible in the media and popular 
consciousness for judgments of the Court of 
Human Rights (and sometimes vice versa), the 
legal complexity that human rights protection 
appears to involve, was not felt, by any 
interviewee, to be a source of friction in free 
movement cases or to be behind the friction 
between free movement and immigration 
law in the UK. One practitioner was clear that 
complications did not occur as a result of any 
confusion in the application of the ECHR or the 
conflation between the EU and the ECHR:
158. ‘New judgements from the Upper Tribunal’, 27 February 2013, http://www.mcgillandco.co.uk/Blog/2013/02/27/new-judgements-from-the-upper-tribunal/. 
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‘I wouldn’t say in the tribunal, it’s not 
something that I’ve come across. That would 
be a pretty crude mistake to make and it’s 
not one that I’ve seen the judges make. Not 
being sure what the principals of EU law is a 
totally different matter.’ [Q30]
 Where confusion does exist it is in the public 
perception, where one interviewee explained 
the difficulty from the public’s point of view of 
knowing the source of their rights, 
‘There is an overlap [with human rights], 
I would say, because you’ve got the 
convention rights on the right to family 
life. That for me is an overlap with the 
immigration rights of family members, 
there’s an overlap there and then and so 
people don’t do... I think most people are 
confused. Also the fact that they know that 
it’s the European Convention of Human 
Rights they automatically intrinsically think 
that is something that falls within the remit 
of the EU and obviously things are even 
more complicated now given we’ve got the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights the kind that 
incorporates... So I think there is an overlap 
between human rights and immigration 
rights, as a result there’s some kind of 
confusion in peoples’ minds as to the source 
of their rights.’ [Q31]
82. Familiarity with the instrument (i.e. the ECHR) 
is what lies behind the ease with which human 
rights decisions are executed by decision-
makers, according to some interviewees. 
The system and the reasoning are familiar 
and it is argued and applied with confidence. 
However looking to the future, the Charter on 
Fundamental Rights and its status in law may 
present challenges to decision makers until it 
becomes an understood and familiar tool:
‘I don’t know whether the Home Office have 
done anything on it, it is likely to be raised in 
the future and judges will have to work out 
when it applies and then work out whether 
it’s binding in a way which is different from 
the Human Rights Convention. I think there’s 
going to be a lot of potential for a lot of 
argument on the issue because I don’t think 
the terms are clear, the proliferation I think 
therefore could have a detrimental effect 
in some cases. My own expectations that 
people, that judges, will fall back for a long 
time to the Human Rights Convention or the 
Refugee Convention and it will be a long 
time before, and it could be ten, twenty years 
before the Fundamental Charter becomes 
the dominant legislation. I think it will take 
a very long time because there is already 
these established principles and established 
Conventions which want to actually, which 
people are more familiar with and therefore 
more confident in.’ [Q32]
83. Information about precisely how the UKBA 
works sometimes seemed scarce even 
for those who engaged with it regularly. It 
was interesting to note that while the UKBA 
informed us that the casework division is 
based in the immigration section of the UKBA, 
even amongst practitioners dealing regularly 
with the UKBA this fact did not necessarily 
seem well known:
‘The move of the European Directorate 
away from the immigration field to the 
nationality field within the structures of UKBA 
is very interesting because it really picks 
up again on this issue which I mentioned 
earlier about whether people are seen as 
co-citizens or as migrants. Obviously co-
citizens, the rights based issue, the equality 
issues and everything else are going to be 
much more stronger, much more prevalent. 
Now that’s only a recent development as 
far as I know. I’m not even sure how stable 
that arrangement is because there is so 
much change going on in UKBA so it might 
have been just a blip at one point but it’s 
a matter that the EU Directorate moved up 
to Liverpool and was therefore within the 
nationality, sort of .. and managers who were 
used to dealing with nationality issues. So I 
think there is a change, well there has been 
a change but it doesn’t fit in neatly anywhere 
because these are very big principles.’ [Q33]
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84. Some respondents expressed a fear that 
UKBA officials involved in policy-making 
relating to EEA cases are too heavily 
inculcated with a culture of immigration control 
because most of their previous careers have 
been spent in the latter area:
‘and because they spent large parts of 
their career in immigration rather than EU, 
they’ve been working in immigration for 15, 
20 years, it’d be very difficult for anyone with 
that background simply to say “we’re still in 
the immigration department, still in UKBA 
but now I need to take an entirely different 
approach because people are accepted.” 
Because people are conservative especially 
when they are going into something new that 
they’re not necessarily massively familiar 
with, they’ve then got to pick it up and they 
just carry the baggage of where they’ve 
been.’ [Q34]
 However, the same respondent also accepted 
that case workers do not have the same level 
of career mobility and so should in principle 
have had longer to develop a deep expertise 
with EU law.
85. Two particular criticisms of the UKBA surfaced 
during the research. These were that it 
sometimes used certain arguments – typically 
restrictive of the rights of EEA claimants – , 
especially before the UK courts with an 
awareness that these would be unlikely to hold 
once the case reached the CJEU. The second 
concerned issues of delay in responding to 
new challenges posed by case law in the 
CJEU, exemplified in particular by the UKBA 
response to the Metock case.159 As regards 
the first issue, the point is well explained by 
a practitioner respondent when asked about 
arguments that had been made by Counsel for 
UKBA:
‘What lies behind [these arguments] is 
what lies behind any argument led by an 
advocate on behalf of a client. The argument 
is designed to promote the policy interests of 
the client in a way which has some prospect 
of success for them. What is perhaps 
interesting from your point of view is that 
often Counsel’s opinion may well be, you 
are more likely than not to succeed in this 
argument in the domestic courts and when 
there’s a reference you are very likely to lose 
this argument. The government is often quite 
content to litigate a case on that basis. If you 
like, “get away with it as long as they can” 
would be one way of putting it, or “continuing 
to assert their different view of the effect of 
freedom of movement rights in Europe for as 
long as they can”.’ [Q35]
86. With respect to the issue of delay, above and 
beyond the delays in routine decision-making 
which have been highlighted elsewhere in this 
Report and which have also received negative 
attention, e.g. on the part of the European 
Parliament,160 a particular issue was thought 
to lie with the UKBA’s delay in implementing 
the Metock judgment of the CJEU, which 
addressed the issue of whether or not it was 
permissible for the UKBA, in common with 
the authorities of several other Member States 
including Ireland, to require that non-EEA 
citizen partners of EEA citizen residents in 
the UK must have resided with their partners 
in another Member State prior to moving to 
the UK. This additional condition, held by the 
CJEU in Metock to be impermissible, had 
been included in the EEA Regulations on the 
basis that they had been approved in the 
Akrich case161 and thus needed to be removed 
by amendment. This took a considerable 
time, and meanwhile practitioner respondents 
felt that there was stagnation in the UKBA 
decision-making processes. For example, one 
respondent told us:
159.  Case C-127/08 Metock [2008] ECR I-6241.
160. See above n.25.
161. See above n.95.
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So it was very difficult to get anything out of 
the Agency on Metock and it’s an ongoing 
battle with the Agency...saying to the Agency 
“You have to have from day one, as we did, 
a working reaction to it and you are sending 
your presenting officers into court, into the 
tribunal without a clear steer as to what they 
should say. They are standing up in different 
courts saying different things. That’s not their 
fault they’re being left to make it up as they 
go along but you are one body you need 
to speak with one voice on this. ... There 
isn’t anything you can do about it, you were 
wrong. This is the position; it’s very clear 
what should apply”. It was heel dragging...’ 
[Q36]
 Extrapolating more generally, the same 
respondent felt that the UKBA needed to do 
more to show that it would respond quickly to 
the exigencies of EU law:
‘You must give your presenting officers in 
court something to say. Really they ought all 
to be saying the same thing because you’re 
one department.” It’s an area where there 
is a very long way to go…… That ability 
to extrapolate from the particular to the 
general which is part of the rule of law and 
understanding of precedent isn’t there, it’s 
not there.’ [Q37]
87. In similar terms another practitioner 
respondent also highlighted the problem of 
‘delay’ or ‘drift’ as a serious one within the 
system, highlighting what s/he saw as an 
unsatisfactory response to the challenge of 
change:
‘I think where a court, whether it’s a UK 
court or a European judgment like Metock, 
where it says ‘no, you can’t do this’ then the 
default response of the border agency is to 
do nothing; to not make a policy for as long 
as possible and allow the decision making 
or the lack of decision making to drift until at 
some point somebody says ‘well, we have to 
come up with a policy’ or until they receive 
another court judgment which says ‘you 
really have to come up with a policy or stop 
making these types of unlawful decisions.’ 
Of their own volition, they’re very resistant 
to that and I think the same factors are at 
play when we talk about EU citizenship law, 
Zambrano...’ [Q38]
88. At the same time, this issue neatly illustrates 
the difficulties imported into the system 
by some of the rapid developments and 
complexities in CJEU case law and other EU 
law matters, a point explicitly introduced by the 
UKBA.162 In similar terms, practitioners – who 
until recently found that EU free movement 
related issues were a relatively small part 
of their practice – have also encountered 
difficulties getting to grips with its complexities:
‘It was an area which I ran away screaming 
from; if anybody asked me about it, I didn’t 
really know about it. It actually came up very 
rarely in my work.’ [Q39]
 While the Metock judgment could, with all 
respect to the UK government, have been 
anticipated and should not have been difficult 
to respond to (even if it was not welcome), 
there have been other recent decisions, 
notably in Ruiz Zambrano, McCarthy and 
Dereci,163 where the twists and turns of CJEU 
case law have placed huge strains on the 
system. As one judge commented:
‘It’s difficult when you look at the 
Luxembourg court decisions. Why 
sometimes do they take a completely 
teleological approach and other times a 
different approach. I mean it’s interesting in 
a recent judgment in McCarthy, they actually 
talk about the literal, the purposive and the 
teleological, actually talk about three different 
approaches.’ [Q40]
162. See paragraph 35.
163. Case C- 34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-1177; Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] ECR I-3375; Case C-256/11 Dereci, Heiml, Kokollari, Maduike and Stevic, 
15 November 2011.
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89. But as one practitioner commented this is just 
part and parcel of an administrative justice 
system:
‘Well that’s what happens when 
administrations get controlled by judgments 
but that’s part of the separation of powers 
and the application and interpretation of the 
law. For some reason they seem to find that 
difficult to grasp.’ [Q41]
 Yet this point may not be fully understood. One 
practitioner said that s/he felt that the niceties 
of the distinction between case law and statute 
law were not well understood through the 
UKBA and that
‘The UK Border Agency struggles with 
precedent, that it has had a role in shaping 
[the law].... You’re told you can’t do this in 
one case so you don’t do it in that case but 
you do it in another case and you have a 
go and that’s just a little bit of a failure to 
understand the rule of law.’ [Q42]
KEY FINDING 4: Problems of friction 
between the systems also stem 
from exogenous factors such as the 
politicisation of immigration and attitudes 
to the EU, media coverage of these 
issues, and the UK’s powerful ‘border 
identity’
90. In addition to asking them about how the two 
systems fitted together as legal/institutional 
systems, we also asked our respondents to 
give us their impressions about what types 
of exogenous factors might affect the 
effectiveness of the implementation of EU free 
movement rules in the UK.
91. A clear theme that emerged in many interviews 
concerned what one practitioner respondent 
called the government’s ‘headline oriented’ 
approach to immigration policy. The same 
respondent rather provocatively suggested 
that immigration policies are operated in such 
a way as to protect ministers:
‘Since the whole Charles Clarke thing about 
foreign national prisoners, the extent of 
which UK immigration policy has been driven 
to protect the Minister from any risk has been 
absolutely overwhelming.’ [Q43]
 On the other hand, such a view about 
approaches to immigration is quite widespread 
amongst immigration commentators more 
generally, and was expressed more than once 
in the context of reactions to the critical report 
of the House of Commons Select Committee 
on Home Affairs on UKBA performance issued 
at the beginning of April 2012.164 It should be 
noted that the Committee Chair was keen to 
reinforce, in media interviews, that this report 
was meant to deliver the message that the 
UKBA’s problems were operational (‘not fit for 
purpose’) not political.165
 Clearly, in such an atmosphere it will continue 
to be difficult for the UKBA to make dealing 
with EEA cases a very high priority, given the 
pressures they are under elsewhere within 
their portfolio of work. Another practitioner 
commented on:
‘…the political angle which is obviously 
always to drive numbers of migrants down 
and so those officials are often under 
pressure directly ... they’re often under direct 
political pressure from the minister who is 
concerned to get the result which will have 
the most beneficial effect on the numbers 
and particularly numbers who will then be 
able to access associated rights of being 
here by virtue of freedom of movement rights 
whether it’s access to housing or benefits or 
whatever else.’ [Q44]
92. This political concern was made abundantly 
clear with an intervention by the Secretary of 
State for Work and Pensions in the wake of 
the decision of the European Commission to 
bring an enforcement action against the UK in 
respect of the use of the ‘right to reside’ test 
as the basis for determining whether a person 
is habitually resident in the UK for purposes 
164. Work of the UK Border Agency (August–December 2011), Twenty-first Report of Session 2010–12, 11 April 2012, HC 1722.
165. See the interviews with the Rt. Hon Keith Vaz MP at http://www.itv.com/news/story/2012-04-11/uk-border-agency-under-fire/. 
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of claiming certain welfare benefits governed 
by the EU rules on the coordination of social 
security rules. Iain Duncan Smith’s arguments 
in the Daily Telegraph were, quite clearly, 
playing the ‘benefit tourism’ card: 166
‘The UK has no problem playing its part in 
supporting the free movement of labour in 
the EU. However, what the EU is now trying 
to do is get us to provide benefits for those 
who come to this country with no intention 
to work and no other means of supporting 
themselves, with the sole purpose of 
accessing a more generous benefit system.’
 The claim of benefit tourism has, however, 
been refuted by other commentators, and the 
figures presented by Duncan Smith have been 
contested for their basis in fact.167 Moreover, 
one respondent well versed in the operation 
of the UK benefits system suggested some 
scepticism as to whether so-called ‘benefit 
tourists’ were actually able to operate the 
benefit system to their advantage:
‘They’re always trying to stop the benefit 
tourist. I have to say I’ve never actually seen 
a benefit tourist. Maybe they don’t appeal. 
But they tried with habitual residence they 
clearly had not ever discovered what habitual 
residence meant and it came as a shock 
when people started to tell them. So they 
abandoned that in favour of this [i.e. the 
right to reside] and I suspect that in a few 
years they will decide that they have not 
ever understood this and as more cases 
come out of European Court I think they 
will become depressed in DWP and they 
will try to come up with some other device 
for controlling access for other nationals to 
benefit.’ [Q45]
93. One respondent connected the issue of 
delay in responses to some of the CJEU’s 
challenging decisions such as Metock and 
Ruiz Zambrano with the greater politicisation 
of immigration in current political debates and 
widespread euro-scepticism in the UK:
‘if you were an official in the Border Agency 
you’d be thinking ‘now we have to make 
a public statement about this’. When we 
come up with a policy which gives effect to 
what the law now says, how is this going to 
play politically? If you live in a country where 
Euro-scepticism is very important, especially 
with the Conservative-Lib coalition, where I 
think it’d be fair to say Euro-scepticism is a 
stronger feature; then that must be a factor 
which enhances their tendency to drag their 
heels and do nothing.’ [Q46]
 Another respondent widened the issue to 
cover press coverage of what is always 
termed ‘East European’ immigration168 since 
2004: 
‘It [media coverage] moved into EU law 
at the time, at the A8 transition. There was 
a big move then. Historically ... Britain’s 
first immigration act ever was called the 
Aliens Act 1905, the reasons the Aliens act 
1905 came into being was as a result of a 
Royal Commission which issued the report 
in 1899 about the massive influx of East 
European Jews into London and whether 
or not that would dilute English blood and 
dissipate English blood. The reason the 
Royal Commission was set up was because 
of a newspaper campaign run by a number 
of newspapers including the Daily Mail. 
<laughs> So nothing has changed in 107 
years.’ [Q47]
166. See I. Duncan Smith, Brussels poses serious threat to our welfare reforms, The Telegraph, 30 September 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/
immigration/8798443/Brussels-poses-serious-threat-to-our-welfare-reforms.html. 
167. See the analysis of the Channel 4 News Fact Check team: ‘Benefit Tourism Scare sent packing,’ 30 September 2011, http://blogs.channel4.com/factcheck/
factcheck-benefit-tourism-scare-sent-packing/8050 and G. O’Neill, ‘Did Two Million Eastern Europeans sign up for UK Benefits?’, 12 September 2011, http://
fullfact.org/blog/immigration_benefits_eastern_europe_daily_express-2967. See also, more recently after a further round of claims by politicians about the 
impact of Romanian and Bulgarian migrants upon benefits, F. Coco, ‘Migrants and benefits: let’s call the whole thing off?’, 25 March 2013,  http://fullfact.org/
factchecks/immigration_and_benefits-28846, citing, inter alia, research that shows that migrants (of all origins – EU or third country) are less likely to claim 
benefits than UK citizens, even when controlling for factors such as level of education, etc.
168. This is what it is universally termed, but geographically and geo-politically speaking, the vast majority of those who have taken advantage of EU free movement 
rules since 2004 have been from Central, or East Central Europe. A Google search (17 December 2012) of “East European Immigration” revealed 147,000 
documents on the internet, the vast majority of which seem to be concerned with the free movement of citizens of the EU from states which have joined the EU 
in 2004 and 2007 (with a small smattering of historical articles about immigration, especially of the Jews of Eastern Europe to the United States).
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94. Media coverage of EU free movement issues 
cuts across two areas (namely immigration 
issues and attitudes to the European Union) 
which received attention in the 2012 Leveson 
Report169 on the practices and ethics of 
the press. Lord Leveson felt that they were 
some of the areas ‘where parts of the press 
appeared to prioritise the title’s agenda over 
factual accuracy’.170 Plenty of examples of 
problematic and irresponsible coverage were 
brought to his attention during the course 
of the Inquiry by witnesses who submitted 
evidence in relation to both immigration 
and the EU, including some references to 
East Europeans as immigrants or asylum 
seekers.171 The Report comments negatively 
both upon sensationalist reporting that would 
tend to exacerbate community relations, 
e.g. between migrants and non-migrants 
or between different religious groups, and 
upon factually inaccurate reporting, all the 
while defending the right of those producing 
newspapers to express their own opinions 
freely. 
95. In conclusion, one respondent nicely captured 
the likely challenges that stem from having a 
highly permissive system of free movement 
law and an increasingly restrictive system of 
immigration law with a strong internal sense of 
‘border identity’ (paragraph 20) pointing out 
‘the big issues for the European Union which 
is that it’s after all an area which is actively 
promoting the crossing of frontiers and 
borders. The extent of which there is just a 
sheer conflict between that happening and 
the objectives of national immigration rules.’ 
[Q48]
 This is reflected in a gradual splintering of the 
consensus around EU free movement, which 
has focused on issues such as the failure to 
impose more restrictive transitional restrictions 
beyond the Workers Registration Scheme on 
citizens from the Member States which acceded 
in 2004 and the prospect of the termination of 
the transitional restrictions on access to the 
labour market for Romanian and Bulgarian 
citizens at the end of 2013. The Daily Telegraph 
reported this in terms of the prospects for a 
new immigration ‘surge’ from Eastern Europe172 
and a number of elected representatives of the 
Conservative Party have voiced their concerns 
about this aspect of EU free movement openly, 
especially in the context of a Westminster Hall 
debate in Parliament (exclusively attended 
by Conservative MPs).173 In fact, after flirting 
with the possibility of finding some basis 
for continuing the transitional restrictions, in 
November 2012 the UK Government confirmed 
that it was planning to lift the transitional 
measures on Bulgarian and Romanian citizens 
which have restricted their access to the 
labour market, as scheduled by the Accession 
Treaty.174 In addition, the UK embassies in 
Bucharest and Sofia commissioned and 
published a review of the literature and of 
relevant data by the National Institute for 
Economic and Social Research, inquiring as to 
what would be the likely impact of the removal 
of the transitional restrictions on labour market 
participation at the end of 2013 on the part of 
citizens of those states, providing a balanced 
review of the presence and absence of various 
push and pull factors in those states and in the 
UK.175 This provided an important corrective 
to some rather strident press coverage and 
exploitation of the issue by political parties such 
as the UK Independence Party.176
169. An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press, 29 November 2012, http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/ and http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/
document/hc1213/hc07/0780/0780.asp. 
170. See above n.169. at 687.
171. Above n.169. at 672.
172. ‘Britain facing new Eastern Europe immigration surge’, 21 October 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/9637967/Britain-facing-new-
eastern-Europe-immigration-surge.html.
173. See the reports on the Immigration Matters website in December 2012, http://www.immigrationmatters.co.uk/mp-warns-that-bulgarians-and-romanians-will-
flood-britain.html and http://www.immigrationmatters.co.uk/bulgarian-and-romanian-immigrants-the-uk-cannot-afford-euro-mp-claims.html. 
174. ‘UK will not extend Romania and Bulgaria migrant curbs’, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-20287061, 11 November 2012.
175. H. Rolfe et al, Potential impacts on the UK of future migration from Bulgaria and Romania, NIESR, 2013.
176. Ukip prepares to put fears over mass Romanian and Bulgarian immigration at heart of campaign strategy, The Independent, 14 January 2013, http://www.
independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/ukip-prepares-to-put-fears-over-mass-romanian-and-bulgarian-immigration-at-heart-of-campaign-strategy-8451447.html. 
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96. Even so, opposition to aspects of EU free 
movement is now firmly tied, at least in 
some people’s minds, to a broader anti-EU 
backlash, with calls for a referendum on 
the UK’s EU membership becoming ever 
louder.177 In other words, EU free movement 
now stands at the crossroads of two issues 
which are regarded as very significant for 
voters, according to many opinion polls: 
relations with the EU and immigration.178 
Sometimes this spills over into a wider hostility 
and into racism.179 Some commentators 
have highlighted that the fact that all the 
three largest parties acknowledge this fact 
in a rather uncomfortable way plays into the 
hands of UKIP, which plays on the fears of 
uncontrolled immigration and a sort of feral 
hostility to the EU as ‘foreign interference’.180 
But free movement issues are here to stay, 
for so long as the UK is part of the EU. As 
Open Europe make clear in a recent report,181 
opting out of free movement must necessarily 
involve leaving the EU. On the other hand, it 
is clear that these exogenous factors have the 
capacity to offset some of the gains in relation 
to an improved application of EU law at least 
at the Upper Tribunal level, in partnership with 
the CJEU, because of the increased sensitivity 
attaching to many issues of EU law.
177. A. Olad, ‘Tory MPs express fears about Romanian and Bulgarian migration to UK’, Migrants’ Rights Network Blog, 4 December 2012, http://www.migrantsrights.
org.uk/blog/2012/12/tory-mps-express-fears-about-romanian-and-bulgarian-migration-uk. For an example of UK Government reaction to these pressures, see 
the Review of the Balance of Competences between the European Union and the United Kingdom, CM 8415, July 2012, commissioned by the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office.
178. P. Kellner, ‘The perilous politics of immigration’, YouGov, 17 December 2012, http://yougov.co.uk/news/2012/12/17/perilous-politics-immigration/. 
179. See ‘No Eastern Europeans’, Warwickshire sign reads’, Daily Telegraph, 10 April 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/9983652/No-Eastern-Europeans-
Warwickshire-sign-reads.html. 
180. See A. Lazarowicz, ‘A dangerous UK consensus’, above n.15.
181. See Open Europe, Tread carefully: 
The impact and management of EU free movement and immigration policy, March 2012.
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Section 8: Conclusions and recommendations from 
the research 
do seem to arise in the EU context with the 
different types of challenges that the EU poses 
– i.e. not just the CRD and its implementation, 
but also treaty rights, the concept of EU 
citizenship, the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and the dynamic role of the CJEU. It 
is notable that the Administrative Justice and 
Tribunals Council (AJCT) report Right First Time 
noted high levels of appeals against UKBA 
decisions, but this failed to disaggregate 
between appeals against EEA decisions and 
other decisions.182 In its Report the Council 
has emphasised (and continues to emphasise 
to the UKBA in another context, namely 
its response to the UKBA consultation on 
family migration183) the importance of getting 
administrative decisions ‘right first time’, and 
to do that it is important for administrative 
authorities to publish clear guidance.
99. The AJCT in its Report provides a useful 
checklist of principles which could also be 
helpful for the UKBA in its EEA decision-
making, in view of the responses we have 
received from informants about the quality of 
its decision-making:184
•	 making	a	decision	or	delivering	a	service	to	the	
user fairly, quickly, accurately and effectively; 
•	 taking	into	account	the	relevant	and	sufficient	
evidence and circumstances of a particular 
case; 
•	 involving	the	user	and	keeping	the	user	
updated and informed during the process; 
•	 communicating	and	explaining	the	
decision or action to the user in a clear and 
understandable way, and informing them 
about their rights in relation to complaints, 
reviews, appeals or alternative dispute 
resolution; 
97. The primary objective of our research was not 
to develop a plan to try to ensure a smoother 
working of the interface between EU free 
movement law and UK immigration law. We 
did not want to invite a ‘blame game’ vis-à-vis 
the UK government, placing the question of 
whether UK law complies correctly with EU 
law or not at the centre of the enquiry. We 
wanted, initially, to identify a way of how we 
can understand those relationships between 
legal systems and legal institutions better, and 
to that end we have applied a mixed method 
incorporating both doctrinal legal research and 
also empirical methods based on stakeholder 
interviews. Our primary intention was that 
uncovering the hidden dimensions of those 
relationships would already be an important 
contribution, and would be one that might lead 
those responding to the research to reassess 
their own strategies or working practices. 
None the less, it has become apparent 
that in two dimensions conclusions and 
recommendations stemming from our findings 
could usefully be put forward for consideration:
•	 In	relation	to	enhancing	the	citizens’	
experience of free movement where it is 
currently being frustrated; and
•	 In	order	to	embed	a	culture	that	can	help	to	
overcome adversarial relationships that have 
developed between some actors and thereby 
to enhance legal certainty and to alleviate the 
scope for mutual misunderstandings.
98. As our respondents commented, in large 
measure the application of the system of EU 
free movement, as with other aspects of the 
immigration system, has to be seen as a wider 
part of an administrative justice system. Such 
a system will work well, in general, where there 
is a clear statutory framework, but problems 
182. June 2011, available from http://www.justice.gov.uk/ajtc/docs/AJTC_Right_first_time_web(7).pdf. 
183. Response of the AJCT to the paper ‘Family Migration – A Consultation’, 6 October 2011, available from http://ajtc.justice.gov.uk/docs/ajtc_family_migration_
consultation_final_response_(2).pdf. 
184. Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council Right First Time 2011 available at http://ajtc.justice.gov.uk/docs/AJTC_Right_first_time_web(7).pdf. 
56
Getting to grips with EU citizenship:  
Understanding the friction between UK immigration law and EU free movement law
•	 learning	from	feedback	or	complaints	about	
the service or appeals against decisions; 
•	 empowering	and	supporting	staff	through	
providing high quality guidance, training and 
mentoring.
 Implementing these suggestions should take 
the pressure off the tribunal system, and 
alleviate concerns about access to justice 
which have also arisen.
100. What emerged during the course of our 
research was evidence of an increasingly 
adversarial relationship developing between 
the UKBA and its ‘users’ in the sense of 
practitioner and advocacy stakeholders whom 
we interviewed which seems inimical to the 
types of principles articulated by the AJCT, 
as well as those who are seeking to bring 
claims based on EU law. This adversarial 
character has even been commented in 
some cases by the judiciary. In AB v. Home 
Office, a case where things went awry 
because of initial UKBA failures in the way 
that paperwork was sent out and subsequent 
UKBA intransigence in relation to what should 
have been a relatively straightforward case to 
decide, Salter J commented on the ‘unduly 
simplistic and adversarial approach to his 
task’ of the Home Office official.185 Such an 
adversarial relationship is not well suited to 
the task of fostering effective and constructive 
cooperation between the various parties 
involved. Even experienced practitioners 
seemed to be coming close to accusing the 
UKBA of displaying a lack of competence in 
its decision-making on EU free movement 
rules or, even worse, of bad faith. Without 
commenting on whether these views are 
justified or not, we none the less felt that it 
was important that they should be aired in 
our conclusions, and problems with decision-
making do indeed seem to be evidenced by 
the figures on successful appeals (paragraph 
13) and some of the case law reviewed above 
(e.g. in paragraph 77-78). One respondent 
pointed to the issue of culture, with a culture 
of suspicion crossing the internal borders 
of the UKBA first from the field of asylum 
decision-making to immigration decision-
making more generally, and then to the field of 
free movement decision-making:
‘That’s where I see the friction as taking 
place, that it comes from the culture that 
exists within the Home Office, the way that 
they treat immigration applications and 
decision making. That culture is strongest 
in the sphere of asylum. There’s long 
been the phrase ‘culture of suspicion’ or 
‘culture of disbelief’ and my experience as a 
practitioner is that more or less has moved 
over into non-asylum immigration decision 
making; anything to do with spouses, 
anything to do with family members .... If 
that’s the culture of the border agency then it 
would be strange if that didn’t carry over into 
EU decision making. I think the Home Office 
has tried on various occasions to apply the 
same approach to free movement law that it 
applies to UK law’. [Q49]
101. Perhaps more surprisingly, some practitioners 
seemed to take a similar view with respect to 
some members of the immigration judiciary:
‘I think, to be careful how I put it, a lot of 
immigration judges perceive themselves 
as being a sort of almost like a last line of 
defence so it’s very much keeping out the 
wrong people and letting in the right people 
and sometimes, it’s my perception that what 
the law says isn’t necessarily that interesting 
to immigration judges. Their view of who’s a 
right person and who’s a wrong person and 
some of the judgments of the ECJ, some 
of the provisions of the Citizens Directive 
are perceived by immigration judges to be 
more generous than they should be and to 
be potential routes for abuse and therefore 
immigration judges approach those kinds of 
cases with quite a degree of scrutiny.’ [Q50]
185. AB and MVC v. Home Office [2012] EWHC 226 (QB)  at para. 100.
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 At the same time, the same respondent 
accepted that this may well be a minority 
problem:
‘most [judges] have come to understand that 
EU law isn’t about right people and wrong 
people.’ [Q51]
 Even so, noting that there is no specific 
reference to EU issues in the title of the 
tribunal chambers that deal with immigration 
and asylum issues led one practitioner to 
remark:
‘It is an organisation that just doesn’t do 
what it says on the tin.’ [Q52]
 However, our own judgment and observation 
of the outputs from the UT (IAC) led us to 
take a much more positive view,186 and we 
thus felt that some of the comments that we 
received reflected a time lag between changes 
in judicial decision-making and perceptions 
amongst practitioners. We also felt that 
more cross-sitting between Chambers and 
cross-ticketing of cases, as is already being 
practised,187 could lead to improved decision-
making and awareness of the key issues. 
None the less, the fact that EU free movement 
issues do not have a titular ‘home’ in either 
the government/administrative structures or 
the UK’s judicial structures does highlight 
how much this issue seems to be submerged 
within the broader pool of immigration and 
asylum law and policy, and how rarely it seems 
to receive direct attention.
102. Good examples of this lack of direct and 
proper attention (through the medium of a 
total absence of discussion) can be found in 
the House of Commons Home Affairs Select 
Committee report on the UKBA188 and the 
UKBA’s own Business Plan 2011-2015.189 The 
absence of any discussion of EEA cases in this 
context raises the questions of how the UKBA 
can most effectively be held accountable for 
its work in this domain and also which body in 
the United Kingdom might wish to hold it so 
accountable.
103. In earlier years, when EU free movement rules 
were less in the public eye and less obviously 
contested than they are in the post-2004 EU, 
the situation where no one agency in the UK 
government had nominate responsibility for 
free movement issues and the associated 
human capital questions was perhaps not 
surprising. It certainly helped, in some ways, 
to keep this issue out of the public eye and 
perhaps this was in some ways a good thing 
because it reduced the level of conflict and 
politicisation. But our respondents themselves 
sometimes referred to the need for a more 
effective and cross-cutting decision-making 
framework for EU free movement issues, 
asking for 
‘some kind of departmental Government, 
cross departmental body which has the 
ability to look at these questions in context 
with their applications, in context with social 
systems, and documenting people, because 
with EU documents, we’re not talking about 
giving your document in order to confirm 
right of admission, they have a right of 
admission by operation of law.... . It might be 
more sensible to have a body that’s cross 
departmental and not basically UKBA and 
also so that the decisions are consistent.’ 
[Q53]
186. See the text accompanying n.155. and following.
187. E.g. Nimako-Boateng (residence orders - Anton considered) [2012] UKUT 00216 (IAC).
188. See above n.164.
189. UKBA Business Plan, April 2011-March 2015, available to download from http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/aboutus/uk-border-
agency-business-plan/. 
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104. The UKBA’s response, when asked to look 
positively towards the future is interesting, and 
fits well with our idea to give more visibility 
to EU citizenship issues, by focusing on the 
external EU dimension. It commented: 
‘The UK is already engaging with other 
Member States and the Commission to 
encourage a mature debate about free 
movement, the opportunities and the 
challenges. Better understanding of different 
positions and experiences and close 
collaboration mitigate against the emergence 
of ‘frictions’.’
105. We would suggest that the experience of EU 
free movement in the UK – both for incoming 
and for outgoing citizens – is undermined by 
its rather hidden nature. If not necessarily in 
relation to decision-making, but at least in 
relation to promoting the visibility and take 
up of rights, the institution of a single EU 
citizenship or free movement ‘champion’ to 
whom aggrieved citizens could turn and who 
would proactively promote awareness and 
take up of rights would be a useful initiative 
for Government to consider. Building on 
the experience with organisations that have 
specific responsibilities for human rights or 
anti-discrimination policy, even without such 
extensive powers, such an Ombudsman-
like office would have the capacity to raise 
a clear EU flag wherever decisions are 
being made on the free movement rules and 
the rights to which they give rise. Properly 
resourced, such an office would have the 
task of promoting a culture change in relation 
to how free movement is understood in the 
UK, emphasising those aspects which differ 
from immigration more generally (i.e. the 
key dimensions of a rights-based system 
premised on a notion of equal treatment) 
while accepting that some issues, e.g. around 
integration, may be shared between free 
movement and immigration more generally. 
The champion could assist in providing 
better quality information to those who seek 
to rely on free movement rights, and also 
facilitate coordination between departments 
of Government (e.g. in relation to the sharing 
of information about an applicant without 
prejudice to data protection rules). It could 
have a role to play in respect of both incoming 
and outgoing EU citizens, recognising the 
innate reciprocity of these principles in a 
common citizenship area. The office could 
also look closely at how immigration and free 
movement interact, assessing the claim put 
forward by some that there is a ‘seepage’ of 
immigration approaches (including a culture of 
permissions rather than a culture of rights) into 
the field of free movement. 
106. Combining the evidence of our interviews 
with stakeholders with the important insights 
drawn from the AJCT Right First Time report 
suggests that there are also important gaps 
in the information flow from the UKBA/EEA 
team to those who are seeking decisions 
under the EU rules. This is backed up by the 
rather high appeal rates and the success 
rates in those appeals. This suggests 
that money is being spent by the UKBA 
on litigation which could more usefully be 
directed towards improving first line decision-
making, or clarifying the information given 
to applicants and their legal advisors and 
advocates. Good guidance was credited 
by our interviewees as having a substantial 
impact on the speed, quality and consistency 
of decisions, and this point seemed to be 
demonstrated in the case law, and it was 
widely felt that this is one of the most effective 
and economically sounds mechanisms 
available to improve the experience of citizens 
and the quality of decisions. Judges in the 
Tribunal Service would also benefit from 
clearer communications and in particular a 
timely response by the UKBA to the challenges 
posed by new cases emerging from the CJEU. 
None of this, of course, militates against the 
need for continuous training and updating for 
all parties as EU law continues to evolve. As 
a first step, much clearer UKBA/Home Office 
website information should also be made 
available as this is usually the first point of 
contact for EU citizens wanting information 
about their rights.
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107. The task of exploiting existing mechanisms at 
the Tribunal level to improve the application of 
EU law has already begun. The Upper Tribunal 
has initiated a process of prioritising EU law 
related cases and are delivering judgments 
that provide clear reasoning and application 
of the rules and it is exploring mechanisms 
such as cross sitting between relevant 
chambers of the Tribunal to bring coherency 
to its decisions. The First Tier Tribunal will be 
challenged to complement this endeavour by 
providing more training to judges. The effort 
would be to increase the familiarity with EU 
law that judges feel and which currently only 
exists in small pockets of the rather extensive 
First Tier of the Tribunal. Moreover, looking to 
the future, both tiers of the Tribunal will need to 
make preparations for the possible impact of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights which may 
become a more regular dimension of litigation.
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A variety of methods of data collection and 
analysis were used in this research. In the first 
phase of our research, we reviewed extensively 
the relevant primary and secondary legal materials 
(cited in footnotes and in the list of principal 
sources) and we have also made extensive use 
of media coverage because this proved to be 
extremely helpful in isolating and characterizing 
the key areas of friction between the two legal 
systems. Using press materials also permitted 
us to respond to the changing legal and political 
climate as the research evolved. A selection 
of relevant media coverage has been brought 
together in a Springpad notebook.190
The structure of the research required us first 
to identify the key areas of friction and the legal 
issues which these raised, as we explained in 
Section 6. This was to give some structure to our 
interviews. We then combined this with a series 
of intuitions or hypotheses generated by the 
research team, as to what might be the causes 
or explanations of these areas of friction. We 
tested intuitions in semi-structured interviews with 
stakeholders, and our primary bank of research 
data from which much of this report is drawn 
is thus our body of 35 stakeholder interviews, 
reviewing and revising our intuitions as we 
proceeded, in line with the principles of empirical 
research based on grounded theory.191
A series of interviews were conducted with key 
stakeholders in the field of EU free movement law 
and UK immigration law throughout the UK and in 
Brussels, Belgium. Interviewees included
•	 UK	(i.e.	English	and	Scottish)	solicitors,	
barristers and advocates;
•	 Former	members	of	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	
European Union;
•	 UK	Judges	of	the	Upper	Tribunal	
(Administrative Appeals Chamber) and of both 
tiers of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber;
•	 Representatives	of	NGOs	and	think-tanks	in	
the UK and in Brussels;
•	 Stakeholders	within	the	European	institutions	
including officials at the European Commission 
and the European Free Trade Association 
Surveillance Authority.
Role No. of participants
Judge 8
Legal Practitioner 8
NGO Representative 9
European Institution
Representative
10
Officials and policy makers within the UK 
government (Home Office and United Kingdom 
Border Agency) were not available for interview 
but instead submitted written responses to a set of 
questions that the research team prepared (held 
on file).
In total thirty-five interviews were conducted 
between March 2011 and February 2012. The task 
of conducting the interviews was shared between 
the Research Team. Most of the interviews lasted 
approximately sixty minutes and were tape-
recorded. Interview transcripts were coded by the 
researchers and analysed with the help of NVivo, a 
qualitative data analysis programme. This analysis 
assisted us in bringing out the main themes 
around which Section 7 of the Report is organised.
A draft of the Report was circulated to those 
interested in attending a feedback meeting for 
interviewees and other interested stakeholders 
that was held at the Nuffield Foundation premises 
in London on 25 May 2012. Both oral feedback 
at the meeting and written reflections on the 
text circulated were taken into account in the 
completion of the final text. These feedback 
processes also constituted part of our data 
sources in so far as they allowed us to cross check 
our findings and conclusions.
Section 9: The methods used in this research and 
methodological issues
190. See http://sprng.me/hlql9. 
191. J. Corbin and A. Strauss, ‘Grounded Theory Research: Procedures, Canons and Evaluative Criteria’, (1990) 19 Zeitschrift für Soziologie 418-427.
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